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ABSTRACT  
 
Using data from Morningstar Principia CDs and employing standard 
methodologies, we examine the extent to which two mutual fund ratings: Morningstar 
star ratings and Morningstar stewardship grades can predict future fund performance. In 
particular, we investigate whether the combined predictive power of the two ratings 
exceeds that of a single rating. We decompose funds into various groups characterized by 
fund age and fund categories in order to address such issues as whether predictive 
performance is uniform across characteristic-based groups. Although our analysis shows 
that none of the ratings alone possesses strong predictive power, there is statistical 
evidence to support the notion that combined rating is superior to single rating in 
forecasting future returns. However, the evidence is not overwhelming enough to justify 
the efficacy of an investment strategy based primarily on Morningstar ratings. Besides 
studying predictability of ratings, we also construct a logistic regression model to seek 
potential determinants of the stewardship grades. We find that funds with good 
stewardship grades are generally those that incur low expenses, possess a large asset base 
and are managed by experienced fund managers. Finally, we investigate whether the two 
Morningstar ratings exhibit short-term persistence. Our findings indicate that the degree 
of persistence (as measured by the percentage of funds that retain their initial rating over 
a 12-month period) of the stewardship grades is much more pronounced than that of the 
star ratings.    
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Mutual funds are among the fastest growing and most successful financial 
innovations. In the past decades, the global mutual fund industry has flourished. As of the 
end of year 2006, there were a total of 61800 mutual funds managing assets worth more 
than 21 trillions of U.S. dollars. Even against the backdrop of financial turbulence 
following the emergence of the sub-prime crisis in mid-2007, the number of mutual funds 
worldwide had jumped to 66300, with the total assets managed increased to 26 trillions of 
U.S. dollars by the end of 2007 (See Mutual Funds Fact Book by Investment Company 
Institute (2008)). Apparently, the incessant growth of this booming business is not 
showing any sign of slowing down. A recent research report published by the Lipper 
Service
1 reveals that conventional US mutual fund
 industry attracted a total inflow of U.S. 
$51 billions in the month of September 2007 alone. Similar magnitudes of growth were 
also registered in other regional markets.  
 
The explosion of the number of mutual funds traded in the financial markets has 
left many investors scrambling to seek financial advisory services. Yet there are also a 
huge number of investors who prefer to take the responsibility of managing personal 
finance in their own hands. In order to make an informed investment decision, these 
investors have turned to salient and readily accessible fund information such as 
publicised fund reports and fund ratings for guidance. Debuted in 1985, the Morningstar 
star ratings awarded to mutual funds based on historical performance is probably the 
most popular and influential mutual fund ratings.   
 
 
                                                 
1 Lipper Services Research Series Fund Flow Report 30 September 2007 
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Indeed, the work by Goetzmann and Peles (1997), Sirri and Tufano (1998), Blake 
and Morey (2000) and Guercio and Tkac (2008) have all provided empirical evidence to 
support the assertion that mutual fund ratings have a significant impact on the trading 
behaviour of mutual fund investors. In particular, Guercio and Tkac (2008) report that 
when a fund receives the most prestigious five-star rating for the first time, significantly 
strong abnormal inflow is registered within six months from the initiation date.  
 
Leveraging on the success of the star rating and recognizing the importance of 
corporate governance to mutual fund investors, Morningstar launched in 2004 the 
fiduciary grades which was renamed the Morningstar stewardship grade in 2005. In 
contrast to the seasoned star rating, the young stewardship grading system evaluates 
funds by considering less tangible factors such as corporate culture of fund sponsors and 
the extent to which the investment style of fund managers may benefit investors in the 
long run.  A letter grade of A(best) to F(worst) will be assigned to funds under evaluation.  
 
The eruptions of U.S. mutual fund scandals in 2003 had aroused enormous public 
concern and precipitated the publication of a series of academic studies on the subject of 
mutual fund governance. The creation of this new fund-rating system can therefore be 
interpreted as nothing but a natural development in the fund rating business. The primary 
objective of this new rating is to help investors identify fund managements that take their 
fiduciary responsibilities seriously. 
 
The notion that fund governance matters for fund performance is supported by the 
work of many researchers, including Cremers, Driessen, Maenhout and Weinbaum 
(2005), Chen, Goldstein and Jiang  (2006), Ferris and Yan (2007), Khorana, Tufano and 
Wedge (2007) and Qian (2007). Ferris and Yan (2007) report that funds for which the 
independent directors receive huge compensation have a higher likelihood of being 
involved in fund scandals. Chen, Goldstein and Jiang  (2006) find that in the absence of 
other control mechanisms, directors tend to own shares in the funds that offer the highest 
expected benefits. Cremers, Driessen, Maenhout and Weinbaum (2005) discover a strong 
positive association between fund performance and directors’ stakes in the funds. Qian   3
(2006) document that investors’ ability to withdraw assets as a show of discontent or 
disapproval of the fund management is an effective fund-monitoring mechanism. 
 
The success of the Morningstar fund ratings has been a puzzle to some 
researchers since the standard finance paradigm suggests that publicly known information 
such as fund ratings cannot be exploited profitably. In order to investigate whether the 
star rating can actually offer some insights into the future performance of funds, many 
academics embark on a wide range of studies pertaining to Morningstar ratings. Blume 
(1998) examines Morningstar’s method of calculating fund rankings and finds that it 
suffers from a rounding-error bias. The error is caused by the conversion of the raw score 
representing a fund’s risk-adjusted return to the nearest integer which is then translated 
into the published star rating. For example, funds that receive scores of 3.2 and 3.4 both 
receive a 3-star rating while funds scoring 3.5 and 3.9 are awarded a 4-star rating. Sharpe 
(1998) reports statistical artifacts inherent in the Morningstar’s methodology.  
 
Blake and Morey (2000) evaluate the ability of the star rating to forecast future 
performance. They find that there is little statistical evidence indicating that 5-star funds 
gain higher future returns than funds with 3-star or 4-star rating, although poor-rated 
funds continue to suffer dismal performance over a one, three and five post-rating period. 
Both Khorana and Nelling (1998) and Warshawsky, DiCarlantonio and Mullan (2000) 
focus on the persistence of the 4-star and 5-star ratings. Their results indicate that the 
degree of persistence varies across age groups and time horizons. Older funds are likely 
to show higher persistence. Morey (2002) detects the presence of age bias which is not a 
consequence of survivorship bias, but rather, of the Morningstar methodology. Age bias 
results in seasoned funds receiving higher average ratings than younger funds.  
 
Unlike the star rating, the stewardship grade has not captured much attention 
within the research community.  Hitherto, the work by Wellman and Zhou (2007) is 
probably the only attempt to study the stewardship grade in substantial detail.  Despite 
their effort, many important issues have yet to be explored. For example, while Wellman 
and Zhou (2007) have obtained statistical evidence to support the contention that the   4
trading behaviour of mutual fund investors is influenced by changes in stewardship 
grades, the question of whether funds with good stewardship grades necessarily yield 
superior ex-post performance has not been properly addressed. This question is an 
important one as it can help explain the phenomenon of huge abnormal fund flows 
following fund rating changes. Furthermore, with two ratings now at our disposal, it is 
natural to examine statistically the degree to which the rating pair can jointly predict 
future performance. It is also meaningful and instructive to investigate whether joint 
predictive ability is stronger than when any one of the ratings is considered in isolation. 
In this dissertation, we aim to explore these issues. Besides predictive ability, we also 
seek potential determinants of the stewardship grades and investigate whether the 
stewardship grades exhibit short-term persistence. 
 
The results of our studies should have important economic significance to 
investors who intend to use the fund ratings in one way or another to construct their 
investment plan. If it turns out that both persistence and predictive ability of high-rated 
funds are supported by sound statistical evidence, then investors can consider adopting 
the strategy of buying and holding a portfolio of funds with top ratings. Otherwise, 
investors should consider factors beyond fund ratings in making their investment 
decisions. 
 
This dissertation has contributed to the literature in at least two ways. First, we 
make the first attempt to compare the stewardship grade with the star rating in several 
aspects. Since Morningstar claims that the two ratings are independent of each other, our 
study helps to examine the extent to which the claim is valid. Second, our study of the 
joint predictive power of the two ratings is also unprecedented. Evidence from various 
academic works that focus on fund flows pattern in relation to fund ratings have revealed 
that many mutual fund investors are ardent supporters of the Morningstar star ratings. 
Our empirical work on joint ratings in this direction can help to shed some light on the 
question of whether investors will be better off by investing in funds that fare excellently 
in not just one, but both ratings. 
   5
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents in detail 
the methodologies for both the star rating and the stewardship grade. Chapter 3 describes 
the data and methodology used in this dissertation. Chapter 4 examines the results and 
provides relevant economic insights.  Chapter 5 concludes this dissertation and offers 
suggestions for further research. Throughout this dissertation, we shall refer to 
Morningstar fund ratings as both Morningstar star rating and Morningstar stewardship 
grade. 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   6
 
 
Chapter Two     
 
Star Ratings and Stewardship Grades 
 
2.1  Methodology For Star Ratings 
 
The Morningstar fund rating has increasingly become one of the most popular and 
influential mutual funds ratings. It has been widely used by mutual fund distributors such 
as commercial banks, financial advisory firms and life insurance companies as an 
advertising tool. The first Morningstar ratings were available to the public via 
subscription to its publications Morningstar Mutual Funds. Morningstar evaluates almost 
all existing funds which are at least three years old. Funds are first classified into 
categories. Prior to the revision of the Morningstar methodology in 2002,  there were four 
broad categories for mutual funds: Domestic Stock, International Stock, Municipal Bond 
and Taxable Bond. After the revision, Morningstar increased the number of categories to 
sixty four
2, grouping each fund into a more narrowly-defined peer group and thus 
facilitating a more effective comparison of funds.  
 
A fund’s star rating is derived from its historical performance, taking into account 
both its risk and return within its own category. To determine a fund’s star rating, 
Morningstar first calculates the Morningstar risk-adjusted return, MRART (T = 3, 5 or 10) 
based on the fund’s past 3, 5 and 10-year returns, where applicable.  
 
We now elaborate on how the formula for MRART is derived. First, based on data 
on the fund’s monthly returns {rt : t = 1, 2, …, 12T} over the past T years, the fund’s 
cumulative return RT, given by  
                                                 
2 See Appendix A   7






  


 


  

1 ) 1 ( 100 R
12
1
T
T
t
t r      (2.1) 
is computed. In addition, the corresponding T-year cumulative risk-free return, Rf, based 
on monthly T-bill rates { rft : t = 1, 2, …, 12T} over the same period is determined. The 
load-adjusted return, LAR, of the fund is then computed according to the formula  
LAR =  f T R )
100
L
(1 R        ( 2 . 2 )  
 
where L is the front-end load. For example, if the front end load is 5%, LAR = 0.95RT – 
Rf. Denoting the average LAR of all funds in the same category by AvgLAR, the 
Morningstar load-adjusted return rate (MLARate) of the fund is defined by 
 
MLARRate
) R   , max(AvgLAR
LAR
f
 .    (2.3) 
 
Next, the Morningstar risk MRisk of the fund, given by the following formula, is 
calculated. 
 
MRisk =  

 
12T
1 t
ft t ,0) r min(r
12T
1
.    (2.4) 
 
The Morningstar risk rate MRiskRate is then determined according to the formula 
 
MRiskRate = 
AvgMRisk
MRisk
     (2.5) 
 
where AvgMRisk is the average of MRisk of all funds within the same category. 
Finally, the Morningstar risk-adjusted return, MRART of the fund is given by 
 
MRART = MLARRate – MRiskRate     (2.6) 
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Funds within each investment category are then ranked based on their MRART. A star 
rating SRT, for the fund’s T-year past performance, is then determined according to the 
following rules: 
(i)  Funds in the top ten percent receive 5 stars. 
(ii)  Funds in next 22.5% receive 4 stars. 
(iii)  Funds in the middle 35% receive 3-stars. 
(iv)  Funds in the next 22.5% receive 2 stars. 
(v)  Funds in bottom 10% receive 1 star. 
 
Finally, the overall star rating, MS is the greatest integer less than or equal to the 
MSScore given by the function 
 





  
 
returns   of   years   10   has   fund   if       SR   2 . 0 SR   3 . 0 SR   0.5
  returns   of   years   10 - 5   has   fund   if                          SR   4 . 0 SR   0.6
returns   of   years   5 - 3   has   fund   if                                                  SR
MSScore
3 5 10
3 5
3
(2.7) 
 
provided MSScore does not end in 0.5, in which case the score will be rounded up to the 
next integer. As an illustration, a fund that receives 4 stars for each of its 3-year and 5-
year  assessments and 5 star for its 10-year assessment will get MSScore = 4.5 and hence 
an overall rating of 5-star. 
 
    
2.2  Methodology For Stewardship Grades 
 
Launched by Morningstar in 2004, the fiduciary grade was engineered to serve as 
a barometer for the standard of corporate governance of mutual funds. It was renamed the 
Morningstar stewardship grade in 2005. The first set of stewardship grades was released 
in August 2004. Going beyond the usual risk and returns assessment, the stewardship 
grade attempts to capture some of the intangibles such as the degree in which potential 
conflicts of interests of the fund management company might affect shareholders and the 
investment culture of portfolio managers.   9
The Morningstar stewardship grade is calculated based on five Stewardship 
components:  
(i)  Board Quality (BQ),  
(ii)  Corporate Culture (CC),  
(iii) Fees  (Fees),   
(iv)  Manager Incentives (MI)  
(v)  Regulatory Issues (RI).   
 
To derive the final stewardship grade, Morningstar computes a score for each of these 
criteria. Prior to 2007, each criterion carried a maximum score of 2 points. For 
Regulatory Issues, the lowest possible score was -2. For each of the other four criteria, 
the minimum score was 0. Based on these scores, a qualitative grade published in 
Morningstar Fund Reports would be assigned according to Table 1 below: 
 
 Table 1   Qualitative Grade For Stewardship components (Prior to July 2007) 
Score Qualitative  Grade 
2.0 Excellent 
1.5 Good 
1 Fair 
0.5 Poor 
<= 0  Very Poor 
 
The sum of the scores assigned to these five criteria was used to determine the overall 
stewardship grade as outlined in Table 2. 
 
      Table 2   Qualitative Grade For Overall Stewardship Grade 
Score Stewardship  Score 
9 – 10  A 
7 - 8.5  B 
5 - 6.5  C 
3 - 4.5  D 
<= 2.5  F   10
Since July 2007, a few changes had been made. First, the maximum score for 
Corporate Culture was increased to 4 in 2007, reflecting Morningstar’s belief that 
corporate culture is, among the five criteria, the most effective means of measuring fund 
governance. Second, the range of points to be assigned to Regulatory Issues was changed 
to -2 –  0. Finally, each component score was translated into qualitative terms: 
 
    Table 3   Qualitative Grade For Stewardship components (In and after July 2007) 
Score Letter  Grade 
Full credit  Excellent 
¾ credit  Good 
½ credit  Fair 
¼ credit  Poor 
No credit  Very Poor 
 
We now briefly outline the important features of the five Stewardship components 
for the sake of subsequent discussion. What we present here are methodologies used prior 
to the revamp mentioned above. The reason for our choice is that we use the 2005 
Morningstar data in this dissertation.  More details on the changes in methodologies 
which were effective on and after July 2007 can be obtained from the Morningstar Fact 
sheets, Morningstar (2007) available on the official website of Morningstar. 
 
Board Quality 
The following four factors for board quality, each worth up to 0.5 point, will be examined: 
 
(i)  Does the board act consistently to protect the interests of shareholders.  
Examples of positive action taken by the board include dismissing or replacing 
underperforming fund managers and disapproving attempt by fund management to merge 
poor-performing funds with more successful funds. 
 
Ding and Wermers (2005) document evidence supporting the hypothesis that the 
replacement of fund managers is beneficial to shareholders. It is found that on the   11
average, fund managers who are replaced by board directors underperform their peers, 
and that incoming managers outperform those replaced by one percentage point per year.   
 
(ii)  Do independent directors have significant investments in the funds?  
The highest score of 0.5 point can be earned if at least 75% of a board’s directors 
invest in the funds they oversee with an amount exceeding his/her aggregate annual 
compensation for serving on a board. 
 
Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2006) and Cremers, Driessen, Maenhout and Weinbaum 
(2005) have independently examined director ownership in funds. The former group of 
authors report that the optimal contracting hypothesis holds: in the absence of other 
control mechanisms, directors tend to own shares in the funds that offer high expected 
benefits. Indeed, directors are found to hold more shares in actively managed funds such 
as small-cap equity funds than in, for example, bond funds. The latter find that there 
exists a strong positive association between fund performance and directors’ stakes in the 
funds. 
 
(iii)  Is a board overseeing too many funds to the extent that its ability to protect 
shareholders’ interest will be compromised? 
 
Ferris and Yan (2007) show that directors who oversee many funds have a higher chance 
of being implicated in a fund scandal. Their results support Morningstar’s view that 
board’s effectiveness would be adversely affected by “over-burdened” directors. 
 
(iv)  Does the fund meet the requirement of the Security and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) that at least 75% of the board’s directors are independent?  
 
Morningstar does not consider current and former employees as well as family members 
of both fund company and fund services providers to be independent. The belief that 
board independence is positive for fund performance is affirmed by Khorana (1996) who 
demonstrates that the degree of independence of a fund’s board has a positive association   12
with the quality of fund governance. It is found that underperforming managers are more 
likely to be replaced when the board has a higher proportion of independent directors.  
 
Corporate Culture 
For this component, Morningstar considers a wide spectrum of factors. 
(i)  Has the fund management company launched “trendy” funds just to chalk up 
assets, regardless of whether the timing to launch such funds is appropriate? For 
example, many funds that were narrowly-focused on technology stocks were 
launched during the time when the technology sector was at the verge of collapse. 
Indeed, the bubble burst in 2001, causing many investors to suffer heavy losses. 
 
(ii)  Has the fund management company closed funds at an appropriate asset size or 
has it allowed the size to reach an unacceptable level. This question is crucial 
because it is difficult to manage a fund with a huge asset base effectively and 
profitably. Fund managers might be forced, due to liquidity and other 
consideration, to take large positions in stocks which might not offer the best 
potential returns. Chen, Hong, Huang and Kubik (2004) find strong evidence that 
fund size erodes fund performance. Furthermore, the adverse effect that fund size 
has on fund returns is most pronounced for funds that invest in illiquid assets such 
as stocks having small capitalization, thus suggesting that liquidity concerns could 
in part explain this effect. As part of fund managers’ compensation is derived 
from management fees which are in turn a fraction of the asset size of the fund, 
unscrupulous fund managers might want to continue growing the size of their 
fund’s  fund asset base to reap higher monetary gains.  
 
(iii)  Does the fund implement measures such as high back-end loads to discourage 
frequent redemption of funds? 
 
(iv)  Does the firm communicate effectively with shareholders? For example, the 
management is expected to produce comprehensive publications such as updated   13
fund fact sheets and portfolio managers’ reports for all shareholders on a regular 
basis.  
 
(v)  Has the firm used soft dollars which are payments made to the fund service 
providers? Soft dollars are incorporated into brokerage fees which will neither be 
reported nor included in the calculation of fund’s expense ratio. Control on the 
use of soft dollars benefits shareholders. Funds paying high soft dollar 
commissions will be penalised. 
 
Fees 
Mutual fund investors pay various levels of fees. Fees related to distribution and 
redemption, commonly known as front-end loads, or sales charges, are paid at the time of 
transaction. Back-end loads or redemption fees are paid when investors sell the fund. 
Management fees are paid on a regular (usually annual) basis via direct deduction from 
the funds’ assets. Funds can come in various share classes
3. Although all classes hold the 
same securities and are managed by the same portfolio manager, they have different fees 
structure. In addition, as mentioned in the preceding paragraph, fund sponsors make soft 
dollar arrangement in which fund managers pay higher brokerage commissions to 
research and brokerage services, incurring another layer of fees for shareholders. 
Morningstar evaluates funds based on two aspects of the fees structure, each worth 1 
point.  
 
(i)  One aspect is Fees Comparison. A fund receives 0.5 points if its expense ratio is 
lower than the median expense ratio of all funds within the same category group 
and having the same share class
3. An additional 0.5 points is awarded to funds 
having an expense ratio within the lowest 25
th percentile. 
 
(ii)  The other aspect is Fees Trends. A fund receives 1 point if its expense ratio 
decreases as its assets grows, or if there is evidence indicating that the fund 
managers will lower the expense ratio when the fund size increases. Funds that 
                                                 
3 See Appendix B   14
charge additional fees such as performance fees, typically a fraction of excess 
returns over a certain benchmark,  will be viewed less favorably by Morningstar 
and hence tend to receive lower score. 
 
Manager Incentives  
Two aspects, each worth 1 point, will be evaluated: 
 
(i)  The first aspect is Fund Ownership. Does a portfolio manager invest a significant 
amount of money in the fund he oversees?  
Managers with at least U.S. $1 million or at least one third of their liquid net 
worth, whichever is lower, invested in their funds will be given 1 point. For 
investment of U.S. $500,000 – U.S. $1 million, managers receive 0.5 points. In 
cases where the fund size is small, fund managers can invest in other funds of the 
same firm to earn partial credit. As of 2005, fund managers of US mutual funds 
are required to disclose the amount (in U.S. dollars) of their wealth invested in the 
fund they manage, in the following seven ranges: 
(i)  0,  
(ii)  1-10,000,  
(iii)  10,001-50,000,  
(iv)  50,001-100,000,  
(v)  100,001-500,000,  
(vi)  500,000-1,000,000  
(vii)  above 1,000,000. 
 
The above disclosure requirement is one of the series of new regulations enacted 
by the Security Exchange and Commisions in 2004 in response to fund scandals 
discovered then.  
Fund ownership, according to a recent work by Khorana, Servaes and Wedge 
(2007), is positively correlated to the risk-adjusted returns of funds, with fund 
performance improving by as much as three basis points for each basis point 
increase in managerial ownership. The results of their work support the notion   15
that managerial ownership gives managers more incentives to generate higher 
returns for fund’s shareholders, and is an important determinant of fund 
performance. Hence, disclosure on the level of managerial ownership offers 
investors valuable information to shareholders. 
 
(ii)  Does the compensation scheme reward portfolio manager based on long-term 
performance or short-term asset appreciation? Funds with incentives geared 
towards short-term growth will be viewed less favourably, and hence given lower 
score. Conversely, funds whose managers are compensated based on long-term 
fund performance instead of asset growth will generally receive higher rating.  
 
Morningstar instructs fund companies to complete a survey which details the 
compensation structure of their fund managers as well the level of their 
investment in the funds they manage. Morningstar believes that fund managers’ 
incentives have a strong influence on the quality of management. A fund manager 
whose compensation is tied to short-term out-performance of its benchmark (e.g. 
performance fees) will have a tendency to take excessive risk, as documented in 
Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) 
 
 
Regulatory Issues  
 
At the point of assessment, Morningstar examines regulatory issues at the fund 
management level over its past three years of history. Funds found with severe breaches 
of certain regulations might get the lowest score of -2. Funds free from regulatory 
violations or potential fund indictments receive the highest score of 2. Funds found to 
have breached certain rules but have remedial actions in place will get a score between -2 
and 2, depending on their level of commitment to reform. 
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2.3  The Effects and Defects of Morningstar Ratings 
 
It is almost indisputable that the Morningstar star rating is popular and influential 
among mutual fund investors. Evidence that supports this claim can be found not only in 
high-profile business press such as the Wall-street Journal and Business Week, but also in 
numerous academic journals. Many recent scholarly works are devoted to an examination 
of the degree to which the star rating can affect investor’s decision. Guercio and Tkac 
(2008) launch a very detailed study on how fund ratings affect fund flows. They find that 
the initiation of a 5-star rating of funds results in a spectacular 53% abnormal cash inflow. 
Furthermore, significant abnormal flow in the right direction (positive for upgrades and 
negative for downgrades) is detected for various rating changes.  
 
In the same vein, Wellman and Zhou (2007) make an unprecedented effort to 
examine, among other issues, the influence Morningstar stewardship grade has on fund 
flows. Using the first release of the stewardship grades dated August 24 2004, they 
examine flows patterns following a stewardship grade upgrade or downgrade of funds. 
The results seem to indicate that investors trade funds in response to these events, selling 
funds with poor grades and buying those with good grades. 
 
Blake and Morey (2000) examine the effectiveness of the star rating as a predictor 
of future fund performance. Their results show that while poor-rated funds generally 
show weaker future performance than do funds with better ratings, there is only weak 
statistical evidence indicating that good-rated funds have superior ex-post performance.  
 
Morey (2005) studies the potential effect that the initiation of a five-star rating has 
on the future fund performance and fund characteristics such as expense ratio and 
turnover ratio. Using standard performance metrics to measure out-of-sample 
performance, Morey (2005) reports that the performance of winning funds falls 
dramatically over a three-year post-rating period and that the risk level of the funds rises 
significantly, though expense ratio and turn over ratio do not change notably. This result, 
which is consistent with those reported in Blake and Morey (2000), can be seen as partly   17
supporting the tournament hypothesis that fund managers are competing with one another 
to emerge winners under the star rating system. 
 
The popularity of the star rating has prompted some researchers to explore 
potential shortcomings underlying the star rating methodology. Morey (2002) discovers 
that the rounding method by which the overall fund star rating is derived from the three-
year, five-year and ten-year ratings creates an asymmetry in ranking. We recall that the 
overall star rating of a fund with more than ten years of history is derived from a 
weighted sum of a fund’s three-year, five-year and ten-year ratings.  Morey (2000) 
reports that for seasoned funds (funds with ten or more years in age), a downgrade by one 
to two points in their three-year Morningstar rating does not make any difference to the 
overall rating in certain cases. For example, if a fund receives 4-star and 5-star for its 
five-year and ten-year ratings respectively, then the overall rating is 4-star regardless of 
whether the three-year rating is 1, 2 or 3; similarly, the overall rating is unaffected by 
change of rating from 4-star to 5-star or vice versa. We illustrate this point with the aid of 
additional examples in Table  4. This suggests that the recent performance of a fund does 
not have much influence on the overall rating, resulting in seasoned funds with good 
long-term historical performance to continue enjoying good ratings despite their poor 
performance over a shorter pre-evaluation period. 
 
Table 4  Illustration of Effect of 3-year rating Change On Overall Rating of 
Seasoned Funds 
Ten-year 
rating 
Five-year 
rating 
Three-year 
rating 
Overall star 
rating 
5 4  1  4 
5 4  2  4 
5 4  3  4 
5 4  4  5 
5 4  5  5 
5 5  1  4 
5 5  2  4 
5 5  3  5 
5 5  3  5 
5 5  5  5 
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We also find that the distribution of overall star ratings of seasoned funds has a 
bias towards higher ratings. Taking all 125 possible triples (SR3, SR5, SR10) representing 
a fund’s three-year, five-year and 10-year ratings, we calculate the fund’s overall rating 
and display the frequency distribution in Table 5 below. Assuming it is equally likely for 
a fund to receive any of the 125 triples, the Morningstar’s method of calculating the 
overall rating results in a small likelihood of funds getting either the worst rating or the 
best rating. 
 
Table 5   Distribution of Possible Overall Star Ratings of Seasoned Funds 
Overall Star Rating  Frequency 
1 1 
2 18 
3 46 
4 44 
5 16 
 
Blume (1998), Morey (2002) and Adkisson, Fraser and Don (2005) also 
demonstrate the presence of age bias the Morningstar star rating. Their studies 
unanimously reveal that young (three to five years) funds have significantly higher 
chance of getting the top 5-star rating than do seasoned funds. In particular, Blume (1998) 
finds that seasoned funds are also less likely than younger funds to get a one-star rating.  
 
Using a sample of 1589 funds
4 taken from the Morningstar July 2005 Principia 
CD, we examine the above phenomenon. We find that 35% of young funds receive 5-star 
ratings as compared to only 11.7% of seasoned funds. In addition, only 2.63% of 
seasoned funds are awarded the worst 1-star rating. The corresponding figure for young 
fund is 18.8%.  
 
Being relatively young as compared to the star rating, the Morningstar 
stewardship grade has not been a popular subject of research. Wellman and Zhou (2007) 
is probably the first group of researchers to launch an academic study on this subject.  
Using the first release of the stewardship grades on August 24 2004, they find that funds 
                                                 
4 A full description of the data set we use in this dissertation will be furnished in Chapter 3.   19
that score high on stewardship grade outperform their peers with poor grades by 19 to 23 
basis points per month over the post-observation period January 2001 to July 2004. They 
also find that among the five stewardship components, Fees and Board Quality exhibit 
the most significant explanatory power for ex-post returns, thus demonstrating the 
positive relation between corporate governance and fund performance.  
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Chapter Three     
 
Data and Methodology 
 
 
3.1  Data Description 
 
We obtain twelve monthly mutual fund data from the January 2005 - December 
2005 Morningstar Principia CDs. The data contain the star ratings (comprising 3-year, 5-
year, 10-year and overall ratings), the grades for all five stewardship components, the 
overall stewardship grade as well as the following fund characteristics: Morningstar-style 
best-fit Alpha (BFAlpha), Morningstar-style best-fit beta (BFbeta), Morningstar-style 
best-fit R-squared (BFRsq),  2004 annual returns (AR04), annual expense ratio (ER), 12-
month prior load-adjusted returns (LAR12m), 3-year prior load-adjusted returns 
(LAR3yr), average manager tenure (MT), asset size (asset), 1-month return after taxes 
and sales (RTS1m),  1-year return after taxes and sales (RTS1yr), monthly Sharpe ratio 
(SR), 3-year Standard deviation (SD), total number of holdings (TH) and turn-over ratio 
(TR).   For estimating out-of-sample performance of our sample funds, we also extract 
data from the Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) mutual fund database. 
 
  We include only mutual funds that receive both star rating and stewardship grade. 
Hence, funds that do not have at least three years of age will not be considered. In order 
to assemble a manageable data set and yet maintain a balanced approach to data analysis, 
we select funds that fall under three broad asset-based categories: Domestic Stock, 
International Stock and Bond (both Municipal Bond and Taxable Bond). For funds 
classified as Domestic Stock funds, we select those under the subcategories of Large 
Blend, Mid-cap Blend and Small-cap blend. For International Stock funds, we discard 
specialty funds which narrowly focus on sectors such as real estates and commodities.   21
We retain all bond funds. This gives rise to a portfolio comprising 1300 to 1500 funds for 
each monthly sample.  
 
For reporting the distribution of fund ratings and basic summary statistics of fund 
characteristics, we use the June 2005 sample. For studies on persistence of fund ratings, 
we employ a sample of funds that are continuously graded from December 2004 to 
November 2005. To examine predictive abilities, we use all the twelve monthly samples. 
Each month represents an evaluation period, or evaluation month, a term we shall adopt 
henceforth. We perform, for each fund and in each evaluation month, a time-series 
regression over a post-evaluation period of predetermined duration using returns 
information such as market monthly risk-free returns and fund’s monthly returns taken 
from the CRSP database.  
 
In order to perform regressions and other statistical analyses, we convert all 
categorical variables to numeric variables. For star ratings (3-year, 5-year, 10-year and 
overall) , the conversion formula is straightforward: 1-star = 1, 2-star = 2, 3-star = 3, 4-
star = 4 and 5-star  = 5. For stewardship grades, we assign scores on the same scale: 
Grade F  = 1, Grade D = 2 , Grade C = 3, Grade B = 4 and Grade A = 5. The five 
stewardship components are also quantified as follows: Excellent = 2 , Good = 1.5 , Fair 
= 1 , Poor = 0.5 and Very Poor = 0 or less.  
 
Based on the above quantitative scores for the star ratings, we compute an 
estimate of the star rating raw score in accordance with Morningstar’s methodology: 
 
Raw score for star rating (SR) = 





  

returns   of   years   10   has   fund   if       SR   2 . 0 SR   3 . 0 SR   0.5
  returns   of   years   10 - 5   has   fund   if                          SR   4 . 0 SR   0.6
returns   of   years   5 - 3   has   fund   if                                                  SR
3 5 10
3 5
3
 (3.1) 
where SRt is the t-year Morningstar rating.  
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 In like manner, we use the quantitative scores of the five stewardship components 
to calculate the raw score for stewardship grade by taking half the sum of  the five scores. 
The multiplication factor of half places the raw scores of both ratings on a common scale 
of 0 – 5. 
 
The use of raw scores rather than the overall ratings should improve the accuracy 
of our statistical tests. The reason is that under the Morningstar methodology, funds 
having different raw scores can have a common rating. For example, a raw score of 3.2 
and 3.3 for star rating will both lead to an overall rating of 3-star. The same applies to 
stewardship grades. Raw scores thus contain more information than the actual ratings. 
Nonetheless, we will use both the actual ratings and the raw cores in our analyses, as it is 
the actual star rating that investors would be observing. Raw scores are only available to 
investors who have paid access to specific Morningstar products. Furthermore, the use of 
both actual ratings and raw scores provides a basis for comparison. 
 
 
3.2  Methodology 
 
In this dissertation, we examine a wide range of issues. To get an idea of how 
funds perform under the Morningstar rating systems, we report frequency distributions of 
both star ratings and stewardship grades. In order to find out if the distribution of ratings 
varies with fund age, we divide funds into three fund age groups: three-year, five-year 
and ten-year. Three-year funds are funds that have at least three years but not more than 5 
years of age. Five-year funds are funds with age between five and ten years. Ten-year 
funds have at least ten years of history. We also divide funds into three categories: 
Domestic Stock, International Stock and Bond.  
 
Morningstar states in the Morningstar Fact Sheet (2007) that “The methodology 
for the stewardship grade for funds is completely different from the Morningstar Rating 
for funds (the “star rating”) and the stewardship grade has no impact on a fund’s star 
rating.” We verify the claim of independence via a standard chi-square contingency table   23
analysis and t-test. For this purpose, we group sample funds into a 2-by-2 contingency 
table based on their star rating and stewardship grade and compute the chi-square 
statistics for test of independence. We also perform correlation analyses. We report both 
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient and Spearman-rho rank correlation 
coefficients based on both original ratings and the raw scores.  
 
  Khorana and Nelling (1998) employ a probit regression model to explore 
influential determinants of the Morningstar star ratings. They find that expense ratio, 
asset size and alpha are some of the fund characteristics that possess strong explanatory 
power for the overall star rating.  We extend their study to the stewardship grades, using 
an ordered logit regression approach. The use of logit regression model is appropriate 
since the dependent variable, namely the Morningstar rating, is a categorical variable. In 
addition, the dependent variable has a natural ordering of 1 (Grade-F) to 5 (Grade-A). 
Ordered logit model takes the form 
k k
1 j
j
k
1 j
j k
1 j
j α
p p - 1
p
log p logit 
 





 












+ 

I
1
i iX β
i
    (3.2) 
for k = 1, 2, 3 and 4, where  j p  is the odds that a fund has a j-rating and the vector X =  
(X1, X2, …, XI) is the set of regressors. The highest rating group (k = 5) is used as a 
reference group as it provides a ceiling for all other groups. A significantly positive  i β  is 
interpreted as an indication that an increment in the independent variable Xi increases the 
likelihood of a fund falling in a higher stewardship-rating group. Conversely, a 
significantly negative  i β  is interpreted as an evidence that a higher value in Xi increases 
the chance that the dependent falls within a lower stewardship grade category. 
 
  We also perform ordinary least-squared regression using the stewardship raw 
scores as dependent variable, treating the raw scores as continuous variables. The 
independent variables are the list of fund-specific variables taken from the Morningstar 
Principia CDs. The list of variables with their abbreviations is given in Appendix C.  
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In order to construct a parsimonious regression model with a reasonable 
goodness-of-fit, we go through a rigorous variable selection process. First, we run a series 
of twelve cross-sectional regressions based on the twelve monthly samples, using all the 
available fund characteristics as regressors. From the results that emerge, we then 
examine the statistics and p-values for each regression, removing insignificant factors 
which have p-value exceeding 10% in 6 or more out of the 12 regressions.  We proceed 
to examine the correlation matrix for the variables from which we remove highly 
correlated variables. This helps mitigate the adverse effect that can possibly be caused by  
the problem of multicollinearity. Next, we regress the dependent variable on the 
remaining variables to further identify those factors that have statistically significant 
regression coefficients. Finally, we use the Akaike’s Information Criterion to obtain the 
final model. We report results based on this model. 
 
For our studies on the predictive ability of the ratings, we employ a standard 
methodology in which the in-sample ratings of funds are compared with their out-of-
sample performance as measured by some commonly-used performance metrics over a 
post-evaluation period. For this purpose, we need to first construct a measure for the out-
of-sample performance of the sample funds. For robustness, we use two commonly used 
(see for example, Blake and Morey (2000)) performance metrics: Sharpe ratio and 
Carhart’s four-factor alpha. We perform the analysis for twelve evaluation samples.  The 
Sharpe ratio of fund i is defined by 
Sharpe Ratoi = 
i
__________
f i
σ
R R 
    (3.3) 
where 
__________
f i R R   is the mean return of fund i in excess of 30-day Treasury-bill rate and  i    
the standard deviation of the excess returns of fund i, over the post-evaluation period.   
We compute a twelve-month series of Sharpe ratios for each of the monthly samples over 
the evaluation period: December 2004 to November 2005. 
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The four factor alpha is the estimated intercept of the following regression model: 
 
it t i4 t i2 t i2 t i1 ft it ε UMD β HML β SMB β RMRF β α R R          (3.4) 
 
which is an extension of the celebrated Fama and French (1993) three-factor model. In 
this model,  t RMRF  is the value of the market return in excess of monthly T-Bill rate; 
t SMB  (small minus big factor) is the difference in returns across small and big portfolios; 
t HML  (high minus low factor) is the difference in returns between high and low book-
to-market equity portfolios;  t UMD   (monthly momentum factor) is the difference in 
average returns on two high ex-ante return portfolios and two low ex-ante return 
portfolios. The SMB factor which is designed to capture the size effect is based on a 
portfolio comprising a long position in a portfolio of small-cap stocks financed by a short 
position in a portfolio of large-cap stocks. The HML factor which is meant to capture the 
book-to-market factor is calculated by building a portfolio that takes a long position in a 
portfolio of high book-to-market (value) stocks and a short position in a portfolio of low 
book-to-market (growth) stocks. The UMD factor, described in Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993), is a momentum factor estimated from a portfolio long in high-momentum stocks 
and short in low-momentum stocks.  
 
For each monthly sample, we merge Morningstar data with those taken from the 
CRSP database. We remove funds that do not have a complete 30-month post-evaluation 
data. Nonetheless, we keep track of number and  ratings of the funds that are dropped 
from the sample. About ten percent of the funds in each sample are disqualified and the 
distribution of ratings is quite uniform among the discarded funds. We therefore do not 
adopt the usual approach of assuming returns of disappearing funds to be equal to that of 
a portfolio of surviving funds in the same fund category, as adopted by Blake and Morey 
(2000). For each eligible fund, we run a time series regression based on model (3), over a  
30-month post-evaluation period.  
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For robustness, we perform the regression on twelve consecutive monthly data 
over the period December 2004 – November 2005. We thus generate twelve sets of four-
factor alphas, each set representing the ex-post performance of funds in a monthly sample. 
Using the twelve sets of estimates, we can compute a simple estimate of the predictive 
strength of the Morningstar ratings. Specifically, we construct a table reporting the 
number of times (out of twelve sample) in which  l k     occurs, where  j  denotes the 
mean/median out-of-sample performance measures of funds in j-star group.  The larger 
this number, the higher the predictive power. 
 
We can also adopt standard tests in the literature to examine the strength of the 
relationship between ex ante fund rating and ex post fund performance. One type of 
statistical test for this purpose is to classify funds as winners or losers in the ranking 
period and repeat the classification in the evaluation period, count the number of winner-
winners, winner-losers, loser-winners and loser-losers and conduct a chi-square test of 
independence.  
 
Another type of test typically involves  sorting funds into performance groups (for 
example, deciles ranked by average performance measure) based on prior performance 
and computing the within-group average performance over a subsequent evaluation 
period. The Spearman-rho rank correlation between the in-sample ranking and out-of-
sample ranking is a measure of the predictive power of in-sample ratings. We caution that 
traditional parametric tests such as Student-t test as parametric tests typically require the 
differences to be random samples from a normal distribution. The validity of such tests 
would be called into question if normality assumption fails to hold. We shall perform 
normality test on the performance estimates to justify our use of parametric-free tests.  
 
A third test, employed by Blake and Morey (2000), is to perform the following 
cross-sectional dummy variable regression of out-of-sample performance measure on a 
set of dummy variables representing the in-sample rating.  
i
4
1 j
ij j 0 i ε D β β S    

   (3.5)   27
If stewardship grades are used as the in-sample ratings, we define four binary dummy 
variables D1, D2, D3 and D4 each representing one level of rating. Specifically, the 
dummy variable Dj indicates whether the fund has a j-star rating, where j = 1, 2, 3 or 4. 
The 5-star rating is used as the reference group as it forms the upper bound for all ratings. 
Under the hypothesis that ratings possess strong predictive ability, we would expect all 
betas in the regression model to be negative, since funds with ratings 1 to 4 are expected 
to underperform five-star funds. Furthermore, strong predictive ability will translate into 
an increasingly negative regression coefficients :  0 4 3 2 1         . 
 
We consider several ways of forming in-sample performance. First, we divide 
funds into five star-rating groups. The resulting analysis generates results on the 
predictive ability of the star rating only. Similarly, we divide funds into five groups based 
on their stewardship grades. This allows us to measure the predictive power of 
stewardship grades.  
 
Since we have two rating systems, we can also divide funds into groups based on 
the rating pair. For this purpose, we use both original ratings and raw scores to split the 
funds. Using the former, we classify funds as 'good', 'fair' or 'poor' based on the following 
criteria: 
Category Criterion 
Good  star rating = 4 or 5 and stewardship grade = ‘A’ or ‘ B’ 
Poor  Star rating = 1 or 2 and stewardship grade = ‘1’ or ‘2’ 
Fair Otherwise 
 
Based on the latter, we sort funds by the sum of their ratings raw scores and organize the 
funds into deciles.  In addition, we also partition funds by fund age and fund type to 
examine the robustness of our results across various age groups and asset classes 
respectively.  
 
Finally, to examine the short-term persistence of Morningstar ratings, we 
assemble a  twelve-month series of star ratings and stewardship grades. This is done by   28
selecting funds that are continuously graded by both star rating and stewardship grade 
over the twelve-month period December 2004 – November 2005. The final sample 
contains 1107 funds, comprising 404 bond funds, 361 domestic stock funds and 342 
international stock funds.  
 
We first compute the percentage of funds that are able to retain the same rating 
throughout the twelve-month period as an estimate of rating persistence. We examine the 
results for the entire sample as well as for sub-samples partitioned by fund age and fund 
type. Next, we construct and compute two measures of rating volatility. One measure is 
based on the actual rating. The other is derived from the raw scores of ratings. These 
measures indicate the degree to which fund ratings fluctuate over the observation period.   
 
When the actual ratings are used, we define volatility of a fund’s rating to be the 
following quantity  
 

rating
i 1  

 
11
1
i 1 i grade grade
12
1
i
.    (3.6)   
 
When raw scores are used , the corresponding volatility measure  is given by 

rating
i 2    


12
1 i
2
________
i 12
1 ) rawscore (rawscore    (3.7) 
 
where gradei = the rating of the fund in month i, where month 1 is December 2004 and 
month 12 is November 2005.  
 
  Finally, we report a 5-by-5 contingency table where each cell (i, j) displays the 
frequency of funds that have a rating of i in the first observation month and a rating of j 
in the last observation month. The diagonal entries in the table show the percentage of 
funds that retain the same fund rating after 11 months. Off diagonal terms give an 
indication of the extent to which the sample funds experience rating upgrade or 
downgrade over the same period.   29
 
 
Chapter Four 
 
Empirical Results 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the statistical results of our empirical studies. In Section 4.1, 
we report the frequency distribution of star ratings and stewardship grades for the sample 
funds. This is followed by a display of summary statistics of fund characteristics in 
Section 4.2. We present results of correlation analysis of the two Morningstar ratings in 
Section 4.3. The output of the logistic regressions for finding determinants of stewardship 
grade are contained in Section 4.4. We analyse the out of-sample performance measures 
in Sections 4.5 and examine the results of Spearman-rho correlation test for predictive 
ability in Section 4.6. Section 4.7 is devoted to the dummy variable regression of out-of-
sample performance measures on fund ratings.  A discussion of the results on the test of 
ratings persistence in Section 4.8 concludes the chapter. 
 
 
4.2  Frequency Distribution of Morningstar Ratings  
 
First, we present in Table 1 the frequency distributions of the various star ratings 
and stewardship grades of the sample funds. We select only funds that receive both star 
rating and stewardship grade. Panel A and Panel B present the frequency distributions of 
star ratings and stewardship grades respectively for the June 2005 sample. We find that a 
majority of funds in the sample receive the middle star-rating of 3-star (35.9%) and the 
second best stewardship grade of B (41.7%). This observation is consistent across all 
fund types.  A comparison between Panel A and Panel B also shows that it is more likely 
for funds to receive the highest star rating than to get the best stewardship grade. To   30
further substantiate this claim, we compile separately the percentage of funds that are 
awarded the top and worst star ratings and stewardship grades for the twelve monthly 
Morningstar data, over the period December 2004 – November 2005. The percentage of 
funds with 5-star rating exceeds that with A stewardship grade by about 7% for all twelve 
monthly data, as displayed in Panel E. In addition, we also find evidence from Panel E 
that the percentage of funds receiving top rating does not fluctuate very much over a 
short one-year period. 
 
We extend the above analysis by partitioning funds by their age (three-year, five-
year or ten-year). The results, given in Panels C and D, indicate that age does matter 
when it comes to fund ratings. Young (three-year) funds exhibit the highest percentage of 
receiving the worst 1-star rating (18.8%) and the best star rating (35.4%).  In contrast, 
only respectively 4.9%  and 2.6% of five-year and ten-year funds receive the worst rating. 
The percentage of ten-year and five-year funds in the best rating category are also far 
below that of three-year funds. This observation is nothing but a manifestation of the age 
bias in the star rating as posited by Blume (1998) and many others.  However, the same 
conclusion cannot be drawn for the case of stewardship grades. We find no young funds 
receiving the worst stewardship grade in the June 2005 sample. In fact, this is true for all 
twelve monthly samples. We conduct, but do not report, results of chi-square tests of 
association between fund ratings and fund age. The result is highly significant (p-value < 
0.0001) for both ratings, suggesting a significant association between age and fund 
ratings. In Section 4.5, we shall further explore the issue of potential age bias in 
stewardship grades. 
 
As articulated in chapter two, the stewardship grade is a weighted sum of five 
scores given to five stewardship components: board quality, corporate culture, fees, 
manager incentive and regulatory issues. We take a microscopic view of the funds’ 
governance by compiling the distribution of each of these component scores.  We report 
the results in Panel F for not just the entire sample, but also for the three categories of 
funds, namely Domestic Stock, International Stock and Bond.  
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TABLE 1 
Frequency of Funds Receiving Morningstar Ratings and Stewardship Grades 
 
Panel A. Frequency Distributions of Morningstar Ratings For June 2005 Sample 
This panel reports the percentage of funds that receive the various Morningstar star ratings (1-star (Worst) 
to 5-star(Best)) awarded on the month of June 2005, as reported in the Morningstar July 2005 Principia CD. 
The sample contains 1589 funds which comprise 494 domestic stock funds, 409 international stock funds 
and 686 bond funds. We include only funds that receive both Morningstar rating and Stewardship Grade. 
% Frequency 
 
Star Rating 
 
All funds 
(N=1589) 
 
Domestic Stock 
(N = 494) 
International 
Stock 
(N = 409) 
 
Bond 
(N = 686 ) 
1-star 3.52  3.04  4.16 3.50 
2-star 20.33  28.14  15.40  17.64 
3-star 35.93  37.25  37.41  34.11 
4-star 28.70  22.87  30.81  31.63 
5-star 11.52  8.70  12.22  13.12 
 
Panel B. Frequency Distributions of Stewardship Grades For June 2005 Sample 
This panel reports the percentage of funds that receive the various Stewardship Grades (F (Worst) to 
A(Best)) awarded on the month of June 2005, as reported in the Morningstar July 2005 Principia CD. The 
sample contains 1589 funds which comprise 494 domestic stock funds, 409 international stock funds and 
686 bond funds. We include only funds that receive both Morningstar rating and Stewardship Grade. 
% Frequency 
 
Stewardship 
Grade 
 
All funds 
(N=1589) 
 
Domestic Stock 
(N = 494) 
International 
Stock 
(N = 409) 
 
Bond 
(N = 686 ) 
F 5.92 3.85  0.24  10.79 
D 11.64 15.99  8.81 10.20 
C 36.44 36.44 35.45  37.03 
B 41.66 38.06 49.88  39.36 
A 4.34 5.66  5.62 2.62 
 
 
Panel C. Frequency Distributions of Morningstar Ratings, Partitioned by Age Groups, for June 2005 
Sample 
This panel reports the percentage of funds in each of the three age groups: 3-year, 5-year and 10-year, that 
receive the various Morningstar ratings awarded on the month of June 2005, as reported in the Morningstar 
July 2005 Principia CD. 3-year funds are funds that have at least three year but not more than 5 years of 
history. 5-year funds are those with at least 5 years but less than 10 years of history. 10-year funds have at 
least 10 years of history. We include only funds that receive both Morningstar rating and Stewardship 
Grade. 
% Frequency 
Star Rating  All funds  
(N =1589) 
3-year 
(N = 48) 
5-year 
(N = 284 ) 
10-year 
(N =1257 ) 
1-star 3.52  18.75  4.93  2.63 
2-star 20.33  25.00  20.07  20.21 
3-star 35.93  14.58  36.27  36.67 
4-star 28.70  6.25  32.04  28.80 
5-star 11.52  35.42  6.69  11.69 
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Panel D. Frequency Distributions of Stewardship Grades, Partitioned by Age Groups for June 2005 
Sample 
This panel reports the percentage of funds in each of the three age groups: 3-year, 5-year and 10-year, that 
receive the various Stewardship Grades awarded on the month of June 2005, as reported in the Morningstar 
July 2005 Principia CD. 3-year funds are funds that have at least three year but not more than 5 years of 
history. 5-year funds are those with at least 5 years but less than 10 years of history. 10-year funds have at 
least years of history. We include only funds that receive both Morningstar rating and Stewardship Grade. 
 
 
% Frequency 
Stewardship 
Grade 
All funds  
(N =1589) 
3-year 
(N = 48) 
5-year 
(N = 284 ) 
10-year 
(N =1257 ) 
F 5.92  0  4.23  6.52 
D 11.64  18.75 12.68  11.14 
C 36.44  14.58 29.93  38.74 
B 41.66  60.42 44.01  40.41 
A 4.34 6.25 9.15  3.18 
 
 
 
Panel E. Percentage of Funds Receiving Best and Worst Morningstar Ratings Over 12 Consecutive 
Months (December 2004 to November 2005). 
This panel reports the percentage of funds that receive the best and worst Morningstar star ratings (1-star 
(Worst) to 5-star(Best)) and stewardship grades (F (Worst) to A(Best)) awarded over 12 consecutive 
months December 2004 to November 2005, as reported in the Morningstar Principia January 2005 to 
December 2005 CDs. We include only funds that receive both Morningstar rating and Stewardship Grade. 
 
 
 %  Frequency 
 Star  Rating  Stewardship  Grade 
Month  5-star  1-star  Grade A  Grade F 
Dec 04  4.40  6.49  13.20  5.24 
Jan 05  4.44  6.10  12.41  5.34 
Feb 05  4.38  6.41  12.07  5.87 
 
Mar 05  4.29 6.57  11.44  4.88 
Apr 05  4.27  6.54  11.08  4.47 
May 05  4.26  6.26  11.75  3.74 
 
Jun 05  4.34  5.92  11.52  3.52 
Jul 05  4.29  5.16  11.44  3.48 
Aug 05  4.43  4.85  11.89  4.00 
Sep 05  4.58  2.44  12.80  4.23 
Oct 05  4.57  1.34  12.79  6.18 
Nov 05  4.56  1.32  12.55  5.77 
 
 
 
   33
Panel F. Frequency Distributions of Raw Scores Assigned to the Five Stewardship Components for June 2005 Sample 
This panel reports the percentage of  funds that receive the various scores given to the five Stewardship assessment components: Board Quality (BQ), Corporate 
Culture (CC), Fees (Fees), Manager Incentives (MI) and Regulatory Issues (RI), on the month of June 2005, as reported in the Morningstar July 2005 Principia 
CD. With the exception of Regulatory Issues whose minimum attainable score  is -2, the worst possible score a fund can receive in each of the other components 
is 0. A letter grade is assigned to the overall Stewardship Grade as follows: A: 9 - 10 points, B: 7 - 8.5 points, C: 5 - 6.5 points, D: 3 - 4.5 points and F: 2.5 points 
or less. Funds' scores for each of the five components are reported in qualitative terms: Excellent = 2 points, Good = 1.5 points, Fair = 1 point, Poor = 0.5 point 
and Very Poor = 0 points and below.  
   
 
 
  % Frequency 
   
All funds (N=1589) 
 
Domestic Stocks (N =494 ) 
 
International Stocks (N =409 ) 
 
Bond (N = 686) 
                      
Grade  BQ CC Fees MI  RI  BQ CC Fees MI  RI  BQ CC  Fees MI  RI BQ CC  Fees MI  RI 
Very  Poor 0.13 2.58  10.89  16.93  6.23 0.20 4.05  12.96  21.05  4.05 0.24 0.24 9.05  15.89  0.24 0.00 2.92  10.50  14.58  11.37 
Poor  5.22 11.58 6.86 24.73  19.19 4.86  7.29 11.34  24.90  21.86 2.44  3.91  3.91 15.16  19.07 7.14 19.24 5.39 30.32  17.35 
Fair  17.56 35.56 22.97 42.42  8.56  24.29 37.45 22.87 33.81  8.30  9.78  38.14 23.96 58.19 10.02 17.35 32.65 22.45 39.21  7.87 
Good  65.14 34.05 18.75  9.19  4.22  61.74 30.97 22.47  8.70  3.24  58.68 41.81 16.14  3.91  6.36  71.43 31.63 17.64 12.68  3.64 
Excellent  11.96 16.24 40.53  6.73  61.80  8.91  20.24 30.36 11.54 62.55 28.85 15.89 46.94  6.85  64.30  4.08  13.56 44.02  3.21  59.77 
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We make a few important observations based on the output in Panel F. First, a 
high percentage (60%) of funds get the best qualitative score of ‘Excellent’ for 
Regulatory Issue. This observation is consistent across the three category groups. Next, 
funds in this sample fare poorly in Manager Incentives, with 30 – 50% of the funds 
graded ‘Poor’ or ‘Very Poor’, suggesting that low level of fund ownership of portfolio 
managers or adoption of compensation schemes that hurt the interests of shareholders 
might still be prevalent in the industry. We also find that a majority of funds, regardless 
of their fund type, attain ‘Good’ or ‘Excellent’ for Fees, indicating that fund 
managements are conscientious in keeping fund expenses low. Finally, we observe that 
funds in the International Stock category surpass their peers in other categories in Board 
Quality: about 29% of International Stock funds get the best rating whereas only 9% and 
4% of domestic stock funds and bond funds have made this achievement. In fact, 87% of 
the International Stock funds are awarded the best and second best grade. This figure far 
exceeds that for each of the other two groups. We examine (but do not report results in 
Table 1) all twelve monthly samples and find that this observation is consistent across all 
12 samples.  Although we do not have an explanation for this observation, we reckon that 
US investors should diversify by investing not just in funds that focus on domestic stocks, 
but also in those that manage assets globally for additional benefits that non-domestic 
funds might be able to offer. 
 
Panel G displays two-way contingency tables for the frequency distributions of 
the pair of ratings: star rating and stewardship grade, for Domestic stock funds in the June 
2005 sample.  Results for International Stock funds and Bond funds are contained in 
Panels H and I respectively. Funds that do well in one rating but poorly in another (for 
example, funds with (5-star, Grade F) rating pair) or receive the best grade in both ratings 
( that is, the (5-star, Grade A) rating pair) are very scarce. Across the three fund types, 
less than 1% of sample funds fall within each of these categories. About 1% to 3% of 
funds are awarded the highest grades in both ratings, with funds in the International Stock 
funds category registering the highest percentage. We also perform (but do not report in 
Table 1) chi-square test for dependence between the two ratings based on all twelve 
samples. The test statistics is highly significant in all twelve samples and for all fund   35
types. These results suggest that we have to interpret Morningstar’s claim on the 
independence of the two ratings with caution. 
 
Panel G. Two-way Contingency Table of Rating Pairs for June 2005 Sample 
This panel displays the two-way contingency table for the pair of ratings (MR, SG) where MR is the 
Morningstar star rating (1-star (Worst) to 5-star(Best)) and SG the corresponding stewardship grade (F 
(Worst)  to A (Best) ), that funds received at the end of June 2005, as reported in the Morningstar July 2005 
Principia Discs. The sample contains 1589 funds which comprise 494 domestic stock funds, 409 
international stock funds and 686 bond funds. We include only funds that receive both Morningstar rating 
and Stewardship Grade. 
  Stewardship Grade 
    F D C B A  Total 
8  15 21 12  0  56 
1-Star  0.5  0.94 1.32 0.76  0  3.52 
28 64  155  69  7 323 
2-Star  1.76 4.03 9.75 4.34 0.44 20.33 
35 67  245  213  11 571 
3-Star  2.2 4.22  15.42  13.4  0.69  35.93 
17 29  124  261  25 456 
4-Star  1.07 1.83  7.8 16.43  1.57 28.7 
6 10  34  107  26  183  5-Star 
0.38 0.63 2.14 6.73 1.64 11.52 
94  185 579 662  69 1589 
Star Rating  
 
Total 
5.92  11.64 36.44 41.66  4.34  100 
 
Panel H. Two-way Contingency Table of Rating Pairs for Domestic Stock Funds In 
June 2005 Sample 
This panel displays the two-way contingency table for the pair of ratings (MR, SG) where MR is the 
Morningstar star rating (1-star (Worst) to 5-star (Best)) and SG the corresponding stewardship grade (F 
(Worst)  to A (Best) ) that funds in the “Domestic Stock” category received at the end of June 2005, as 
reported in the Morningstar July 2005 Principia Discs. We include only funds that receive both 
Morningstar rating and Stewardship Grade. The sample contains 494 funds. 
 
  Stewardship Grade 
   F  D  C  B A  Total 
2 9 3 1  0 15 
1-Star  0.4 1.82  0.61 0.2  0  3.04 
6 29  75  25  4 139 
2-Star  1.21  5.87 15.18 5.06  0.81 28.14 
7 28  75  70  4 184 
3-Star  1.42 5.67  15.18  14.17 0.81 37.25 
3 11  20  66 13  113 
4-Star  0.61 2.23 4.05  13.36 2.63 22.87 
1 2 7  26 7 43  5-Star 
0.2 0.4  1.42  5.26 1.42 8.7 
19 79  180  188 28 494 
Star Rating  
 
Total 
3.85 15.99  36.44  38.06  5.67  100   36
Panel I. Two-way Contingency Table of Rating Pairs for International Stock Funds 
In June 2005 Sample 
This panel displays the two-way contingency table for the pair of ratings (MR, SG) where MR is the 
Morningstar star rating (1-star (Worst) to 5-star (Best)) and SG the corresponding Stewardship grade (F 
(Worst)  to A (Best) ) that funds in the “International Stock” category received at the end of June 2005, as 
reported in the Morningstar July 2005 Principia Discs. We include only funds that receive both 
Morningstar rating and Stewardship Grade. The sample contains 404 funds. 
 
 
  Stewardship Grade 
    F D C B A  Total 
1 5 7 4 0  17  1-Star 
0.24 1.22 1.71 0.98  0  4.16 
0 8  32  22 1 63 
2-Star  0 1.96  7.82  5.38  0.24  15.40 
0 12  63 76 2 153 
3-Star  0 2.93  15.4  18.58  0.49  37.41 
0 8  34  77 7  126 
4-Star  0 1.96  8.31  18.83  1.71  30.81 
0 3 9 25  13  50  5-Star 
0 0.73  2.2 6.11  3.18  12.22 
1 36  145  204  23  409 
Star Rating  
 
Total 
0.24 8.8  35.45  49.88  5.62  100.00 
 
 
 
 
4.3  Descriptive Statistics of Fund Characteristics 
 
Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics of several fund-specific characteristics 
which include fund size, expense ratio and total returns, for the June 2005 sample. Panel 
A contains the statistics for the entire sample. Panels B and C display the results for funds 
the various star rating and stewardship grade groups respectively. We perform Kruskal-
Wallis test to gauge the significance of equality of medians for each variable across 
various rating groups. Of particular interest are expense ratio and fund size. The 
statistical tests reject the hypotheses of equal medians at the 1% significance level. Both 
the mean and median expense ratio decreases monotonically with increasing star rating. 
This is consistent with observation found in various studies on the relation between fund 
expenses and fund performance. This relation, however, does not hold strongly for 
stewardship grades.    37
Fund size, as measured by the natural logarithm of the net asset size of the fund, 
exhibits a positive relation with star ratings: it increases monotonically with improving 
star rating. The same relation partially holds between fund size and stewardship grade: 
Grade-A funds have larger asset base than funds in other rating groups. Grade-F funds 
are on average smaller than grade-C and grade-D funds. The only case when the relation 
fails to hold is when we compare grade-C funds with grade-D funds. The differences in 
median fund size across rating groups are significant at the 1% significance level. We 
also apply two-sample t-tests to all twelve samples to see if the difference in means of 
expense ratio and fund size of funds in the best (five-star or Grade-A)  and worst (one-
star or Grade-F) rating groups are significant. We find that the differences in means are 
significant at the 1% level for all 48 cases (12 months, two fund characteristics and two 
ratings). 
 
 
To further investigate the relation between expense ratio and fund ratings, we 
compute the Spearman-rho rank correlation coefficients between expense ratio and each 
of the two ratings for all the twelve monthly data. We do this in two ways. First, we 
compute the average expense ratio of funds within each rating group.  We then rank the 
five groups by these averages. The Spearman-rho rank correlation coefficient measures 
the degree to which the two rankings differ. Second, we directly compute the Spearman-
rho rank coefficient coefficients between the rating raw scores and the expense ratios for 
all the funds. As the results based on both methods are similar, we only report the former 
in Panel D.  
 
For the case of star rating, the results show that for all twelve samples, star ratings 
are perfectly and negatively correlated with expense ratio at the 1% level of significance. 
However, no such relationship is found between expense ratio and stewardship grade 
even though one of the stewardship component is Fees which in turn includes funds’ 
expense ratio as one of the factors of consideration. We shall investigate this issue further 
in Section 4.5.  We also find that there is a perfectly positive correlation between star 
rating and mean fund size as measured by the logarithm of the total net asset of the funds. 
A similar relationship between stewardship grade and fund size also emerges.   38
TABLE 2 
Summary Statistics of Fund-specific Variables 
 
Panel A.  Summary Statistics of Fund-specific Variables for June 2005 Sample 
This panel reports the descriptive statistics, including mean, median, range and skewness, of selected fund variables. The sample contains 1589 funds which 
comprise 494 domestic stock funds, 409 international stock funds and 686 bond funds. We include only funds that received both the Morningstar rating and 
Stewardship grades. 
 
  Mean Median  Standard Deviation  Kurtosis Skewness  Range Minimum  Maximum 
AR04  10.99  10.31  7.43 0.94 0.76  55.13  -11.56  43.57 
BFAlpha 0.26  -0.23  3.55  12.45  2.51  39.28  -9.57  29.71 
BFBeta 0.91  0.94  0.42 277.80  -13.23 10.23  -7.97  2.26 
BFRsq  90.15 94.00 11.65  9.93  -2.77 88.00 12.00  100.00 
BQ 1.42 1.50 0.35 1.12 -0.77 2.00 0.00 2.00 
CC  1.25 1.50 0.49 -0.34  -0.26 2.00 0.00 2.00 
ER  1.23 0.02 1.20 0.60 -0.46 0.13 3.13 0.00 
Fees 1.36 1.50 0.67 -0.65  -0.71 2.00 0.00 2.00 
LAR12m  13.12  11.08  10.55 3.21  1.33 85.66  -15.09  70.57 
LAR3yr  12.24  12.08  7.77 2.81 1.09  54.92  0.09  55.01 
MI  0.82 1.00 0.54 -0.25 0.26 2.00 0.00 2.00 
MT 6.49 5.30 4.88 1.30 1.10  28.80  0.10  28.90 
MR 3.24 3.00 1.02 -0.59  -0.04 4.00 1.00 5.00 
log(asset)  4.89 5.38 2.75 0.31 -0.78  13.59  -2.30  11.28 
RI  1.48 2.00 0.71 -0.96  -0.85 2.00 0.00 2.00 
RTS1m  0.30 -0.09 2.09 -0.79 0.00 11.10  -4.71 6.39 
RTS1yr  8.90 7.39 6.94 3.08 1.32  55.68  -9.81  45.87 
RTS3yr  10.29  9.76 6.92 3.46 1.25  48.73  -0.33  48.40 
SR  1.06 0.98 0.52 0.53 0.53 3.80 -0.79 3.01 
SD3  10.02  11.43  5.62 1.28 0.58  47.19  0.31  47.50 
SG  3.27 3.00 0.93 0.14 -0.67 4.00 1.00 5.00 
TNH  507.82 174.50  1847.90  203.23  12.74  36030.00 1.00 36031.00 
TR07 82.46 45.00  110.98  13.19  3.30 823.00 1.00 824.00   39
Panel B. Summary Statistics of Fund Variables by Star Ratings for June 2005 Sample 
This panel reports the median sample values of selected fund characteristics across different categories of star ratings. The p-value for the Kruskal-Wallis tests of 
equality of medians are given in parentheses (  ).  The sample contains 1589 funds which comprise 494 domestic stock funds, 409 international stock funds and 
686 bond funds. We include only funds that received both the Morningstar rating and Stewardship Grade. The symbols   * , ** and  *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percentage levels respectively. 
 
  1-star 
(N = 56) 
2-star 
(N = 323) 
3-star 
(N = 571) 
4-star 
(N = 456) 
5-star 
(N = 183) 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean  Median Mean Median Mean  Median 
AR0407***(<0.0001)  9.25 4.11 9.11 8.43  11.16  10.62  11.75  10.71  12.46  11.76 
BFAlpha07**(0.024)  -1.82 -2.42 -1.46 -1.60 -0.09 -0.57 1.10 0.31  2.79  1.32 
BFBeta07  (0.2209)  0.82 0.94 0.87 0.94 0.91 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.99 0.95 
BFRsq07***(0.0004)  86.45 96.00 90.52 94.00 91.33 95.00 89.87 94.00 88.10 90.00 
BQ07***(<0.0001)  1.34 1.50 1.30 1.50 1.39 1.50 1.48 1.50 1.57 1.50 
CC07***(<0.0001)  1.00 1.00 1.06 1.00 1.19 1.00 1.39 1.50 1.48 1.50 
ER07***(<0.0001)  1.66 1.64 1.48 1.52 1.29 1.25 1.04 0.99 0.95 0.88 
Fees07***(<0.0001)  0.84 0.50 1.18 1.00 1.30 1.50 1.56 2.00 1.50 1.50 
LAR12m07***(<0.0001)  11.18  3.77  10.98  9.85  13.26 11.56 13.74 11.16 15.57 13.25 
LAR3yr07***(<0.0001)  10.01  6.41 9.93 9.99  12.33  12.07  12.95  13.02  14.99  14.97 
MI07**( 0.0117)  0.67 0.50 0.76 1.00 0.84 1.00 0.85 1.00 0.86 1.00 
MT07***(<0.0001)  5.20 4.50 4.91 3.60 6.46 4.70 7.36 6.90 7.65 6.60 
MR07***(<0.0001)  1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 5.00 
Logasset***(<0.0001)  3.48 3.64 4.08 4.56 4.53 5.18 5.64 6.10 6.00 6.36 
RI07***(<0.0001)  1.13 1.00 1.26 1.50 1.42 2.00 1.65 2.00 1.74 2.00 
RTS1m07***(<0.0001)  -0.61 -1.17 -0.05 -0.38 0.29 0.08  0.50 0.15  0.77  0.02 
RTS1yr07***(<0.0001)  7.45 3.05 7.23 6.29 8.97 7.65  9.48 7.65  10.69  9.27 
RTS3yr07***(<0.0001)  8.90 5.84 8.37 8.27  10.31  9.72  10.76  10.73  12.78  12.73 
SR07*** (<0.0001)  0.93 0.80 0.82 0.75 1.06 0.98  1.17 1.09  1.24 1.17 
SD307  (0.4521)  10.62 12.43 10.25 12.32 10.32 11.78  9.53 10.02  9.72  8.87 
SG07***(<0.0001)  2.66 3.00 2.89 3.00 3.17 3.00  3.54 4.00  3.75 4.00 
TNH07***(<0.0001)  208.98 137.50 332.01 142.00 548.89 167.00  538.82 221.00  702.30 266.00 
TR07***(<0.0001)  109.18 63.50 332.01  142.00 84.87 52.00  67.52 39.00  70.30  34.00 
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Panel C. Summary Statistics of Fund Variables by Stewardship Grades for June 2005 Sample 
This panel reports the median sample value of several fund characteristics across different categories of Stewardship Grades. The p-value for the Kruskal-Wallis 
tests of equality of medians for selected variables (highlighted) are given in parentheses.  The sample contains 1589 funds which comprise 494 domestic stock 
funds, 409 international stock funds and 686 bond funds. We include only funds that received both the Morningstar rating and Stewardship Grade(the 
corresponding frequency distributions of which are displayed in Panel B).  The symbols   * , ** and  *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 
percentage levels respectively. 
 
 
.  Grade F (N=94)  Grade D (N = 185)  Grade C (N = 579)  Grade B (N = 662)  Grade A (N = 69) 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean  Median Mean Median Mean  Median 
AR0407***(<0.0001)  6.68 4.36 9.95 8.37  10.57  10.18  11.94  11.16  14.24  13.76 
BFAlpha07**(0.024)  -0.25 -0.79 -1.20 -0.92 -0.51 -0.84 1.13  0.12  2.03  1.17 
BFBeta07***(<0.0001) 0.62  0.92  0.97  0.96 0.91 0.94 0.94 0.95 0.87  0.95 
BFRsq07***(<0.0001) 86.93 93.00 93.26 96.00 90.72 94.00 89.84 93.00 84.43  89.00 
BQ07***(<0.0001)  1.33 1.50 1.07 1.00 1.31 1.50 1.58 1.50 1.86  2.00 
CC07***(<0.0001)  0.31 0.50 0.81 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.64 1.50 1.93  2.00 
ER07***(<0.0001) 1.32  1.30  1.49  1.53 1.39 1.36 1.04 1.03  1.05  1.00 
Fees07***(<0.0001)  0.56 0.50 0.46 0.50 1.32 1.50 1.70 2.00 1.79  2.00 
LAR12m07***(<0.0001) 5.70  4.22  11.75  9.61  12.35 10.42 14.89 13.28 16.52  18.26 
LAR3yr07***(<0.0001) 7.20  4.97  10.68  10.21 11.27 11.69 13.89 13.36 15.67  16.65 
MI07***(<0.0001)  0.37 0.50 0.72 0.50 0.80 1.00 0.84 1.00 1.71  2.00 
MT07***(<0.0001)  5.21 3.60 4.70 3.50 6.14 4.10 7.37 6.60 7.85  7.20 
MR07***(<0.0001)  2.84 3.00 2.76 3.00 2.99 3.00 3.58 4.00 4.01  4.00 
Logasset***(<0.0001) 3.67  4.07  4.24  4.59 4.03 4.75 5.92 6.16 6.36  6.75 
RI07***(<0.0001)  0.02 0.00 0.99 0.50 1.25 1.00 1.98 2.00 1.99  2.00 
RTS1m07***(<0.0001) -0.91  -0.71  -0.09  -0.28 0.16 -0.19 0.63 0.38 1.09  1.10 
RTS1yr07***(<0.0001) 4.17  3.06  7.89  6.27 8.42 6.92  10.01  8.78  11.02  12.19 
RTS3yr07***(<0.0001) 6.60  4.97  9.04  8.43 9.26 9.24  11.54  10.88  13.28  14.30 
SR07***  (<0.0001)  0.96 0.91 0.89 0.81 1.02 0.94 1.14 1.03 1.22  1.17 
SD307***(<0.0001) 6.73  4.79  9.99  11.89  9.74  10.73 10.64 12.27 10.99  12.21 
SG07***(<0.0001)  1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 5.00  5.00 
TNH07***(<0.0001)  304.96 246.50 246.72 115.00 482.33 151.00 669.32 288.00 143.57  69.00 
TR07***(<0.0001)  92.10 44.50 99.59 60.00 85.58 52.00 77.41 42.00 45.74 29.00   41
Panel D. Spearman-rho Rank Correlation between Expense Ratio/Fund Size and Star 
Rating/Stewardship Grade for Twelve Monthly Samples: December 2004 to November 2005 
This panel reports the Spearman-rho rank correlation coefficient between fund rating and median expense 
ratio/log of total net asset of  funds for 12 consecutive monthly samples from December 2004 to November 
2005, as reported in the Morningstar January 2005 to December 2005 Principia CDs.  The symbols  * , ** 
and  *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percentage levels respectively 
 
 
 Spearman-rho  Rank  Correlation 
Month  Expense Ratio  Fund Size 
 Star  Rating  Stewardship  Grade  Star Rating  Stewardship Grade 
Dec 04  -1.00***  -0.6  1.00***  0.9** 
Jan 05  -1.00***  -0.6  1.00***  0.9** 
Feb 05  -1.00***  -0.6  1.00***  0.9** 
Mar 05  -1.00***  -0.6  1.00***  0.9** 
Apr 05  -1.00***  -0.6  1.00***  0.9** 
May 05  -1.00***  -0.6  1.00***  0.9** 
Jun 05  -1.00***  -0.6  1.00***  0.9** 
Jul 05  -1.00***  -0.7  1.00***  0.9** 
Aug 05  -1.00***  -0.6  1.00***  0.9** 
Sep 05  -1.00***  -0.7  1.00***  0.9** 
Oct 05  -1.00***  -0.7  1.00***  0.8 
Nov 05  -1.00***  -0.7  1.00***  0.9** 
 
 
 
4.4  Correlation Between Star Ratings and Stewardship Grades 
 
We now turn our focus on the correlation between the two Morningstar ratings: 
star rating and stewardship grade. For this purpose, we compute for each of the twelve 
monthly samples the mean stewardship grade of funds within each star rating group and 
rank the funds by these averages. The Spearman rank correlation coefficient and Pearson 
linear product-moment correlation coefficient between the two rankings are then 
computed. Table 3 Panel A reports the results.  
 
Based on all twelve monthly data, we find that the two ratings are perfectly and 
positively correlated when Spearman rank correlation coefficient is used. The results 
based on Pearson product-moment linear correlation also indicate strong correlation of 
above 0.97 in all twelve months. When we repeat the correlation analysis by computing 
the correlation coefficients using the rating raw scores, we obtain the same conclusion. 
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TABLE 3 
Correlation Analysis of Star Ratings and Stewardship Grades 
 
Panel A. Correlation Between Star Ratings and Stewardship Grades for Twelve Monthly 
Samples December 2004 to November 2005 
This panel reports the Spearman-rho Rank and Pearson linear product-moment correlation coefficient 
between star ratings and stewardship grades of  funds for 12 consecutive monthly sample from December 
2004 to November 2005, as reported in the Morningstar January 2005 to December 2005 Principia CDs. 
Funds’ ranking by star rating is compared with the ranking induced by the mean stewardship grade within 
each star rating group. The symbols  * , ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 
percentage levels respectively. 
Month 
Spearman-rho Rank  
Correlation Coefficient 
Pearson Product -moment  
Correlation Coefficient 
Dec 04  1.000*** 
(<0.0001) 
0.99309*** 
(0.0007) 
Jan 05  1.000*** 
(<0.0001) 
0.99051*** 
(0.004) 
Feb 05  1.000*** 
(<0.0001) 
0.99868*** 
(<0.0001) 
Mar 05  1.000*** 
(<0.0001) 
0.99252*** 
(0.0008) 
Apr 05  1.000*** 
(<0.0001) 
0.99081*** 
(0.0011) 
May 05  1.000*** 
(<0.0001) 
0.99984*** 
(<0.0001) 
Jun 05  1.000*** 
(<0.0001) 
0.99598*** 
(0.0003) 
Jul 05  1.000*** 
(<0.0001) 
0.99119*** 
(0.001) 
Aug 05  1.000*** 
(<0.0001) 
0.97671*** 
(0l0043) 
Sep 05  1.000*** 
(<0.0001) 
0.97124*** 
(0.0058) 
Oct 05  1.000*** 
(<0.0001) 
0.98558*** 
(0.0021) 
Nov 05  1.000*** 
(<0.0001) 
0.98587*** 
(0.002) 
 
 
To investigate whether there is a significant difference between the raw scores of 
the two Morningstar ratings for individual funds, we perform paired-sample t-test and 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test on the June 2005 data, with funds partitioned by age and fund 
type. The results displayed in Panel B indicate that the differences in means are highly 
significant for the entire sample. However, when we consider age-based and category-
based groups, the differences in raw scores are only found to be significant in seasoned 
funds (10-year) and Bond funds.  
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Panel B. Paired-Sample t-test and Wilcoxon Signed-rank Test for Differences in 
Mean and Median  Star Rating Raw Scores and Stewardship Grade Raw Scores 
 
This panel reports the results of paired-sample t-test and Wilcoxon signed-rank test on the difference 
between star rating raw scores and stewardship grade raw scores of the June 2005 sample funds, as reported 
in the Morningstar July 2005 Principia CD. Raw scores for star ratings are computed based on funds’ risk-
adjusted returns over three periods: trailing 3, 5, and 10-years, where applicable. Ratings are recalculated 
each month. A raw score is assigned for each of these periods and the overall score is a weighted sum of 
these scores. Funds are then ranked by the overall raw scores and their final star rating assigned as follows: 
5-star: top 10%, 4star: next 22.5%, 3-star: middle 35%, 2-star: next 22.5% and 1-star: bottom 10%.. Raw 
score for stewardship is the sum of the point awarded for each Stewardship components. The final 
stewardship grade is assigned as follows:  A: 9 - 10 points, B: 7 - 8.5 points, C: 5 - 6.5 points, D: 3 - 4.5 
points and F: 2.5 points or less.  The sample contains 1589 funds which comprise 494 domestic stock funds, 
409 international stock funds and 686 bond funds. We include only funds that received both the 
Morningstar star rating and stewardship grade. The numbers in parentheses (  ) are the p-values. The 
symbols   * , ** and  *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percentage levels respectively. 
 
 
 
Paired-sample t-test and Wilcoxon signed-rank Test for Mean and Median of 
(Star Rating Raw Score  - Stewardship Grade Raw Score) 
 
   
  
t-test 
 
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test 
 
All funds 
 
2.1679** 
 
37539** 
  (0.03) (0.0377) 
3-year   -1.2444 -99.00 
  (0.2195) (0.3400) 
5-year  -0.91154 -1694.5 
  (0.3628) (0.2218) 
10-year  3.449*** 40875.5*** 
  (0.0006) (0.0012) 
Domestic Stock  -1.76124* -8389.5*** 
  (0.07) (0.00015) 
International Stock  -0.19535 907 
  (0.8452) (0.704) 
Bond  4.701582*** 25197.5*** 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
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4.5  Determinants of Stewardship Grades 
 
Khorana and Nelling (1998) use a probit regression model to determine influential 
determinants of the star ratings. They show that fund size, expense ratio, manager tenure 
and turn over ratio possess significant explanatory power for the star ratings. In the same 
vein, we perform both an ordinary least-squared regression as well as an ordered logit 
regression to seek determinants of the stewardship grade. 
 
Panel A of Table 4 reports the correlation matrix of a set of Morningstar variables 
of funds taken from the June 2005 sample. We do not observe any highly correlated pair 
of variables except for the obvious ones such as stewardship grades with any of the five 
stewardship components. 
 
Panel B displays the results of regressing stewardship grade raw scores (treated as 
a continuous variable) on short-listed variables that emerge from a rigorous model 
selection process that has been carried out. Except for Morningstar-style 12-month load-
adjusted returns (LAR12m) and Morningstar-style best-fit R-squared (BFRsq), all other 
variables exhibit highly significant explanatory power for the dependent variable in all 
the twelve monthly regressions.  
 
A few interesting conclusions can be made. First, expense ratio is a highly 
significant variable in this regression model. The negativity of its beta indicates that 
funds with high expense ratio are more likely to get poor stewardship grades than those 
with low expenses. This is not surprising, considering that fund expenses is one of the 
major assessment components in the Stewardship grading system. Next, we find that fund 
size has a significantly positive beta. This shows that the larger funds are, the more likely 
it is for the funds to receive good stewardship grades. Similarly, we find evidence based 
on the significantly positive beta for manager tenure that funds managed by more 
experienced portfolio managers tend to have better stewardship grades. Finally, the 
positive relation between stewardship grade and the star rating, controlling for other 
determinants, is evidenced by the highly significant beta for star rating.   45
Panel C contains the results of the second regression model in which both BFRsq 
and LAR12m are removed; the model also controls for fund type and fund age by 
including the following dummy variable: Dage3, Dage5, Dbond and Ddomestic . Dage3 and Dage5 
take value one when the fund has 3-5 and 5-10 years of history respectively, and zero 
otherwise. Similarly, Dbond and Ddomestic  take value one when the fund belongs to Bond 
and Domestic Stock category respectively, and zero otherwise. The 10-year fund group 
serves as the reference for age. Similarly, the International Stock fund group is the 
reference for fund type.  
 
The results are mostly consistent with those obtained in the preceding analysis. 
However, Morningstar-style one year return after tax and sales (RTS1yr) appears highly 
significant in all regressions once we control for fund age and fund type. An examination 
on the coefficients of the dummy variables reveals two pieces of information. First, we do 
not find any perceivable relation between stewardship and age in the presence of other 
fund characteristics. Neither Dage3 nor Dage5 turns out to be significant even at the 10% 
level, thus providing evidence that fund age does not have significant explanatory power 
when we control for other influential fund characteristics.  Second, the coefficients of 
both fund-type dummy variables are highly significant and negative, indicating that the 
type of assets held has an influence on stewardship score. The negative sign also 
indicates that funds under the International Stock category fare better in stewardship 
grade than their peers in Bonds and Domestic Stock groups. Furthermore, domestic 
stocks outperform bonds in stewardship grades when all other variables are held constant. 
 
The use of ordinary least-squared regression with the stewardship grade raw score 
as dependent variable has an obvious shortcoming as the stewardship grade raw score is 
not exactly a continuous variable (since it is a weighted sum of 5 component scores, each 
being a polychotomous variable, which means the raw score is at best another 
multinomial variable with a large number of levels).  We therefore repeat the analysis by 
performing ordered logit regression of the actual stewardship grades on those fund-
characteristics that have been found significant. The results reported in Panel D, however, 
do not show much deviation from those recorded in Panel C.   46
TABLE 4 
Regression of Stewardship Grade on Potential Determinants 
 
Panel A. Pair-wise Pearson Correlation Coefficient Matrix for Selected Fund Characteristics 
This panel reports the linear correlation matrix of a set of fund characteristics that are possible determinants of the stewardship grade. The sample contains 1589 
funds which comprise 494 domestic stock funds, 409 international stock funds and 686 bond funds. We include only funds that receive both star rating and 
stewardship grade. Appendix C contains an explanation of the abbreviated terms used in the table below. 
 
 
Variables BQ CC Fees MI MR RI SG  BFAlpha  BFBeta  BFRsq  ER  LAR12m  MT  logasset  RTS1m  RTS1yr 
 
SD3 
BQ 1.000  0.444  0.348  0.074  0.232  0.145 0.475  0.223  0.060 -0.044  -0.049  0.201 0.105  0.108 0.143 0.193  0.115 
CC 0.444  1.000  0.438  0.158  0.302  0.638 0.839  0.209  0.112 0.011  -0.327  0.234 0.161  0.330 0.251 0.233  0.173 
Fees  0.348 0.438  1.000 -0.064 0.240 0.260 0.608  0.200  0.028 -0.025  -0.344  0.064 0.145  0.248 0.070 0.060  -0.032 
MI 0.074  0.158  -0.064  1.000  0.071  0.022 0.297  0.066  0.004 -0.102  0.185  0.062 0.117  0.005 0.012 0.052  0.008 
MR 0.232  0.302  0.240  0.071  1.000  0.250 0.327  0.376  0.085 -0.031  -0.330  0.122 0.187  0.267 0.142 0.146  -0.052 
RI 0.145  0.638  0.260  0.022  0.250  1.000 0.724  0.150  0.061 -0.056  -0.207  0.122 0.214  0.321 0.124 0.127  0.116 
SG 0.475  0.839  0.608  0.297  0.327  0.724 1.000  0.234  0.076 -0.064  -0.251  0.210 0.186  0.303 0.203 0.205  0.140 
BFAlpha 0.223 0.209 0.200 0.066 0.376 0.150 0.234  1.000  -0.123  -0.399  -0.093 0.298 0.044 0.134 0.061 0.299 0.162 
BFBeta 0.060  0.112  0.028  0.004  0.085  0.061 0.076  -0.123  1.000 0.382 0.066  0.194 -0.035  -0.007 0.115 0.198 0.310 
BFRsq  -0.044 0.011  -0.025 -0.102 -0.031 -0.056 -0.064  -0.399  0.382  1.000 -0.074 0.021 -0.022  -0.006 0.057 0.027 0.069 
ER -0.049  -0.327  -0.344  0.185  -0.330  -0.207 -0.251  -0.093  0.066  -0.074 1.000  0.244 -0.106  -0.415  -0.006 0.240 0.293 
LAR12m 0.201 0.234 0.064 0.062 0.122 0.122 0.210  0.298  0.194 0.021 0.244  1.000 -0.112  0.001 0.694 0.996 0.688 
MT 0.105  0.161  0.145  0.117  0.187  0.214  0.186 0.044 -0.035  -0.022  -0.106  -0.112 1.000 0.165 -0.105  -0.098  -0.103 
logasset 0.108  0.330 0.248  0.005  0.267  0.321 0.303  0.134  -0.007  -0.006  -0.415  0.001 0.165  1.000  -0.056  0.000  -0.013 
RTS1m 0.143  0.251  0.070  0.012  0.142  0.124 0.203  0.061  0.115 0.057  -0.006  0.694 -0.105  -0.056 1.000 0.692 0.539 
RTS1yr 0.193  0.233  0.060  0.052  0.146 0.127 0.205  0.299  0.198 0.027 0.240  0.996 -0.098  0.000 0.692 1.000 0.676 
SD3 0.115  0.173  -0.032  0.008  -0.052  0.116 0.140  0.162  0.310 0.069 0.293  0.688 -0.103  -0.013 0.539 0.676 1.000 
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Panel B. Regression of Stewardship Grade on Fund characteristics  
This panel reports the regression estimates and summary statistics of the regressions of fund stewardship grade on the following fund characteristics: BERsq, ER, 
LAR12m, LAR3yr, MT, MR, logaset, RTS1m, RTS1yr.  We perform a series of cross-sectional regressions using twelve consecutive monthly data over the 
period December 2004 to November 2005, using the model 
i ε F β α S ji
J
1 j
j i    

 
where  Ji 2i 1i F ,..., F , F  are the J characteristics of fund i.. The characteristics include best fit R-squared (BFRsq), expense ratio (ER), 1-yr load-adjusted return 
(LAR12m), 3-yr Load-adjusted return (LAR3yr), average manager tenure (MT), Morningstar star rating raw score (MR), log of fund size (logasset), 1-yr return 
after tax and sales (RTS1yr) ad 3-yr return after tax and sale (RTS3-yr). The model does not control for fund age and find type.   Each monthly sample contains 
more than 1400 funds from the following three categories: (i) Domestic Stock (ii) International Stock and (iii) Bonds. We then select the most appropriate model 
based on the significance of the regression coefficients, the size of the regression R
2 as well as the Akiade’s Information Criterion (AIC). The results below show 
only the results based on the final model. The numbers within < > are the t-statistics and those within (  ) are the p-values. The symbols   * , ** and  *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percentage levels respectively 
 
 
 
Month    Estimates of Regression Coefficients, t-statistics and p-values 
    Intercept BFRsq  ER  LAR12m  LAR3yr MT  MR  logasset  RTS1m  RTS1yr 
Dec04    0.9516***  -0.0004  -0.0903***  0.0300***  0.0164*** 0.0094*** 0.0354***  0.0357***  0.0105* -0.0501*** 
    <8.903>  < -.3738>  < -4.6195>  <3.0459>  <5.7471>  <4.7446> <3.358>  <6.7877>  <1.699>  <  -3.2644> 
    (0.0000) (0.70861)  (0.0000)  (0.00238)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.00081)  (0.0000)  (0.08961)  (0.00113) 
Jan 05    1.0413***  -0.0009  -0.1019*** 0.0228** 0.0196*** 0.0125*** 0.0274***  0.0285***  0.0149* -0.0460*** 
    <9.6233>  < -.9241>  < -5.6356>  <2.2128>  <6.6905>  <6.3921> <2.629>  <5.4347>  <1.9078> <  -2.9> 
    (0.0000)  (0.35563)  (0.0000) (0.02711) (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.00868) (0.0000) (0.05667) (0.0038) 
Feb 05    1.0199***  -0.0009  -0.0682***  0.0322***  0.0168*** 0.0139*** 0.0313***  0.0293***  0.0167***  -0.0489*** 
    <9.7235>  < -.988>  < -3.5062>  <3.2742>  <6.5003>  <7.3335>  <2.9298> <5.7175> <2.6435> <  -3.217> 
    (0.0000) (0.32337)  (0.00047)  (0.00109)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.00346)  (0.0000)  (0.00831)  (0.00133) 
Mar 05    0.9585***  -0.0009  -0.0806*** 0.0205** 0.0151*** 0.0126*** 0.0464***  0.0282***  -0.0056  -0.0294** 
    <9.5934>  < -1.0455>  < -4.1179>  <2.1531>  <4.5614>  <6.7298>  <4.3238>  <5.4135>  < -1.0556>  < -2.0269> 
    (0.0000)  (0.29602)  (0.00004) (0.03151) (0.00001)  (0.0000)  (0.00002)  (0.0000)  (0.29136) (0.04289) 
Apr 05    0.9208***  -0.0007  -0.0747***  0.0253***  0.0172*** 0.0137*** 0.0499***  0.0287***  0.0100* -0.0412*** 
    <9.3949>  < -.7547>  < -4.2541>  <2.6468>  <5.192>  <7.5238> <4.812>  <5.8576>  <1.8888>  <  -2.8378> 
    (0.0000)  (0.45057)  (0.00002)  (0.00823)  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.05915)  (0.00462)   48
May 05    1.0129*** -0.0013  -0.0807***  0.0241**  0.0130***  0.0141***  0.0476***  0.0264***  0.0144**  -0.0386*** 
    <10.5577>  < -1.4563>  < -4.4978>  <2.4671>  <5.1643>  <7.9037> <4.8778> <5.5139> <2.0715>  <  -2.6115> 
    (0.0000) (0.14557)  (0.00001)  (0.01375)  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.03852)  (0.00912) 
Jun 05    1.1402*** -0.0023***  -0.1012***  0.0231** 0.0069*** 0.0144***  0.0502***  0.0224***  0.0065**  -0.0327** 
    <13.5097>  < -3.1219>  < -5.9399>  <2.4675>  <2.9446>  <8.4927> <5.5326> <5.358> <1.1391>  <  -2.3717> 
    (0.0000) (0.00184)  (0.0000)  (0.01373)  (0.00329) (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.25487)  (0.01785) 
Jul 05    1.1060***  -0.0010  -0.0915***  0.0021  0.0144***  0.0110*** 0.0242*** 0.0231*** 0.0180***  -0.0064 
    <13.3645>  < -1.3713>  < -5.3617>  <.2206>  <5.4079>  <6.7443> <2.6276> <5.5387> <3.1011> <  -.4697> 
    (0.0000) (0.17053)  (0.0000)  (0.82545)  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0087)  (0.0000)  (0.00197)  (0.63862) 
Aug 05    1.2263*** -0.0017**  -0.1209***  -0.0031  0.0110***  0.0110***  0.0342***  0.0168***  0.0138** -0.0003 
    <14.8066>  < -2.3532>  < -7.0842>  < -.3214>  <5.4416> <6.7661> <4.011>  <4.1444>  <2.3026>  <  -.0217> 
    (0.0000)  (0.01875)  (0.0000)  (0.74797)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.00006) (0.00004) (0.02145) (0.98265) 
Sep 05    1.1621*** -0.0007  -0.1074***  0.0051 0.0168***  0.0123***  0.0185**  0.0194***  0.0282***  -0.0151 
    <13.9249>  < -.9792>  < -6.3666>  <.6072>  <8.1812>  <7.768> <2.2042>  <4.8441> <4.747>  <  -1.1993> 
    (0.0000) (0.32763)  (0.0000)  (0.54384)  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.02767)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.23059) 
Oct 05    1.2991***  -0.0024*** -0.1263***  0.0085  0.0121***  0.0098*** 0.0410*** 0.0166*** 0.0191***  -0.0214* 
    <16.3092>  < -3.3515>  < -7.9687>  <1.016>  <6.888>  <6.533> <5.31>  <4.2855>  <3.7225>  <  -1.7088> 
    (0.0000)  (0.00083)  (0.0000)  (0.30983)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.00002) (0.00021) (0.08771) 
Nov 05    1.3095***  -0.0023*** -0.1220*** 0.0206***  0.0105***  0.0102*** 0.0325*** 0.0198*** 0.0314*** -0.0400*** 
    <16.9145>  < -3.3358>  < -7.8261>  <3.226>  <7.4771>  <6.8782> <4.3521> <5.2054> <6.2979>  <  -4.0479> 
    (0.0000) (0.00087)  (0.0000)  (0.00128)  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.00001)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.00005) 
 
 
Month  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  11  12 
R
2  0.2956 0.2863 0.3168 0.3009 0.3060 0.2957 0.2867 0.2682 0.2515 0.2728 0.2814 0.2825 
F  Stats  50.1279 48.3903 57.7468 54.2218 55.8301 53.4268 53.0126 48.9478 46.1243 52.7666 53.0524 54.2558 
 
Month 1 – Dec 04, Month 2 – Jan 05, …, Month 12 – Nov 05   49
Panel C. Regression of Stewardship Grade on Fund characteristics  
This panel reports the regression estimates and summary statistics of the regressions of fund stewardship grade on the following fund characteristics: ER,  
LAR3yr, MT, MR, logaset, RTS1m, RTS1yr. We perform a series of cross-sectional regressions using twelve consecutive monthly data over the period 
December 2004 to November 2005, using the model 
 
where  Ji 2i 1i F ,..., F , F  are the J characteristics of fund i. and  Ki 2i 1i D ,..., D , D  are dummy variables associated with fund age and fund type. Dummy variables 
representing age are Dage3 and Dage5 which take value 1 when the fund has 3-5 and 5-10 years of history respectively; Bond and Domestic are fund-type dummy 
variables taking value 1 if the fund belong to bond and domestic stock category respectively. The 10-year fund group serves as the reference group for age. 
Similarly, the International Stock funds group is the reference for fund type. Characteristics include expense ratio (ER), 3-yr Load-adjusted return (LAR3yr), 
average manager tenure (MT), Morningstar rating (MR), log of fund size (log asset), 1-yr return after tax and sales (RTS1yr) ad 3-yr return after tax and sale 
(RTS3-yr).  Each monthly sample contains more than 1400 funds from the following three categories: (i) Domestic Stock (ii) International Stock and (iii) Bonds. 
We then select the most appropriate model based on the significance of the regression coefficients as well as on the Akiade’s Information Criterion. The results 
below show only the results based on the final model. The numbers  within <  > are the t–statistics and those in (   ) are the p-values. The symbols   * , ** and  
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percentage levels respectively. 
 
Month  Estimates of Regression Coefficients, t-statistics and p-values 
  Intercept ER01  LAR3yr  MT  MR  logasset RTS1m RTS1yr  Dage3  Dage5  Dbond  Ddomestic stock 
 Dec04  1.1948*** -0.1107***  0.0248*** 0.0136*** 0.0408***  0.0242***  0.0431*** -0.0278***  0.0329  0.0414*  -0.26477*** -0.08906*** 
  <19.571> <  -5.973>  <8.341>  <7.074>  <4.106>  <6.058>  <5.69>  < -5.962>  <.585>  <1.76>  < -7.892>  < -3.345> 
  (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.5586)  (0.0787)  (0.0000) (0.0008) 
 Jan 05  1.0939*** -0.1309***  0.0216*** 0.0146*** 0.0399***  0.0211***  0.0225*** -0.0216***  0.0578  0.0567** -0.15126*** -0.10685*** 
  <19.238> <  -7.155>  <7.478>  <7.712>  <4.085>  <5.217>  <2.937>  < -4.677>  <1.006>  <2.374>  < -5.057>  < -3.991> 
  (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0034)  (0.0000)  (0.3146)  (0.0177)  (0.0000) (0.0001) 
Feb 05  1.1502*** -0.0919***  0.0224*** 0.0153*** 0.0311***  0.0270***  0.0416*** -0.0162***  0.0717  0.0738*** -0.23968*** -0.10333*** 
  <20.445> <  -5.019>  <8.783>  <8.456>  <3.149>  <6.939>  <6.552>  < -4.808>  <1.368>  <3.223>  < -8.208>  < -3.979> 
  (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0017)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.1715)  (0.0013)  (0.0000) (0.0001) 
Mar 05  1.0909*** -0.0899***  0.0248*** 0.0145*** 0.0430***  0.0264***  0.0295*** -0.0168***  0.0614  0.0741*** -0.24045*** -0.08149*** 
  <18.487> <  -4.87>  <7.546>  <8.174>  <4.258>  <6.699>  <4.419>  < -4.351>  <1.232>  <3.222>  < -7.635>  < -3.095> 
  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.2181)  (0.0013) (0.0000)  (0.002) 
Apr 05  1.0748*** -0.1072***  0.0227*** 0.0148*** 0.0497***  0.0261***  0.0279*** -0.0174***  0.0559  0.0479** -0.20291*** -0.18335*** 
  <19.048> <  -5.924>  <7.19>  <8.451>  <5.107>  <6.697>  <4.46>  < -4.782>  <1.111>  <2.101>  < -7.868>  < -6.163> 
  (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.267)  (0.0358)  (0.0000) (0.0000) 
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May 05  1.0632*** -0.1122***  0.0163*** 0.0144***  0.0458***  0.0257***  0.0261***  -0.0122***  0.2305***  0.0515*  -0.15701*** -0.13765*** 
  <19.268> <  -6.205>  <6.579>  <8.416>  <4.852>  <6.617>  <3.813>  < -3.878>  <3.552>  <1.731>  < -6.334>  < -5.212> 
  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0004)  (0.0836)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
7Jun 05  1.0230*** -0.1041***  0.0118*** 0.0133***  0.0464***  0.0272***  0.0244***  -0.0081***  0.1113**  0.0344  -0.09131*** -0.15571*** 
  <19.054> <  -6.044>  <5.313>  <8.054>  <5.196>  <7.44>  <3.872>  < -2.715>  <2.379>  <1.557>  < -3.216>  < -6.325> 
  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0001)  (0.0067)  (0.0175)  (0.1196)  (0.0013)  (0.0000) 
 Jul 05  1.1045*** -0.1035***  0.0158*** 0.0108***  0.0326***  0.0244***  0.0269***  -0.0101***  0.0256  0.0408*  -0.12936*** -0.04429*** 
  <20.976> <  -6.099>  <6.542>  <6.806>  <3.722>  <6.742>  <4.495>  < -3.48>  <.544>  <1.921>  < -4.488>  < -1.86> 
  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0002)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0005)  (0.5867)  (0.0549)  (0.0000)  (0.063) 
Aug 05  1.1204*** -0.1316***  0.0104*** 0.0103***  0.0432***  0.0203***  0.0107***  -0.0073***  0.0848*  0.0401*  -0.09208*** -0.07553*** 
  <21.379> <  -7.902>  <5.064>  <6.429>  <5.227>  <5.668>  <1.999>  < -2.447>  <1.849>  <1.901>  < -2.95>  < -3.105> 
  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0458)  (0.0145)  (0.0647)  (0.0575)  (0.0032)  (0.0019) 
Sep 05  1.2179*** -0.1120***  0.0161*** 0.0117***  0.0239***  0.0228***  0.0382***  -0.0131***  0.0489  0.0520*** -0.14979*** -0.10399*** 
  <24.592> <  -6.979>  <8.182>  <7.713>  <3.>  <6.569>  <6.594>  < -4.957>  <1.178>  <2.583>  < -5.162>  < -4.666> 
  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0027)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.2391)  (0.0099)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Oct 05  1.1497*** -0.1265***  0.0109*** 0.0089***  0.0409***  0.0205***  0.0261***  -0.0118***  0.0647  0.0352*  -0.07505*** -0.10752*** 
  <24.631> <  -8.052>  <5.729>  <6.019>  <5.424>  <5.847>  <4.698>  < -4.405>  <1.576>  <1.784>  < -2.761>  < -4.863> 
  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.1153)  (0.0746)  (0.0058)  (0.0000) 
Nov 05  1.0837*** -0.1261***  0.0117*** 0.0096***  0.0324***  0.0221***  0.0286***  -0.0111***  0.1047**  0.0369*  -0.01036  -0.04535** 
  <22.475> <  -8.152>  <6.268>  <6.511>  <4.226>  <6.298>  <5.465>  < -4.189>  <2.432>  <1.859>  < -.331>  < -1.965> 
  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0151)  (0.0632)  (0.741)  (0.0495) 
 
 
Month  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  11  12 
R
2  0.2956 0.2863 0.3168 0.3009 0.3060 0.2957 0.2867 0.2682 0.2515 0.2728 0.2814 0.2825 
F  Stats  50.1279 48.3903 57.7468 54.2218 55.8301 53.4268 53.0126 48.9478 46.1243 52.7666 53.0524 54.2558 
 
Month 1 – Dec 04, Month 2 – Jan 05, …, Month 12 – Nov 05 
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Panel D.  Ordered Logit Regression of Stewardship Grade on Fund Characteristics  
This panel reports the regression estimates and summary statistics of the regressions of fund stewardship grade on the following fund characteristics: ER,  
LAR3yr, MT, MR, logaset, RTS1m, RTS1yr. We perform a series of 12 cross-sectional ordered logit regressions using twelve consecutive monthly data over the 
period December 2004 to November 2005. The response variable is the stewardship grade; the regressors include expense ratio (ER), 3-yr Load-adjusted return 
(LAR3yr), average manager tenure (MT), Morningstar rating (MR), log of fund size (log asset), 1-yr return after tax and sales (RTS1yr) ad 3-yr return after tax 
and sale (RTS3-yr) and dummy variables associated with fund Age and fund type. Dummy variables representing age are Dage3 and Dage5 which respectively 
take value 1 when the fund has 3-5 and 5-10 years of history; Bond and Domestic are fund-type dummy variables taking value 1 if the fund belong to bond and 
domestic stock category respectively. The dummy variable for 10-year fund serves as the reference for age. Similarly, the dummy for international stock funds is 
the reference. The numbers  within <  > are the Wald Chi-square Statistics and those in (   ) are the p-values. The symbols   * , ** and  *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percentage levels respectively. 
 
 
 
 
Month  Estimates of Regression Coefficients, t-statistics and p-values 
    
ER LAR3yr MT  MR logasset  RTS1m  RTS1yr Dage3  Dage5  Dbond  Ddomestic stoc 
 Dec04    -0.7353***  0.1695***  0.0638***  0.2386***  0.1517***  0.3382*** -0.2236***  0.4803  0.4325*** -1.9509*** -0.4608*** 
   <39.5488>  <75.5497>  <27.2282>  <14.5088> <36.8001> <49.747>  <55.7233>  <1.7481> <8.4768>  <79.9503>  <7.4546> 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (.186)  (.004)  (0.000)  (.006) 
 Jan 05    -0.8664***  0.1435***  0.0662***  0.2028***  0.1300***  0.2080*** -0.1789***  0.6658*  0.4947*** -0.9832*** -0.5395*** 
   <56.373>  <59.17>  <30.7132>  <11.0997> <27.1135>  <18.9881>  <37.2763>  <3.2432> <10.9027>  <27.2515> <10.2796> 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (.072)  (.001)  (0.000)  (.001) 
Feb 05    -0.6350***  0.1575***  0.0692***  0.1253***  0.1771***  0.3428*** -0.1349***  0.5733*  0.6462*** -1.7069*** -0.5636*** 
   <29.2533>  <83.3654>  <34.9761>  <3.9609> <50.721>  <69.6792>  <36.9723> <2.8131> <18.9288>  <77.5018> <11.2207> 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (.047)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (.093)  (0.000) (0.000)  (.001) 
Mar 05    -0.6451***  0.1691***  0.0620***  0.2201***  0.1681***  0.2342*** -0.1267***  0.3101  0.5613*** -1.7208***  -0.4039** 
   <29.8688>  <61.0991>  <29.182>  <11.6757> <44.8115>  <30.5401> <26.4359>  <.9473>  <14.2647> <69.2095>  <5.6614> 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (.33)  (0.000) (0.000)  (.017) 
Apr 05    -0.7046***  0.1498***  0.0625***  0.3059***  0.1625***  0.2386*** -0.1337***  0.2804  0.3287**  -1.3938*** -1.2448*** 
   <37.059>  <52.1552>  <30.6081>  <24.1917> <42.9529>  <35.4451> <32.4117>  <.7576>  <5.1262> <67.7184> <41.6958> 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (.384)  (.024)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
May 05    -0.7346***  0.1055***  0.0590***  0.3028***  0.1555***  0.1951*** -0.0918***  1.4563***  0.3904**  -1.0189*** -0.8351*** 
   <40.397>  <41.814>  <28.6031>  <25.3126> <40.143>  <20.3801>  <20.6595> <11.7081> <4.1353>  <40.1843> <24.0435> 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (.001)  (.042)  (0.000)  (0.000)   52
Jun 05    -0.7136***  0.0704***  0.0567***  0.3423***  0.1625***  0.1585*** -0.0545***  0.7526**  0.2932*** -0.6590*** -0.8975*** 
   <40.0525>  <22.8621>  <26.8219>  <34.4053> <46.94>  <15.0664>  <7.8607> <6.0198> <4.1507>  <12.4685>  <30.413> 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (.005)  (.014)  (.042) (0.000) (0.000) 
 Jul 05    -0.6846***  0.0973***  0.0566***  0.2832***  0.1847***  0.2232*** -0.0713***  0.3855  0.6199*** -0.8755***  -0.2616 
   <34.9912>  <34.2562>  <26.9075>  <22.6952> <56.2407>  <30.0346>  <12.8039>  <1.4519> <17.9041>  <19.3333>  <2.5714> 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (.228)  (0.000) (0.000)  (.109) 
Aug 05    -0.8111***  0.0628***  0.0482***  0.3659***  0.1603***  0.1066*** -0.0576***  0.6227**  0.6209*** -0.5565*** -0.5140*** 
   <51.8146>  <20.5301>  <20.0322>  <43.3387> <45.015> <8.6513>  <8.1868>  <4.0042> <18.8088>  <6.9778> <9.7685> 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (.003) (.004)  (.045)  (0.000) (.008)  (.002) 
Sep 05    -0.7161***  0.1017***  0.0661***  0.2281***  0.1754***  0.2777*** -0.0897***  0.3208  0.7335*** -0.9925*** -0.8049*** 
   <39.7594>  <52.3418>  <37.193>  <16.8025> <51.6533>  <46.3394>  <22.9329>  <1.2005> <25.9786>  <23.1865> <25.7735> 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (.273)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
Oct 05    -0.8452***  0.0611***  0.0527***  0.3521***  0.1608***  0.1817*** -0.0763***  0.5023*  0.6248***  -0.4730**  -0.8427*** 
   <54.2481>  <19.683>  <23.9782>  <41.3046> <40.6541>  <20.4495>  <15.299>  <2.8392> <18.8963>  <5.8191>  <27.2929> 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (.092)  (0.000)  (.016)  (0.000) 
Nov 05    -0.8172***  0.0734***  0.0548***  0.2754***  0.1738***  0.2336*** -0.0775***  0.5427*  0.5871***  0.0740  -0.3271** 
   <52.9436>  <29.0922>  <26.0799>  <24.9853> <47.5965>  <38.1932> <16.4137>  <3.0672>  <16.6617> <.109>  <3.9018> 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (.08)  (0.000)  (.741)  (.048) 
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In Section 4.2, we report evidence of an association between fund age and 
stewardship grade. We now proceed to investigate further the issue of age bias in 
stewardship grade by examining the statistical significance of pair-wise differences in the 
mean stewardship grades across the three age groups: three-year, five-year and ten-year. 
We report in Panel E the results based on the overall stewardship grades. We also repeat 
the analysis using stewardship raw scores. All the results point to the same conclusion: 
there is strong evidence supporting the hypothesis that both three-year and five-year 
funds outperform the more seasoned ten-year funds although there is no statistical 
evidence to indicate that three-year and five-year funds perform differently under 
stewardship assessment. 
 
We extend our analysis via a dummy variable regression of stewardship grade on 
fund age. Seasoned (ten-year) fund group is used as the reference group. The regression 
coefficient corresponding to the dummy variable for three-year and five-year group 
represent the rating difference between the respective age-group and the reference group. 
A significantly positive regression coefficient indicates that funds in the younger group 
earn higher average stewardship grade than those in the reference group.  The results 
shown in Panel F again reveals that younger funds generally receive better stewardship 
grade than seasoned funds as evidenced by the observation that the regression coefficient 
for both three-year and five-year dummy variables are positive and significant at the 1% 
level in almost all twelve monthly regressions. 
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Panel E. Differences in Mean Stewardship Grades Across Age Groups  
This panel reports, for twelve consecutive monthly data over the period: December 2004 to November 
2005, the mean stewardship grades of funds in the three age groups: 3-year, 5-year and 10-year and results 
of t-tests on the pair-wise differences in mean stewardship grades. The symbols   * , ** and  *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percentage levels respectively. 
  Average Stewardship Rating  t-test of differences in Stewardship grade 
Month  10-year  5-year  3-year  Between 3-yr & 5-yr  Between 3-yr and 10-yr  Between 5-yr and 10-yr 
1 3.6889  3.3712 3.1968  2.47**  4.20***  2.61*** 
2 3.7045  3.4000 3.1968  2.34**  4.28***  3.04*** 
3 3.5625  3.4104 3.1945  1.09  2.85**  3.26*** 
4 3.4681  3.4453 3.1980  0.16  2.06**  3.88*** 
5 3.4681  3.3808 3.1907  0.62  2.07**  2.87*** 
6 3.8333  3.4904 3.2105  2.28**  4.70***  3.50*** 
7 3.5417  3.4120 3.2269  0.94  2.45**  2.95*** 
8 3.5000  3.5618 3.2348  -0.43  1.92**  6.00*** 
9 3.5745  3.5619 3.4212  0.09  2.42**  6.06*** 
10 3.5283  3.5681  3.2775  -0.30  2.01**  5.61*** 
11 3.4727  3.4914  3.2942  -0.14  1.42*  3.93*** 
12 3.4167  3.4800  3.2946  -0.42  0.85  3.73*** 
 
Panel F. Ordered Logit Regression of Stewardship Grade on Age Dummy Variables  
This panel reports the regression estimates and summary statistics of the regressions of fund stewardship 
grade on two dummy variables representing fund age: Dage3 and Dage5, where Dage3 and Dage5 which 
respectively take value 1 when the fund has 3-5 and 5-10 years of history. Funds with age 10 years form the 
reference group. We perform a series of 12 cross-sectional ordered logit regressions using twelve 
consecutive monthly data over the period December 2004 to November 2005. The numbers  within (   ) are 
the p-values. The symbols   * , ** and  *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percentage 
levels respectively. 
Month  Dage3 D age5 
1 1.0791***  0.3653*** 
 (0.0003)  (0.0042) 
2 1.1439***  0.4388*** 
 (0.0002)  (0.0006) 
3 0.8398***  0.4642*** 
 (0.003)  (0.0003) 
4 0.5698***  0.5388*** 
 (0.0423)  (<0.0001) 
5 0.5708**  0.4008*** 
 (0.0417)  (0.0012) 
6 1.2643***  0.5913*** 
 (0.002)  (0.0002) 
7 0.7406***  0.3956*** 
 (0.0086)  (0.0013) 
8 0.6468**  0.6528*** 
 (0.0269)  (<0.0001) 
9 0.8273***  0.6578*** 
 (0.0039)  (<0.0001) 
10 0.6213**  0.6611*** 
 (0.0198)  (<0.0001) 
11 0.4905*  0.4988*** 
 (0.0584)  (<0.0001) 
12 0.3031  0.4655*** 
 (0.2694)  (<0.0001)   55
To determine which of the five stewardship components contribute most to the 
age bias, we run separately five ordered logistic regressions on the age dummy variables, 
each having one stewardship component as the dependent variable. The results,   
displayed in Panel G, indicate that regulatory issue and corporate culture are the main 
contributing factors for the age bias of stewardship grades. In particular, younger funds 
tend to do better in these two components as reflected in the significantly positive 
regression coefficients. This conclusion is also strongly supported by the results of t-tests 
on differences in means as reported in Panel H.  
 
Consolidating the above findings, we believe our conclusion that younger funds 
fare better than seasoned funds in stewardship grades can be partly accounted for by the 
manner in which Morningstar evaluate funds for the individual stewardship component. 
For Regulatory Issue, which is one of the two components that we have found to be a 
crucial determining factor for the overall stewardship grade, we recall that funds are 
given penalty points ranging from -2 to 0. The final score depends on the degree to which 
the funds are involved in such regulatory issues as fund indictments and scandals over the 
past three-year history of the funds as well as the level of commitment the fund 
companies show in trying to salvage the situation. We conjecture that older funds could 
have a higher chance of being involved in regulatory woes due to certain level of 
managerial entrenchment, for seasoned funds are typically well-performing flagship 
funds for the fund family to which it belongs. Fund managers who fear being replaced for 
their failure to at least maintain a good track record of fund performance have the 
tendency to engage in activities that might lie beyond the regulatory framework. 
Similarly, our finding that younger funds outperform older ones under Corporate Culture 
could be ascribed to possible differences in investment culture adopted by managers of 
old and young funds. Older funds tend to have larger asset base as these funds have a 
longer time horizon to build their assets. When fund size grows too large and fund 
managers do not put in a concerted effort to curb the size, a lower score for Corporate 
Culture will be given.  
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Panel G. Ordered Logit Regressions of Stewardship Grade Components on Age Dummy Variables  
This panel reports the regression estimates and summary statistics of the regressions of each of the five stewardship grade components: Board Quality (BQ), 
Corporate Culture (CC), Fees (Fees), Manager Incentives (MI) and Regulatory Issue (RI)  on two dummy variables representing fund age: Dage3 and Dage5, where 
Dage3 and Dage5 respectively takes value 1 when the fund has 3-5 and 5-10 years of history. Funds with age 10 years form the reference group. We perform a series 
of 12 cross-sectional ordered logit regressions using twelve consecutive monthly data over the period December 2004 to November 2005. The numbers  within 
(   ) are the p-values. The symbols   * , ** and  *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percentage levels respectively. 
 
Month BQ  CC  Fees  MI  RI 
  
Dage3  Dage5 D age3 D age5 D age3 D age5 D age3 D age5 D age3 D age5 
1  0.3744  -0.0605  1.2795*** 0.3682***  -0.1178  -0.2374**  0.1379  0.2065*  1.3449*** 0.7922*** 
  (0.2266) (0.6592)  (<0.0001)  (0.0031) (0.6687) (0.0545) (0.6173) (0.0966) (0.0009)  (<0.0001) 
2  0.3907  0.0906  1.3428*** 0.4309***  -0.1163  -0.2380**  0.1124  0.2882**  1.5055*** 0.9014*** 
  (0.2124) (0.5136)  (<0.0001)  (0.0006) (0.6757)  (0.055)  (0.6868) (0.0212) (0.0005)  (<0.0001) 
3  0.1364  0.0491  1.1325*** 0.4438***  -0.3772  -0.2767**  0.1166  0.2222*  1.6132*** 1.0352*** 
  (0.6475) (0.7193)  (<0.0001)  (0.0003) (0.1532) (0.0235) (0.6623) (0.0708) (0.0002)  (<0.0001) 
4  0.1355  0.0693  0.8155*** 0.5594***  -0.4377  -0.2221**  0.2494  0.3002**  1.0838*** 1.1072*** 
  (0.6532) (0.6078) (0.0027)  (<0.0001)  (0.1002)  (0.066)  (0.3588) (0.0142) (0.0025)  (<0.0001) 
5  0.1200  -0.0996  0.7786*** 0.4754***  -0.5089* -0.3140***  0.3774  0.3628*** 1.0903*** 0.9076*** 
  (0.6894) (0.4517) (0.0041) (0.0001) (0.0556) (0.0085) (0.1652) (0.0028) (0.0023)  (<0.0001) 
6  1.0135**  0.2764  1.1166*** 0.6101***  0.5273  -0.1735  0.8064**  0.5668*** 1.1065*** 1.0456*** 
  (0.0147) (0.1062) (0.0032) (0.0001) (0.1784) (0.2533) (0.0333) (0.0003) (0.0312)  (<0.0001) 
7  0.0406  -0.1846  0.7058*** 0.5339***  -0.3621  -0.2949**  0.6106**  0.4351*** 1.0180*** 0.8193*** 
  (0.8932) (0.1669) (0.0086)  (<0.0001)  (0.1694) (0.0127)  (0.024)  (0.0003) (0.0044)  (<0.0001) 
8  0.0685  -0.1885  0.5205**  0.4237*** -0.5796**  -0.2092*  0.7482*** 0.5374*** 0.8572*** 1.0251*** 
  (0.826)  (0.1529) (0.0647) (0.0004) (0.0345) (0.0778) (0.0081)  (<0.0001)  (0.0154)  (<0.0001) 
9  0.0806  -0.2025  0.8728*** 0.4235***  -0.2185  -0.2991*** 0.9410*** 0.5846*** 0.9483*** 1.0367*** 
  (0.791)  (0.118)  (0.0015) (0.0003) (0.4138) (0.0096) (0.0006)  (<0.0001)  (0.0069)  (<0.0001) 
10  0.1629  -0.2016  0.8844*** 0.4433***  -0.4726*  -0.2202** 0.6957*** 0.4331*** 1.1505*** 1.1073*** 
  (0.5699) (0.1158) (0.0007) (0.0002) (0.0593) (0.0558) (0.0072) (0.0002) (0.0008)  (<0.0001) 
11  0.0355 -0.4291***  0.8002***  0.3230*** -0.3903 -0.3467***  0.4824**  0.4754***  0.9314***  0.8189*** 
  (0.8967) (0.0002) (0.0016) (0.0032) (0.1121) (0.0012) (0.0582)  (<0.0001)  (0.0035)  (<0.0001) 
12  -0.0069 -0.4631 0.7962  0.2926***  -0.5122**  -0.2762***  1.0825***  0.4303***  0.7479**  0.8497*** 
  (0.9811) (0.0001) (0.0033) (0.0072) (0.0503) (0.0097) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0209)  (<0.0001)   57
Panel H Differences in Mean Scores of Stewardship Components: Corporate Culture and Regulatory Issues Across Age 
Groups  
This panel reports, for twelve consecutive monthly data over the period December 2004 to November 2005, the mean scores of two stewardship components: 
Corporate Culture and Regulatory Issue, of funds in the three age groups: 3-year, 5-year and 10-year and results of t-tests on the differences in mean stewardship 
grades. The numbers  within (   ) are the p-values. The symbols   * , ** and  *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percentage levels respectively. 
 
 
 
 
Corporate Culture    Regulatory Issue 
 
Average Score in Corporate 
Culture 
t-test of differences 
in means    Average Score in Culture 
t-test of differences in 
means 
 
Month 
 
10-year 
 
5-year 
 
3-year 
Between 
3-year 
and 10-
year 
Between 
5-year 
and 10-
year   
 
10-year 
 
5-year 
 
3-year 
Between 
3-year and 
10-year 
Between 5-
year and 
10-year 
1  1.5889 1.3125 1.2404 6.58*** 2.02**  1.7667  1.6780  1.4181  4.11***  6.02*** 
2  1.6023 1.3231 1.2373 6.98** 2.31**  1.7955  1.6981  1.4209  4.60***  6.47*** 
3  1.5521 1.3231 1.2373 5.81*** 2.58**  1.8125  1.7295  1.4199  5.20***  7.56*** 
4  1.4574 1.3431 1.2386 4.41***  3.53***   1.7234  1.7336  1.3952  3.96***  8.41*** 
5  1.4468 1.3238 1.2179 4.33***  3.07***   1.7234  1.6815  1.3923  3.99***  6.90*** 
6  1.5417 1.3758 1.2251 4.25***  3.43***   1.7708  1.7516  1.4189  3.62***  7.15*** 
7  1.4271 1.3363 1.2224 4.18***  3.30***   1.7292  1.6831  1.4256  3.73***  6.20*** 
8  1.4205  1.3622  1.2621  2.99***  3.19***    1.7159 1.7739 1.4910 2.68** 8.50*** 
9  1.5000 1.3629 1.2604 4.10***  3.35***   1.7340  1.7759  1.4908  3.06***  8.81*** 
10  1.5000 1.3621 1.2545 4.71***  3.56***   1.7642  1.7940  1.5004  3.69***  9.78*** 
11  1.4727 1.3290 1.2579 4.10***  2.59***   1.7273  1.7339  1.5168  2.86***  7.58*** 
12  1.4688  1.3200  1.2550  3.17***  2.37**    1.6875 1.7443 1.5134 1.99** 7.90*** 
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4.6  Descriptive Statistics of Out-of-sample Performance Measures 
 
  We display and analyse in Table 5 the estimates of two out-of-sample 
performance: Carhart’s four-factor alpha and Sharpe ratio of each fund for each of the 
twelve monthly samples of mutual funds taken from the Morningstar Principia CDs. 
 
We first perform Shapiro and Wilk’s Normality Test on these estimates. Panel A 
only reports the results for the November 2005 sample, although we conduct the tests for 
all twelve samples. We reject at the 1% significance level the hypothesis of normality for 
both performance estimates for all twelve samples. This provides strong evidence that the 
distribution of the ex-post performance of mutual funds is not normal.  
 
A closer examination of the distribution of the performance estimates reveals that 
the four-factor alphas has a significantly right-skewed distribution while the distribution 
of the Share ratio is somewhat symmetrical, as indicated by the estimates of skewness.  
We therefore remark that in any subsequent tests that we shall conduct using these 
performance measures, the median value is probably a more appropriate choice than the 
mean.  
 
We also perform Student-t test to determine whether the mean of each of the 
performance estimates differs significantly from zero. Results from Panel A show that the 
mean values of both performance measures are significantly positive, providing an 
evidence that the sample funds deliver, on average, significantly positive excess returns 
over a 30-month post-evaluation period 
 
One of our primary reasons for estimating the out-of-sample performance of the 
sample funds is to examine whether fund ratings have any power to forecast future 
performance. With this in mind, we first decompose the sample into groups based on the 
funds’ ratings (star rating or stewardship grade) and compare the average out-of-sample 
performance measures of funds within each rating group. If ratings do possess predictive   59
ability, then we would expect the average out-of-sample performance to increase 
monotonically with fund ratings.  
 
We record the statistics for the November 2005 sample in Panels B and C. 
Although the median is a more appropriate statistic to use than the mean in view of our 
earlier observation that the performance measures are positively skewed, we report 
results based on both mean and median.  When funds are grouped according to their star 
ratings, as reported in Panel B, we find that the median within-group Sharpe ratio 
increases monotonically from 1-star group to 5-star group. The corresponding results for 
four-factor alpha also indicates that funds in the higher rating groups (4-star and 5-star) 
outperform funds in the lower rating group, though there is no evidence that 2-star funds 
fare better than 1-star funds on the average. However, we have to note that the latter 
could be partly due to the relatively small class size of 1-star funds (67) as compared to 
the much larger class size (279) of 2-star funds. In addition, we obtain (but do not report) 
the results when funds are further portioned by their age. We find that the predictive 
power improves drastically in the three-year and ten-year groups, with the effect 
manifested almost monotonically across ratings; both mean and median out-of-sample 
measure in a rating group exceeds the corresponding figures for funds in a lower rating 
group. However, no improvement has been observed in the five-year group. 
 
Panel C contains the results for funds partitioned by their stewardship grades. The 
predictive ability of stewardship grades appears to be relatively weaker than that of the 
star ratings. For example, we find little evidence that Grade-A funds outperform Grade-B 
funds, and conclusions drawn with regard to funds in C, D and F categories are mixed. 
When we consider the Sharpe ratio, the expected trend of higher ex-post performance for 
higher stewardship grade is observed across the grades. However, the results based on the 
four-factor alpha do not appear to support this observation.  
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TABLE 5 
Summary Statistics of Out-of-sample Performance Measures 
 
For each fund in each of the 12 evaluation months: December 2004 to November 2005, we estimate two 
out-of-sample performance measures: four-factor alpha and Sharpe ratio. The four-factor alpha of Carhart 
(1997) is estimated via the following time-series linear regression model: 
 
it i4 t i3 t i2 t i1 ft it ε UMD β HML β SMB β RMRF β α R R          
for t = 1, 2, ..., 30, where t = 0 is the evaluation month. 
ft it R R   is the  monthly return of fund i in excess of monthly T-Bill rate;   t RMRF  is the value of the 
market return in excess of monthly T-Bill rate;  t SMB (small minus big factor) is the difference in returns 
across small and big portfolios;  t HML (high minus low factor) is the difference in returns between high 
and low book-to-market equity portfolios;  t UMD  (monthly momentum factor) is the difference in average 
returns on two high ex-ante return portfolio and two low ex-ante return portfolios. The second performance 
measure, the Sharpe ratio, of a fund i is defined by 
Sharpe Ratioi = 
i
__________
f i
σ
R R 
 
where 
__________
f i R R   is the mean return of fund i in excess of 30-day Treasury-bill rate and  i    the standard 
deviation of the excess returns of fund i , over the out-of-sample 30-month post-evaluation period, using 
data obtained form the Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. 
 
 
 
Panel A.  Results of Statistical Tests of Normality and of Zero Mean on the Cross-sectional 
Series of Performance Metrics for November 2005 Sample 
This panel report results of statistical tests of normality on the two out-of-sample performance metrics: 
four-factor alpha and Sharpe ratio, of funds calculated over a 24-month period December 2005 to 
November 2007, for the November 2005 sample. The Shapiro-Wilk test statistic W lies between 0 and 1. 
Normality is rejected when W is sufficiently close to 1. The numbers in parenthesis (   ) are the p-values. 
The symbols   * , ** and  *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percentage levels 
respectively. 
 
 
 
Shapiro and Wilk’s Normality Test and  Test of Zero Mean  
Four-factor Alpha  Sharpe Ratio 
Shapiro-Wilk Test 
Ho: Underlying distribution is 
Normal 
t-test of zero 
mean 
 Skewness 
Shapiro-Wilk Test 
Ho: Underlying 
distribution is Normal 
t-test of zero 
mean 
 Skewness 
0.872965*** 
 (<0.0001) 
11.83212*** 
 (<0.0001) 
 
            
1.60777211 
0.988961*** 
(<0.0001) 
24.93664*** 
(< 0.0001)  -0.2520578 
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Panel B.  Comparison of Out-of-sample Performance Measures Across Various 
Star-rating Groups for November 2005 Sample 
This panel reports the within-group averages of two out-of-sample performance metrics: four-factor alpha 
and Sharpe ratio, of funds calculated over a 24-month period December 2005 through November 2007 for 
the November 2005 sample. The groups are formed by partitioning the funds by their star ratings. We 
perform Kruskal-Wallis tests of equality of median. The test statistics and p-value are indicated below the 
table. The symbols   * , ** and  *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percentage levels 
respectively. 
 
 
   
Four-factor Alpha  Sharpe Ratio 
Star-rating 
Group  N Mean  Median  N Mean  Median 
1-star 67  0.272277  0.049703  67  0.152771  0.095263 
2-star 279  0.080088  -0.00526  279  0.139996  0.138414 
3-star 470  0.166234  0.008209  470  0.175315  0.162361 
4-star 428  0.178813  0.073447  428  0.185355  0.167683 
5-star 185  0.184377  0.119062  185  0.187492  0.195631 
 
Kruskal-Wallis Test of equality of means 
Four-factor Alpha  Sharpe ratio 
Chi-Square Statistic   
46.0393***    
Chi-Square Statistic   
20.5301***    
(<0.0001)  (<0.0001 )                
 
  
 
 
 
 
Panel C.  Comparison of Out-of-sample Performance Measures Across the Five 
Stewardship-grade Groups for November 2005 Sample 
This panel reports the within-group averages of the two out-of-sample performance metrics: four-factor 
alpha and Sharpe ratio of funds calculated over a 24-month period December 2005 to November 2007 for 
the November 2005 sample. The groups are formed by partitioning the funds by their stewardship grades. 
We perform Kruskal-Wallis tests of equality of median. The test statistic and p-value are indicated below 
the table. The symbols   * , ** and  *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percentage levels 
respectively. 
 
 Four-factor  Alpha  Sharpe  Ratio 
Stewardship 
Group N  Mean  Median N  Mean Median 
F 16  0.031169  0.028614  16  0.061002  0.06291 
D 154  -0.00359  -0.04444  154  0.06845  0.091512 
C 519  0.12005  -0.00339  519  0.159815  0.133969 
B 664  0.228748  0.091028  664  0.202608  0.20582 
A 76  0.200234  0.033499  76  0.219964  0.188409 
 
 
Kruskal-Wallis Test of equality of means 
 
Four-factor Alpha 
 
Sharpe ratio 
Chi-Square Statistic   
54.5342***    
Chi-Square Statistic   
70.9408***    
(0.0013)  (0.0004 )                  62
In order to investigate whether there is any discernible difference in future 
performance across different age groups and fund categories, we compile the average 
out-of-sample performance of funds in each of the three age groups and three fund 
categories. The results displayed in Panel D show that middle-age (five-year) funds 
outperform funds in other age groups. Kruskall Walli’s test shows that the differences in 
medians across the three groups are significant at the 1% level. International Stock funds 
emerge the winner among the three categories based on the figures reported in Panel E. 
Differences in group medians are also found to be significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel D.  Comparison of Out-of-Sample Performance Measures Across Various Age 
Groups for June 2005 Sample 
This panel reports the within-group averages of the two out-of-sample performance metrics: four-factor 
alpha and Sharpe ratio of funds calculated over the period December 2005 to November 2007 for the 
November 2005 sample. The groups are formed by partitioning the funds by their fund age. We perform 
Kruskal-Wallis tests of equality of median. The test statistic and p-value are indicated. The symbols   * , ** 
and  *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percentage levels respectively. 
 
 
 
  Four-factor Alpha  Sharpe Ratio 
Age Group  N  Mean  Median  N  Mean  Median 
3-year  41 0.104198  0.053173 41  0.132667  0.151605 
5-year  257 0.308343 0.159591 257  0.264438  0.24819 
10-year  1131 0.12895 0.021549  1131  0.152352  0.146235 
 
 
 
 
Kruskal-Wallis Test of equality of means 
Four-factor Alpha  Sharpe ratio 
Chi-Square Statistic   
43.4401 ***       
Chi-Square Statistic   
47.8280***    
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
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Panel E.  Comparison of Out-of-sample Performance Measures Across Various Fund-type 
Categories 
This panel reports the within-group averages of the two out-of-sample performance metrics: four-factor 
alpha and Sharpe ratio of funds calculated over the period December 2005 to November 2007 for the 
November 2005 sample. The groups are formed by partitioning the funds by their respective fund types: 
Bonds, Domestic Stock and International Stock. We perform Kruskal-Wallis tests of equality of median. 
The test statistic and p-value are indicated. The symbols   * , ** and  *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10, 5 and 1 percentage levels respectively. 
 
  Four-factor Alpha  Sharpe Ratio 
Type N Mean  Median  N  Mean  Median 
Bond  581 -0.03278  -0.0516  581  -0.00300  0.01763 
Domestic 
Stock  434 -0.08386 -0.07351 434  0.169272  0.172768 
International 
Stock  414 0.68792 0.646718 414  0.420265  0.428467 
 
Kruskal-Wallis Test of equality of means 
Four-factor Alpha  Sharpe ratio 
Chi-Square Statistic   
798.7697 ***       
Chi-Square Statistic   
928.7181***    
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
 
We proceed to examine the joint ability of the two Morningstar ratings in 
forecasting future returns. There are a few ways in which funds can be divided into 
rating-based performance groups using the two ratings. One approach would be to simply 
group the funds into a 25 subgroups based on rating pair (SR, SG) of the funds, where SR 
is the star rating and SG the stewardship grade and compute the average (mean or median) 
out-of-sample  performance measures of funds for each group. We display the results in 
Panel F. For subsequent discussion, we shall refer to group (i, j) the group in which funds 
receive ratings i and j for star rating and stewardship grade respectively. We comment 
that grouping funds by their rating pairs has a serious limitation in achieving our 
objective of making a comparison: we do not have a proper way of ordering the groups. 
For example, there is difficulty with comparing group (4, 5) with group (5, 4). 
Nonetheless, we can draw some conclusions for cases that are less ambiguous. We 
observe that funds in groups with good rating pairs (for example, those with both i  4   
and j  4  ) fare better, in terms of the average Sharpe ratio, than all their peers in groups 
with poor ratings (for example, those with i  2   and j  2  ). The results based on four-
factor alpha turn out to be less assuring.  
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Panel F.  Comparison of Out-of-sample Performance Measures Across Twenty Five (Star 
rating, Stewardship grade) Groups for November 2005 Sample 
This panel reports the within-group averages of two out-of-sample performance metrics: four-factor alpha 
and Sharpe ratio of funds calculated over the period December 2005 to November 2007 for the November 
2005 sample. The groups are formed by partitioning the funds by their rating pairs : (star rating , 
stewardship grades).  
  Four-factor Alpha  Sharpe Ratio 
Star-
rating 
Stewardship 
Grade N  Mean Median N  Mean  Median 
1-star F  0  NA  NA  0  NA  NA 
1-star D  21  0.157791  0.029225  21  0.108832  0.246889 
1-star C  20  -0.00414  -0.10474  20  0.026146  -0.01164 
1-star B  26  0.577374  0.721149  26  0.285663  0.458391 
1-star A  0  NA  NA  0  NA  NA 
2-star F  5  0.011244  0.024734  5  0.062064  0.07502 
2-star D  46  -0.07643  -0.08545  46  0.068603  0.051444 
2-star C 155  0.106503  0.010794  155  0.155402  0.211368 
2-star B  65  0.145719  0.007981  65  0.166288  0.177621 
2-star A  8  -0.02191  -0.01691  8  0.087112  0.133897 
3-star F  6  0.042587  0.044135  6  0.0892  0.06291 
3-star D  55  -0.07258  -0.07074  55  0.050499  0.106593 
3-star C 189  0.088376  -0.06746  189  0.137034  0.098969 
3-star B 205  0.30827  0.143076  205  0.244739  0.229823 
3-star A  15  0.131193  0.050783  15  0.200961  0.156575 
4-star F  4  0.03953  0.042578  4  0.025682  0.028008 
4-star D  24  0.129088  0.088647  24  0.098764  0.117114 
4-star C 107  0.191316  0.055066  107  0.214195  0.199866 
4-star B 262  0.179305  0.087285  262  0.182363  0.173076 
4-star A  31  0.187974  -0.01367  31  0.198741  0.125379 
5-star F  1  0.02885  0.02885  1  0.027786  0.027786 
5-star D  8  0.067993  -0.00886  8  -0.00595  0.008044 
5-star C  48  0.1814  0.099626  48  0.198239  0.139841 
5-star B 106  0.162563  0.134679  106  0.173068  0.187342 
5-star A  22  0.345365  0.228397  22  0.311138  0.249797 
 
 
The average out-of-sample performance (be it four-factor alpha or Sharpe ratio) in 
the best rating group (5,5) is superior to all other groups except group (1, 4) (1-star and 
grade B). In fact, the latter exhibits the best ex-post performance. This applies to both 
performance measures. One possible explanation for this anomaly is that managers of 
funds in this group changed their investing strategy, taking higher risk to improve the 
subsequent short-term fund returns in order to gain a higher star rating. This is a possible 
manifestation of the so-called tournament phenomenon in the mutual fund literature: fund 
managers, in their attempt to compete for good fund ratings, tend to make drastic changes 
to their investment style to improve fund performance. 
   65
  We remark that the preceding analysis based on rating-pair groups is problematic 
in that the size of rating-pair group is not uniform. Top and bottom rating-pair groups 
generally have much smaller group size than the other groups. In order to have a 
meaningful comparison of out-of-sample performance based on the two ratings, we 
devise a method of grouping the funds into three ordered groups ‘Good’, ‘Fair’ or ‘Poor’. 
A fund is in the ‘Good’ category if both its star rating and stewardship grade are either 4 
or 5. A fund is classified as ‘Poor’ if both its star rating and stewardship grade are 1 or 2. 
Funds with other ratings combinations are labeled as ‘Fair’. It turns out that the effect of 
rating-based performance on future performance is pronounced. Panel G shows that the 
average out-of-sample performance, be it the four-factor alpha or the Sharpe ratio, 
exhibits the expected monotone increasing trend from ‘Poor’ to ‘Good’. Results of 
Krusal-Wallis tests provide evidence that the differences in medians across the three 
groups are significant at the 1% level, while the outcome of two-sample t-test also 
indicates that the differences in means between any two groups are significant at the 1% 
significant level. 
Another way to group funds based on their rating pair is to sort the funds by the 
sum of the raw scores for their two ratings. By this ordering, we are assuming it is not the 
individual rating, but the combined score for both ratings, that determines the 
performance of a fund. We organise funds into deciles and report the results in Panel H. 
 
Panel G.  Comparison of Out-of-sample Performance Measures Across Three Performance 
Groups Defined by Fund’s  (Star-rating, Stewardship-grade) Pairs 
This panel reports the within-group averages of two out-of-sample performance metrics: four-factor alpha 
and Sharpe ratio of funds calculated over the period December 2005 to November 2007 for the November 
2005 sample. The three performance groups formed by partitioning the funds by their rating pairs: (star 
rating, stewardship grades) are defined as follows: A fund is in the ‘Good’ category if both SR and SG are 
4 or 5, in the  ‘Poor’ category if both SR and SG are 2 or 1, and in the ‘Fair’ category otherwise. We 
perform Kruskal-Wallis tests of equality of median. The test statistic and p-value are indicated. The 
symbols   * , ** and  *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percentage levels respectively. 
  Four-factor Alpha  Sharpe Ratio 
Performance Group  N Mean  Median  N  Mean  Median 
Poor 128  0.118723  -0.00801  128  0.112028  0.061301 
Fair 880  0.155145  0.017924  880  0.173001  0.162838 
Good 421  0.184406  0.090605  421  0.187958  0.183214 
 
Kruskal-Wallis Test of equality of means 
Four-factor Alpha  Sharpe ratio 
Chi-Square Statistic   
13.5412 ***    
Chi-Square Statistic   
13.9031***    
(0.0011)  (0. 0.001 )                  66
Panel H.  Comparison of Out-of-sample Performance Measures Across Deciles Formed by 
Ranking Funds Based on Sum of Raw Scores 
This panel reports the within-decile averages of two out-of-sample performance metrics: four-factor alpha 
and Sharpe ratio of funds calculated over the period December 2005 to November 2007 for the November 
2005 sample. Funds are ranked by the sum of the raw scores of star rating and stewardship grade and 
organized into deciles. We perform Kruskal-Wallis tests of equality of median. The test statistic and p-
value are indicated. The symbols  * , ** and  *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 
percentage levels respectively. 
  Four-factor Alpha  Sharpe Ratio 
Decile  N  Mean  Median  N  Mean            Median 
(Worst)1 143  0.06734  -0.04007  143  0.08954 0.07271 
2 143  0.106366  -0.01281  143  0.14660  0.16188 
3 143  0.096343  -0.01532  143  0.14836  0.15248 
4 143  0.110674  -0.02014  143  0.14952  0.13904 
5 143  0.236849  0.073535  143  0.16554  0.13143 
6 143  0.234225  0.002373  143  0.20627  0.20928 
7 143  0.131252  0.05678  143  0.19142  0.17669 
8 143  0.210226  0.114394  143  0.19477  0.20536 
9 143  0.2196  0.104262  143  0.21327  0.17345 
(Best)10 142  0.19238  0.157738  142  0.21445 0.21476 
 
 
Kruskal-Wallis Test of equality of means 
Chi-Square Statistic   
43.4401 ***       
Chi-Square Statistic   
36.8411***    
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
 
 
 
For robustness, we repeat the above analysis on 12 consecutive monthly data over 
the period December 2004 – November 2005. We document the statistics based on star 
ratings in Panel I. In order to make sense out of these voluminous statistics, we construct 
a table reporting the number of times (out of 12)  l k     occurs, where  j  denotes the 
mean/median out-of-sample performance measures of funds in j-star group. The results 
are given in Panel J.   
 
In general, top-rated funds outperform lower-rated funds, with 5-star funds 
enjoying higher ex-post returns than 3-star finds in all twelve evaluation months. In at 
least 10 out of 12 months, 4-star funds are also found to gain higher average returns than 
3-star funds. In addition, 5-star funds also appear to do better than 4-star funds in most of 
the cases. On the flip side, the predictive ability of lower-rated funds is relatively weaker 
than that of high-rated ones. When we consider the four-factor alpha, only in 3 out of 12 
cases do we get  1 2    . The corresponding number for Sharpe ratio is 7.  To determine   67
whether the differences in out-of-sample performance of 4-star funds and 5-star funds are 
significant, we perform a series of twelve two-sample t-tests on the difference in mean 
performance between the two groups. We find that in the case of four-factor alpha, only 5 
out 12 of the test-statistics are significant at the 10% level. When Sharpe ratio is used 
instead, the difference in mean out-of-sample performance is found significant in 10 out 
of 12 samples. 
 
We report the corresponding results for stewardship grades in Panels K and L. 
Consistent with our earlier report, stewardship grades are at best on par with the star 
rating in forecasting future fund returns. If we use the four-factor alpha as performance 
metric, then Grade A funds do not seem to fare better than Grade B funds, although 
Grade B funds outperform lower grade funds in at least 10 out of 12 sample. On the 
positive side, lower ratings exhibit strong predictive power, with  1 2 3       in at least 
8 out of 12 samples.  
 
  Tuning to joint predictive ability of the two Morningstar ratings, we divide funds 
into three categories: ‘Good’, ‘Fair’ and ‘Poor’, according to each fund’s (SR SG)  rating 
pair, based on the following. 
Fund i is classified as 





   
 
otherwise               fair      
6 SG SR   and   3 SG   and   3 SR    if            poor      
4 SG    and   4 SR    if                   good
i i i i
i i
 
 
where SRi and SGi are the star rating and stewardship grade of fund i, with stewardship 
grades quantified by: A = 5, B = 4, C = 3, D = 2 and F =  1. The choice of the above 
criteria is based on the assumption that investors regard funds that fail to attain more than 
half the maximum total score of 10 ( 5-star + Grade A) as poor performers and funds that 
attain at least the second best rating as good performers. We denote by  k  the 
mean/median of out of-sample performance measure in group k where ‘Good’ = group 3, 
‘Fair’ = group 2  and ‘Poor’ = group 1.    68
Panel I.  Comparison of Out-of-sample Performance Measures Across Various Star-rating Groups for Twelve Consecutive Monthly 
Samples December 2004 to November 2005 
This panel reports the within-group averages of two out-of-sample performance metrics: four-factor alpha and Sharpe ratio, of funds calculated over a 30-month 
post-evaluation period for twelve evaluation months December 2004 to November 2005. For each sample, groups are formed by partitioning the sample funds by 
star ratings. 
 
    Summary statistics (Mean and Median) 
   Four-factor  Alpha  Sharpe  Ratio 
Month  Statistics  1-star 2-star 3-star 4-star 5-star 1-star 2-star 3-star 4-star 5-star 
 
Dec04 N  31  133 299 232 103  50  212 460 364 184 
  Mean  0.0492 0.1119 0.0903 0.1606 0.2496 0.1037 0.0954 0.1674 0.2001 0.2015 
  Median 0.0584 0.0555 0.0136 0.1076 0.2526 0.1846 0.2020 0.2214 0.2607 0.2523 
Jan  05 N  39  141 312 236 100  49  221 468 372 171 
  Mean  0.1204 0.1419 0.1062 0.2245 0.2006 0.1213 0.0883 0.1462 0.1746 0.1844 
  Median  -0.2101 0.0579 -0.0253 0.1500 0.2969 0.1533 0.1752 0.1780 0.2060 0.2261 
Feb  05 N  44  141 330 236  97  59  227 492 375 170 
  Mean  0.1246 0.0607 0.0863 0.1486 0.1885 0.0935 0.0650 0.1327 0.1493 0.1670 
  Median 0.0247 0.0021 -0.0545 0.0909 0.2489 0.1374 0.1477 0.1669 0.1806 0.2329 
Mar  05 N  32  150 327 237  98  46  255 488 384 166 
  Mean  0.2168 0.0841 0.1144 0.2094 0.2734 0.2007 0.1296 0.2119 0.2320 0.2628 
  Median 0.0801 -0.0206  -0.0410 0.0924 0.3289 0.1757 0.1817 0.2351 0.2565 0.3250 
Apr  05 N  33  156 334 242  86  45  249 504 381 161 
  Mean  0.1819 0.0628 0.1766 0.1710 0.3005 0.2635 0.1771 0.2594 0.2764 0.2741 
  Median  -0.1663  -0.0296 0.0209 0.0461 0.3695 0.2565 0.2630 0.3112 0.3306 0.3703 
May  05 N  28  178 325 244  96  38  267 483 396 174 
  Mean  0.1646 0.1073 0.1927 0.1856 0.2983 0.1412 0.1241 0.1758 0.1831 0.2066 
  Median  -0.1173 0.0175 0.0702 0.0716 0.3588 0.1077 0.1550 0.1868 0.1867 0.2214 
Jun  05 N  29  178 325 245  94  40  267 493 421 172 
  Mean  0.4075 0.0681 0.1815 0.1874 0.2498 0.1611 0.0962 0.1386 0.1544 0.1560 
  Median 0.1610 -0.0288 0.0652 0.0869 0.2506 0.1365 0.1078 0.1565 0.1507 0.1735 
Jul  05 N  30  185 321 249  89  38  265 501 430 171 
  Mean  0.4151 0.0804 0.1349 0.1982 0.2716 0.0724 0.0500 0.0631 0.0987 0.0952 
  Median  -0.0008  -0.0412  -0.0116 0.0688 0.2944 0.0361 0.0480 0.0538 0.1060 0.1216   69
Aug  05 N  39  176 324 267  93  47  260 503 445 185 
  Mean  0.6209 0.0195 0.1286 0.1998 0.2110 0.1370 0.0024 0.0361 0.0658 0.0412 
  Median 0.4156 -0.0658 0.0172 0.1120 0.2482 0.1350 0.0039 0.0330 0.0844 0.0908 
Sep  05 N  40  174 325 268 112  54  258 512 443 200 
  Mean  0.2811 0.0189 0.1037 0.1444 0.1555 0.0367 0.0159 0.0379 0.0644 0.0536 
  Median 0.0416 -0.0645 0.0226 0.0783 0.1775 0.0577 0.0135 0.0406 0.0662 0.0656 
Oct  05 N  48  179 308 279 117  68  252 465 423 184 
  Mean  0.3054 -0.0098 0.1089 0.1697 0.2078 0.0992 0.0736 0.1081 0.1327 0.1357 
  Median 0.0916 -0.0246 0.0351 0.0659 0.3040 0.0966 0.0819 0.1124 0.1302 0.1497 
Nov  05 N  49  197 315 271 114  67  276 463 424 183 
  Mean  0.3525 0.0079 0.1042 0.1531 0.2020 0.1030 0.0715 0.0989 0.1201 0.1215 
  Median 0.1641 -0.0047 0.0421 0.0768 0.2623 0.0822 0.0788 0.0949 0.1136 0.1392 
 
 
Panel J.  Summary of Ability of Star Ratings to Forecast Future Fund Performance  
This panel reports the number of times (out of 12) the mean or median out of-sample performance measure in one rating group exceeds that in a lower rating 
group for several cases of comparison. We denote by  k the mean/median of out of-sample performance measures in rating group k. 
 
Out of-sample 
Performance  Average 
# time 
(out of 12) 
4 5     
# time 
(out of 12) 
3 4     
# time 
(out of 12) 
3 5     
# time 
(out of 12) 
2 3     
# time 
(out of 12) 
1 2     
 
Four-factor alpha  mean  11 10 12 10  2 
  median 
  12 12 12  8  3 
Sharpe ratio   
mean 
 
8 
 
12 
 
12 
 
12 
 
0 
  median  10 10 12 12  7 
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Panel K.  Comparison of Out-of-sample Performance Measures Across Various Stewardship-Grade Groups for Twelve 
Consecutive Monthly Sample December 2004 to November 2005 
This panel reports the within-group averages of two out-of-sample performance metrics: four-factor alpha and Sharpe ratio, of funds calculated over a 30-month 
post-evaluation period for twelve evaluation months December 2004 to November 2005. For each sample, groups are formed by partitioning the funds by their 
stewardship grades.  
 
    Summary statistics (Mean and Median) 
   Four-factor  Alpha  Sharpe  Ratio 
Month    F D C B A F D C B A 
Dec04 N  24  90  283 354  47  68  138 430 572  62 
  mean  -0.1352 0.1076 0.0582 0.2061 0.2237 0.0095 0.1462 0.1667 0.1797 0.2746 
  median -0.1945 0.0669 -0.0379 0.1586 0.2249 -0.0002 0.2338 0.2194 0.2379 0.3265 
Jan  05 N  26  89  292 373  48  68  141 437 573  62 
  mean  -0.1478 0.1568 0.0833 0.2293 0.2272 -0.0194 0.1144 0.1435 0.1701 0.2478 
  median -0.2077 0.0140 -0.0674 0.1980 0.0973 -0.0382 0.1807 0.1774 0.2054 0.2515 
Feb  05 N  26  96  296 382  48  74  148 443 595  63 
  Mean -0.1404 0.0866 0.0432 0.1812 0.1909 -0.0399 0.1038 0.1164 0.1545 0.2225 
  Median  -0.1504  -0.0052  -0.0776 0.1512 0.0867 -0.0850 0.1752 0.1511 0.1899 0.2320 
Mar  05 N  26  78  299 393  48  74  133 462 607  63 
  Mean -0.1085 0.0821 0.0928 0.2327 0.2206 0.0405 0.1564 0.1948 0.2412 0.2891 
  Median  -0.1237  -0.0229  -0.0625 0.2062 0.0682 -0.0169 0.2231 0.2130 0.2771 0.3154 
Apr  05 N  26  88  303 387  47  74  143 461 599  63 
  Mean -0.0836 0.0451 0.1024 0.2539 0.2321 0.0490 0.1917 0.2412 0.2870 0.3490 
  Median  -0.1296  -0.0425  -0.0424 0.2298 0.0946 -0.0460 0.2905 0.2821 0.3576 0.3705 
May  05 N  27  88  316 391  49  77  144 465 609  63 
  Mean -0.0623 0.0787 0.1305 0.2617 0.2339 -0.0065 0.1179 0.1533 0.2109 0.2489 
  Median  -0.0977  -0.0189 0.0335 0.1959 0.0937 -0.0300 0.1589 0.1585 0.2094 0.2350 
Jun  05 N  27  88  311 396  49  74  147 472 635  65 
  Mean -0.0530 0.0652 0.1332 0.2404 0.2321 -0.0316 0.0839 0.1167 0.1791 0.2083 
  Median  -0.0622  -0.0371 0.0569 0.1699 0.0699 -0.0488 0.1285 0.1179 0.1861 0.1852 
Jul  05 N  12  66  333 414  49  63  125 502 650  65 
  Mean -0.1155 0.0565 0.1144 0.2313 0.1628 -0.0460 0.0203 0.0541 0.1107 0.1164 
  Median  -0.0737  -0.0365  -0.0068 0.1386 0.0188 -0.0290 0.0433 0.0499 0.1020 0.1151   71
Aug  05 N  12  72  338 425  52  64  130 508 669  69 
  Mean -0.1132 0.0665 0.1162 0.2181 0.1328 -0.0936  -0.0078 0.0216 0.0783 0.0845 
  Median  -0.0776 0.0045 0.0172 0.1279 -0.0040  -0.0645 0.0277 0.0334 0.0841 0.0781 
Sep  05 N  8  76  348 434  53  31  163 527 673  73 
  Mean  0.0308 0.0068 0.0676 0.1712 0.1094 -0.0252  -0.0212 0.0273 0.0736 0.0688 
  Median 0.0344 -0.0559 0.0211 0.0951 0.0243 -0.0057  -0.0231 0.0295 0.0745 0.0449 
Oct  05 N  8  79  340 450  54  16  150 492 659  75 
  Mean  0.0225 0.0199 0.0605 0.2024 0.0878 0.0911 0.0301 0.0950 0.1437 0.1231 
  Median 0.0251 -0.0443 0.0296 0.1536 -0.0335 0.1074 0.0524 0.0965 0.1474 0.0987 
Nov  05 N  4  83  356 447  56  16  154 506 661  76 
  Mean  0.0246 0.0275 0.0702 0.1856 0.1041 0.0240 0.0202 0.0931 0.1308 0.1127 
  Median 0.0248 -0.0163 0.0496 0.1520 -0.0069 0.0263 0.0236 0.0913 0.1266 0.0932 
 
 
Panel L.  Summary of Ability of Stewardship Grades to Forecast Future Fund Performance. 
This panel reports the number of times (out of 12) the mean and median out of-sample performance measure in one stewardship grade category exceeds that in a 
lower grade category for several cases of comparison. We denote by  k the mean/median of out of-sample performance measures in rating group k. 
 
Out of-sample 
Performance  Average 
# time 
(out of 12) 
4 5     
# time 
(out of 12) 
3 4     
# time 
(out of 12) 
3 5     
# time 
(out of 12) 
2 3     
# time 
(out of 12) 
1 2     
Four-factor  alpha  mean  2 12  12 9 10 
  median 
  1 12 9  8  9 
Sharpe ratio   
mean  9  12 12 12 10 
 median 7  12  12  5  9 
 
 
 
 
   72
We report the summary statistics in Panel M and the table indicating the strength 
of predictive ability in Panel N. We find evidence to support the hypothesis that the 
predictive ability of the combined ratings is superior to that of a single rating. With only 
one exception, namely mean four-factor alpha between ‘Poor’ and ‘Fair’ funds, the event 
1 2 3       occurs in 11 out of 12 samples.  
 
We also perform Kruskall Wallis tests for equality of means across the three 
groups. The null hypothesis is rejected at the 1% significance level, indicating strong 
evidence that the differences in performance across the three performance groups are 
significant. However, when we carry out sample t-tests for the difference in means of any 
pair of performance groups, we are unable to reject the hypothesis of equality of means 
for ‘Good’ and ‘Fair’ groups, indicating that it is impossible to distinguish between the 
best and second best funds. On the positive side, results are significant for the other 
combinations (‘Good’ versus ‘Bad’) and (‘Fair’ versus ‘Bad’). We remark that there is a 
small percentage of funds having SR = 1 and SG = 5  or SR = 5 and SG = 1. Treating 
these funds as outliers, we remove them from the sample and repeat the above analysis. 
We find that the conclusions remain in tact.  
 
In summary, our statistical analyses have provided evidence that each of the 
Morningstar ratings possesses some ability, albeit a weak one, to forecast funds’ future 
returns. The stewardship grade is at best on par with the star rating in terms of predictive 
ability. Evidence based on our studies also show that low-ratings on the whole indicate 
poor future performance and funds with good star ratings tend to deliver better ex-post 
returns than funds with poor ratings.  In addition, we find evidence to support the 
contention that the two Morningstar ratings, when jointly used, exhibit superior 
predictive performance than each individual rating. On the flip slide, we are unable to 
conclude that the best rated funds necessarily outperform funds with second best rating 
when funds are ranked according to predetermined criteria governed by the fund’s joint 
ratings. 
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Panel M.  Comparison of Out-of-sample Performance Measures Across Three Performance 
Groups Defined by Fund’s  (Star-rating, Stewardship-grade) Pairs For 12 consecutive 
Evaluation Months 
This panel reports the within-group averages of the two out-of-sample performance metrics: four-factor 
alpha and Sharpe ratio of funds calculated over a 30-month post-evaluation period for the 12 evaluation 
months Dec 2004 to Nov 2005. The three performance groups formed by partitioning sample funds by their 
rating pairs: (star rating , stewardship grades) are defined as follows: A fund is in the ‘Good’ category if 
both SR and SG are 4 or 5, in the  ‘Poor’ category if both SR and SG are 2 or 1, and in the ‘Fair’ category 
otherwise. We perform Kruskal-Wallis tests of equality of median. Hypothesis of equal medians is rejected 
at 1% significance for all 12 samples. 
 
  
Summary statistics 
(Mean and Median) 
    Four-factor alpha  Sharpe Ratio 
Month   Poor  Fair  Good  Poor Fair Good 
Dec04 N  189  666  415  149  754  367 
 mean  0.0506  0.0314  0.1274  0.0650 0.1721  0.1986 
 median  -0.0487  -0.0411  0.0313  0.1322  0.2251  0.2664 
Jan 05  N  189  689  403  148  778  355 
 mean  0.0417  0.0764  0.1333  0.0387 0.1578  0.1742 
 median  -0.0644  -0.0337  0.0127  0.0720  0.1963  0.2090 
Feb 05  N  185  733  405  165  801  357 
 mean  0.0024  0.0423  0.1229  0.0348 0.1319  0.1641 
 median  -0.0655  -0.0556  0.0330  0.0234  0.1739  0.2149 
Mar 05  N  205  728  406  161  812  366 
 mean  0.0118  0.0787  0.1661  0.1067 0.2076  0.2530 
 median  -0.0685  -0.0375  0.0442  0.0911  0.2382  0.2881 
Apr 05  N  214  725  401  159  820  361 
 mean  0.0002  0.0867  0.1432  0.1373 0.2555  0.2902 
 median  -0.0825  -0.0456  0.0187  0.1890  0.3112  0.3639 
May 05  N  223  715  420  154  826  378 
 mean  0.0103  0.1064  0.1367  0.0613 0.1754  0.2051 
 median  -0.0662  -0.0143  0.0471  0.0764  0.1886  0.1942 
Jun 05  N  228  723  442  153  837  403 
 mean  -0.0280 0.0940  0.1268  0.0445 0.1379  0.1740 
 median  -0.0863  -0.0298  0.0225  0.0282  0.1618  0.1649 
Jul 05  N  218  730  457  134  861  410 
 mean  -0.0005 0.1375  0.1713  0.0077 0.0683  0.1134 
 median  -0.0395  -0.0028  0.0802  -0.0009 0.0634  0.1190 
Aug 05  N  227  737  476  136  873  431 
 mean  -0.0251 0.1189  0.1356  -0.0035  0.0348  0.0747 
 median  -0.0675  0.0008  0.0712  -0.0210 0.0425  0.0969 
Sep 05  N  245  739  483  129  910  428 
 mean  -0.0315 0.1081  0.1120  -0.0086  0.0380  0.0730 
 median  -0.0718  0.0183  0.0631  -0.0220 0.0368  0.0766 
Oct 05  N  241  662  489  126  836  430 
 mean  -0.0191 0.1365  0.1537  0.0662 0.1069  0.1371 
 median  -0.0195  0.0251  0.1210  0.0470  0.1130  0.1425 
Nov 05  N  255  676  482  128  864  421 
  mean 0.0035  0.1335 0.1477  0.0595  0.0993  0.1239 
  median -0.0008  0.0463  0.1251  0.0184  0.0972  0.1230   74
Panel N.  Summary of Joint Ability of Star Ratings and Stewardship Grades To Forecast Ex-post Fund Performance 
This panel reports the number of times (out of 12) the mean or median out of-sample performance measure in one rating-pair group exceeds that in an inferior 
rating-pair group for several comparison cases.  We denote by  k the mean/median of out of-sample performance measure in group k where “Good” = group 3, 
“Fair” = group 2 and “Poor” = group 1. 
 
Out of-sample performance 
 
Average 
 
# time 
(out of 12) 
2 3     
# time 
(out of 12) 
1 2     
 
Four-factor alpha  By mean  12  11 
  By median 
  12 12 
Sharpe Ratio  By mean  12  12 
 By  median  12  12 
Remarks 
“Outliers” , defined to be funds that receive top grade in one rating and the worst in the other (e.g. 5 star and Grade F), are very rare. We repeat the 
above analysis with these funds removed. The results were hardly affected.  
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Panel P.  Comparison of Out-of-sample Performance Measures Within Deciles Ranked by Sum of Raw Scores of Star Ratings and 
Stewardship Grades for 12 Consecutive Evaluation Months 
This panel reports the decile averages of the two out-of-sample performance metrics: four-factor alpha and Sharpe ratio of funds calculated  over a 30-month 
post-evaluation period for the 12 evaluation months December 2004 to November 2005. Deciles are formed by ranking funds by the sum of the raw scores of star 
rating and stewardship grade.  
 
  
Four-factor Alpha 
 
Month  Decile  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 
 
1  N  127 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 127 
  mean  -0.0009 0.0249 -0.0511 0.0552 0.0727 0.1236 0.0404 0.0877 0.1500 0.1542 
  median  -0.0487 -0.0541 -0.0744 -0.0420 -0.0243 0.0050 -0.0499 0.0523 0.0367 0.0392 
2  N  128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 
  mean  0.0251 0.0047 -0.0192 -0.0075 0.2358 0.1150 0.1184 0.1201 0.1216 0.1790 
  median  -0.0661 -0.0710 -0.0678 -0.0857 0.0102 -0.0197 -0.0157 0.0303 0.0082 0.0549 
3  N  132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 
  mean  -0.0143 -0.0177 -0.0496 -0.0301 0.1927 0.1089 0.0683 0.0903 0.1186 0.1478 
  median  -0.0964 -0.0653 -0.0665 -0.0792 0.0242 -0.0086 -0.0583 0.0256 0.0171 0.0687 
4  N  133 133 133 133 133 133 133 133 133 133 
  mean  0.0200 0.0014 -0.0209 0.0272 0.1764 0.1521 0.0942 0.1232 0.1587 0.2104 
  median  -0.0793 -0.0489 -0.0666 -0.0419 -0.0222 -0.0026 -0.0433 -0.0047 0.0567  0.0886 
5  N  134 134 134 134 134 134 134 134 134 134 
  mean  0.0061 -0.0014 -0.0326 0.0375 0.2346 0.1267 0.1116 0.0741 0.1309 0.2103 
  median  -0.1048 -0.0629 -0.0831 -0.0579 -0.0125 -0.0097 -0.0230 -0.0246 0.0343  0.0630 
6  N  135 135 135 135 135 135 135 135 135 135 
  mean  -0.1097 0.0696 0.0597 -0.0423 0.1760 0.1670 0.2057 0.0926 0.1203 0.2497 
  median  -0.1189 -0.0532 -0.0319 -0.0551 0.0017 0.0114 0.0293 -0.0241 0.0667 0.1457 
7  N  139 139 139 139 139 139 139 139 139 139 
  mean  0.0351 -0.0602 0.0067 0.0437 0.2090 0.1459 0.0810 0.0799 0.0819 0.2166 
  median  -0.0732 -0.1056 -0.0623 -0.0251 0.0008 0.0009 -0.0310  -0.0157 0.0256 0.1423 
8  N  140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 
  mean  0.0772 -0.0385 0.0565 0.1062 0.2473 0.1389 0.1471 0.1455 0.1605 0.2297 
  median  -0.0088  -0.0614  -0.0415  -0.0073 0.0783 0.0032 0.0207 0.0696 0.1228 0.2037   76
9  N  144 144 144 144 144 144 144 144 144 144 
  mean  0.0240 -0.0221 0.1228 0.0825 0.1056 0.1373 0.1555 0.1205 0.1826 0.1088 
  median -0.0371 -0.0765 -0.0014 -0.0073 -0.0319 0.0061  0.0712  0.0897  0.1194  0.0457 
10  N  146 146 146 146 146 146 146 146 146 146 
  mean -0.0228  -0.0006 0.0622 0.1096 0.0725 0.1787 0.0600 0.1308 0.1724 0.1025 
  median -0.0600 -0.0504 -0.0043 0.0248 -0.0297 0.0028  0.0619  0.1157  0.1206  0.0689 
11  N  139 139 139 139 139 139 139 139 139 139 
  mean  0.0195 0.0334 0.0751 0.0508 0.1403 0.1879 0.1404 0.1713 0.1718 0.1655 
  median  -0.0304  -0.0042 0.0122 -0.0379 0.0872 0.0399 0.0861 0.1434 0.1171 0.2098 
12  N  141 141 141 141 141 141 141 141 141 141 
  mean  0.0471 0.0733 0.0305 0.0837 0.1120 0.1269 0.1610 0.1725 0.1802 0.1669 
  median  -0.0006  -0.0007  -0.0020  -0.0008 0.0715 0.0421 0.1261 0.1461 0.1449 0.1948 
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4.7  Spearman-Rho Rank Correlation Test For Predictive Ability  
 
To conduct a further test for joint predictive ability of rating, we adopt the 
approach of Blake and Morey (2000). The main idea is to examine the Spearman-rho 
rank correlations between the star ratings and the ranking induced by the out-of-sample 
performance measures. More precisely, we organise funds into various fund rating-based 
groups, either by the star ratings, the stewardship grades or the respective rating raw 
scores. We compute the average out-of-performance measures of funds within each group 
and organise the funds into deciles. We can then compare the decile rankings determined 
by the average out-of-sample performance measures with the rating-based rankings. We 
compute both mean and median out-of-sample performance measures. The results are 
presented in Table 6.  
 
Panels A reports the results for the star ratings based on the November 2005 
sample when funds are ranked by the star rating. For the entire sample, correlation is 
significant when the Sharpe ratio is used to measure out-of-sample performance. No 
evidence of significant correlation is found in the case of four-factor alpha. However, 
significantly high correlation emerge within the ‘3-year’ group and the Bond category. 
Corresponding results for the Stewardship grades, contained in Panel B, show that for the 
case of Sharpe ratio, correlation is significantly positive on the whole, although for 
groups formed by fund age or fund category, only International Stock funds exhibit 
significant correlation. For four factor alphas, no significant correlation is found for the 
entire sample, but in the International Stock category, significantly perfect positive 
correlation is observed. Summing up, the conclusion that individual rating possesses 
rather limited predictive power based on correlation analysis is in line with that collated 
in the preceding sections. 
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TABLE 6 
Spearman-rho Rank  Correlation Between In-sample Fund Ratings and  
Out-of-sample Performance Metrics 
 
We organise sample funds into rating-induced performance groups. For each of the methods of 
partitioning, we compute the average out-of-performance measures. We then rank the groups 
based on theses averages and  evaluate the Spearman-rho rank coefficient, given by the formula 
1) (N N
) R (R 6
1
2
2
N
1 i
sample of out
i
sample in
i





  
 
where 
sample of out
i
sample in
i R   and   R
    are respectively the in-sample rank of the i
th group based on the 
ratings and out-of-sample ranking based on the group averages of  performance measures; N is 
the number of groups being ranked.   
 
 
 
 
Panel A.   Rank Correlation Using Star-Rating As In-sample Performance Measures for 
November 2005 Sample 
This panel reports the Spearman-rho rank correlation coefficients between ranking by funds’ star ratings 
received in November 2005 and ranking based on subsequent 24-month post-evaluation performance 
measures: four-factor alpha and Sharpe ratio, for the full sample as well as for sub-samples organised by 
fund age and fund type. The numbers within parentheses (  ) are the p-values for the test of significance of 
correlation. The symbols * , ** and  *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percentage levels 
respectively. 
 
   Four-factor  Alpha  Sharpe  Ratio 
Star  Rating  Mean Median Mean Median 
 
All 
0.0 
(1.00) 
0.7 
(0.1881) 
0.9** 
(0.0374) 
1.00*** 
(<0.0001) 
3-year 
 
0.9** 
(0.0374) 
0.9** 
(0.0374) 
0.700 
(0.18881) 
0.6 
(0.2848) 
5-year -0.1 
(0.8729) 
0.0 
(1.00) 
-0.1 
(0.8729) 
-0.1 
(0.8729) 
10-year 
 
0.6 
(0.2848) 
0.9** 
(0.0374 
0.700 
(0.18881) 
0.9** 
(0.0374) 
Bond 
 
0.9** 
(0.0374 
0.9** 
(0.0374 
0.9** 
(0.0374 
0.700 
(0.18881) 
Domestic Stock  0.1 
(0.8729) 
0.1 
(0.8729) 
-0.3 
(0.6238) 
-0.3 
(0.6238) 
International 
Stock 
-0.1 
(0.8729) 
-0.1 
(0.8729) 
-0.5 
(0.391) 
-0.2 
(0.7471) 
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Panel B.  Spearman-rho Rank Correlation Using Stewardship Grades As In-sample 
Performance Measures for November 2005 Sample 
This panel reports the Spearman-rho rank correlation coefficients between ranking by stewardship grades 
of funds in an evaluation month and ranking based on a subsequent post-evaluation performance measures: 
Four-factor alpha and Sharpe ratio, for the full sample as well as for sub samples partitioned by fund age 
and fund type. The numbers within parentheses are the p-values for the test of significance of correlation. 
The symbols  * , ** and  *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percentage levels 
respectively. 
 
 Four-factor  Alpha  Sharpe  Ratio 
Stewardship 
Grade  Mean Median Mean  Median 
 
All 
0.8 
(0.1041) 
0.6 
(0.2848) 
1.00*** 
(<0.0001) 
0.9** 
(0.0374) 
3-year 
 
0.8 
(0.1041) 
0.8 
(0.2) 
0.4 
(0.6) 
0.4 
(0.6) 
 
5-year  -0.2 
(0.8) 
0.8 
(0.2) 
-0.2 
(0.8) 
-0.2 
(0.8) 
 
10-year 
 
0.6 
(0.2848) 
 
0.2 
(0.7471) 
0.8 
(0.1041) 
0.8 
(0.1041) 
Bond 
 
-0.10000 
(0.8729) 
 
-0.10000 
(0.8729) 
0.4 
(0.5046) 
0.7 
(0.1881) 
Stock  0.6 
(0.4) 
-0.4 
(0.6) 
-0.8 
(0.2) 
-0.4 
(0.600) 
 
International 
Stock 
1.00*** 
(<0.0001) 
1.00*** 
(<0.0001) 
0.8 
(0.2) 
1.00*** 
(<0.0001) 
 
 
To examine joint ability of the two ratings in predicting future performance, we 
consider groups formed by the sum of rating raw scores. The results in Panel C present 
evidence that for the November 2005 sample, there is a highly significant and positive 
correlation between joint rating as measured by the sum of raw scores and post-
evaluation returns using either four-factor alpha or Sharpe ratio as performance measure. 
We also find that Bond funds and seasoned (ten-year) funds appear to possess the 
strongest predictive power among their peers.  
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Panel C.  Spearman-rho Rank Correlation Using Sum of Rating Raw Scores As In-sample 
Performance Measures for November 2005 Sample  
This panel reports the Spearman-rho rank correlation coefficients between ranking by the sum of the raw 
scores for ratings received in November 2005 and ranking based on a subsequent 30-month post-evaluation 
performance measures: Four-factor alpha and Sharpe ratio, for the full sample as well as for sub-samples 
partitioned by fund age and fund type. Funds are sorted by the sum and raw scores and divided into ten 
deciles. The decile average of out-of-sample performance measures are computed and new ranking based 
on these averages determined. The numbers within parentheses are the p-values for the test of significance 
of correlation. The symbols   * , ** and  *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percentage 
levels respectively. 
 
 
   Four-factor  Alpha  Sharpe  Ratio 
Decile Mean Median Mean Median 
 
All 
0.64848** 
(0.0425) 
0.90303*** 
(0.0003) 
0.96364*** 
(<.0001) 
0.76970*** 
(0.0092) 
 
3-year 
0.58333* 
(0.0992) 
0.53333 
(0.1392) 
0.40000 
(0.2861) 
0.40000 
(0.2861) 
 
5-year 
0.05455 
(0.8810) 
0.35758 
(0.3104) 
0.05455 
(0.8810) 
0.06667 
(0.8548) 
 
10-year 
0.68485** 
(0.0289) 
0.76970*** 
(0.0092) 
0.97576*** 
(<.0001) 
0.80606*** 
(0.0049) 
 
 
Bond 
 
0.91515*** 
(0.0002) 
 
0.84242*** 
(0.0022) 
 
0.86667*** 
(0.0012) 
 
0.74545** 
(0.0133) 
Domestic 
Stock 
0.66061** 
(0.0376) 
0.62424* 
(0.0537) 
0.01818 
(0.9602) 
-0.05455 
(0.8810) 
International 
Stock 
-0.26061 
(0.4671) 
-0.34545 
(0.3282) 
0.23636 
(0.5109) 
0.36970 
(0.2931) 
Bottom 5 
Deciles 
 
0.90** 
(0.0374) 
 
0.60 
(0.2848) 
 
0.4 
(0.6) 
 
0.4 
(0.6) 
Top 5 
Deciles 
 
-0.30 
(0.6238) 
0.9000** 
(0.0374) 
-0.2 
(0.8) 
-0.2 
(0.8) 
 
 
 
 
For robustness, we repeat the analysis for all twelve monthly samples: December 
2004 to November 2005. Out-of-sample performance measures are estimated over a 30-
month post-evaluation period. We report the results in Panel D. Parallel to what we have 
previously gathered, we detect highly significant Spearman coefficients in all twelve 
samples, regardless of which out-of-sample performance measure is being used, thus 
offering yet another justification for the conjecture that the joint predictive ability of the 
two Morningstar ratings exceeds that of an individual rating. 
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Panel D.  Spearman-rho Rank Correlation Using Sum of Rating Raw Scores as In-
sample Performance Measures for 12 Consecutive Evaluation Months  
This panel reports the Spearman-rho rank correlation coefficient between ranking by sum of raw scores for 
star rating and stewardship grade in an evaluation month and ranking by a subsequent 30-month post-
evaluation period performance metrics: Four-factor alpha and Sharpe ratio for full sample. The numbers in 
the parenthesis are the p-values. The symbols   * , ** and  *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 
and 1 percentage levels respectively. 
 
 
 Four-factor  Alpha  Sharpe  Ratio 
Month Mean  Median  Mean  Median 
1 0.8667***  0.7697***  0.7091**  0.8909*** 
 (0.00117)  (0.00922)  (0.02167)  (0.00054) 
2 0.7091**  0.7939***  0.8909***  0.7939*** 
 (0.02167)  (0.0061)  (0.00054)  (0.0061) 
3 0.6727**  0.8424***  0.8182***  0.7697*** 
 (0.03304)  (0.00222)  (0.00381)  (0.00922) 
4 0.7939***  0.8909***  0.7939***  0.7697*** 
 (0.0061)  (0.00054)  (0.0061)  (0.00922) 
5 0.7212**  0.8788***  0.6970**  0.6364** 
 (0.01857)  (0.00081)  (0.0251)  (0.04791) 
6 0.7576**  0.8909***  0.6727**  0.5758* 
 (0.01114)  (0.00054)  (0.03304)  (0.08155) 
7 0.7576**  0.8545***  0.8182***  0.7091** 
 (0.01114)  (0.00164)  (0.00381)  (0.02167) 
8 0.7697***  0.8909***  0.9515***  0.9394*** 
 (0.00922)  (0.00054)  (0.00002)  (0.00005) 
9 0.6485**  0.8667***  0.8303***  0.9273*** 
 (0.04254)  (0.00117)  (0.00294)  (0.00011) 
10 0.6485**  0.9030***  0.8303***  0.8909*** 
 (0.04254)  (0.00034)  (0.00294)  (0.00054) 
11 0.8303***  0.8788***  0.8667***  0.7818*** 
 (0.00294)  (0.00081)  (0.00117)  (0.00755) 
12 0.9273***  0.8667***  0.9394***  0.8909*** 
 (0.00011)  (0.00117)  (0.00005)  (0.00054) 
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4.8  Regression Analysis of Out-of-sample Performance Measures 
 
As a final test of the predictive ability of fund ratings, we regress out of-sample 
performance on the fund ratings. First, we perform separate analysis on each of the 
following combinations of in-sample rating and out-of-sample performance:  
(i)  regression of four-factor alpha on star ratings,  
(ii)  regression of Sharpe ratio on star ratings, 
(iii)  regression of four-factor alpha on stewardship grades, 
(iv)  regression of Sharpe Ratio on stewardship grades.  
 
For each of the above case, we perform a series of twelve cross-sectional regressions, 
each based on a monthly data from the period December 2004 to November 2005. The 
results are contained in Panels A to D of Table 7.  
 
To better interpret the massive statistics generated, we construct and display in 
Panel E a table reporting the number of times (out of 12)  l k    , where  j  denotes the 
regression coefficient of the dummy variable Dj which takes the value 1 if the fund has a 
j-rating and 0 otherwise. The higher the number of occurrences of these inequalities, the 
stronger the evidence supporting the hypothesis that fund ratings possess predictive 
ability. The results are presented in Panel E.  
 
       A few important inferences can be made from these statistics. First, we find the 
intercept term, which corresponds to the reference group (5-star or Grade A) significantly 
positive in all 48 cases (12 months and four combinations). This indicates that the best-
rating group outperforms all other groups. Second, we see that 4-star funds do not differ 
significantly from 5-star funds as the coefficient  4   is significant and negative in at most 
3 out of the 12 regressions for each of the four combinations we analyse.  
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TABLE 7 
Dummy Variable Regression To Examine Predictive Ability of  
Morningstar Ratings and Stewardship Grades 
 
We perform the following  dummy variable cross-sectional regression  
i
4
1 j
ij j 0 i ε D β β S    

 
where Si is the out-of-sample performance measure of funds measured over a 30-month post-evaluation period, for twelve consecutive evaluation 
months December 2004 to November 2005. The dummy variable Dij takes the value 1 when a fund i has stewardship grade  j ( j is the numeric 
grade of stewardship where Grade A = 5, B = 4, C = 3, D = 2, F =1 )  and 0 otherwise. In-sample funds, comprising domestic stock, international 
stock and bond funds, are taken form the January 2005 to December 2005 Principia CDs. Out-of-sample data are obtained from the Centre for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) mutual fund database 
 
 
Panel A   Dummy Variable Regression Of Four-Factor Alpha On Star Ratings  
This panel displays the results of cross-sectional dummy variable regression of out-of-sample four-factor alpha on dummy variables representing the star ratings 
(Grade 4 to 1) of funds. The numbers  within <  > are the t–statistics and those in (   ) are the p-values. The symbols   * , ** and  *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percentage levels respectively 
 
 
 
 
  Dummy Variable Regression Of Four-factor Alpha on Star Rating 
Month 
Intercept  1  (1-star)  2  (2-star)  3  (3-star)  4  (4-star) 
 
R
2  F-Stat 
1  0.1363*** -0.1766***  -0.0919***  -0.1036***  -0.0378  0.0211  6.8098 
  <6.1436> <  -3.6792> <  -3.0309>  < -3.9459>  < -1.3886>    
  (0.0000) (0.0002)  (0.0025)  (0.0001) (0.1652)     
2  0.1212*** -0.0858 -0.0507  -0.0707**  0.0202 0.0119  3.8560 
  <4.2818> <  -1.4302>  < -1.3463>  < -2.1397> <.5919>     
  (0.0000) (0.1529)  (0.1784)  (0.0326)  (0.554)     
3  0.1149*** -0.0875*  -0.1003***  -0.0713**  -0.0205 0.0111  3.6999 
  <4.5345> <  -1.7525> <  -2.9941>  < -2.4257>  < -.6729>       84
  (0.0000) (0.0799)  (0.0028)  (0.0154) (0.5011)     
4  0.1796*** -0.1139*  -0.1448***  -0.1115*** -0.0436 0.0170  5.7528 
  <6.2534> <  -1.8477> <  -3.9244>  < -3.3536>  < -1.2687>    
  (0.0000) (0.0649)  (0.0001)  (0.0008) (0.2048)     
5  0.1657*** -0.1205*  -0.1479***  -0.0722** -0.0605* 0.0122  4.1343 
  <5.5115> <  -1.873> <  -3.8348>  < -2.0917>  < -1.6866>    
  (0.0000) (0.0613)  (0.0001)  (0.0367) (0.0919)     
6  0.1715*** -0.1436**  -0.1252***  -0.0647** -0.0682** 0.0101  3.4366 
  <6.1098> <  -2.1655> <  -3.4713>  < -1.9754>  < -2.0242>    
  (0.0000) (0.0305)  (0.0005)  (0.0484) (0.0431)     
7  0.1182*** 0.0878  -0.1027***  -0.0319  -0.0176  0.0115  4.0537 
  <4.2367> <1.3681>  < -2.8722>  < -.9852> <  -.5303>     
  (0.0000) (0.1715)  (0.0041)  (0.3247)  (0.596)     
8  0.1602*** 0.1194  -0.1043**  -0.0377  -0.0106  0.0094  3.3060 
  <4.6868> <1.4896>  < -2.3788>  < -.9526> <  -.2633>     
  (0.0000) (0.1366)  (0.0175)  (0.341)  (0.7924)     
9  0.0913*** 0.3774***  -0.0955** 0.0109  0.0374  0.0312  11.5663 
  <2.7277> <5.0741> <  -2.1812> <.2777>  <.9387>     
  (0.0065) (0.0000)  (0.0293)  (0.7813) (0.3481)     
10  0.0928*** 0.0753  -0.0708**  -0.0047  0.0154 0.0079  2.8959 
  <3.4739> <1.3004>  < -1.9914>  < -.1486> <.478>     
  (0.0005) (0.1937)  (0.0466)  (0.8819) (0.6328)     
11  0.1582*** 0.0623  -0.1510***  -0.0425  -0.0135  0.0209  7.3938 
  <5.5623> <1.1375>  < -4.0366>  < -1.2652> <  -.396>     
  (0.0000) (0.2555)  (0.0001)  (0.206)  (0.6922)     
12  0.1513*** 0.0970*  -0.1276***  -0.0428  -0.0070 0.0219  7.8744 
  <5.6629> <1.8786>  < -3.703>  < -1.3548> <  -.2185>     
  (0.0000) (0.0605)  (0.0002)  (0.1757) (0.8271)     
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Panel B   Dummy Variable Regression of Sharpe Ratio on Star Ratings  
This panel displays the results of cross-sectional dummy variable regression of out-of-sample four-factor alpha and Sharpe ratio alpha on dummy variables 
representing the star ratings (Grade 4 to 1) of funds. The numbers  within <  > are the t–statistics and those in (   ) are the p-values. The symbols   * , ** and  *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percentage levels respectively 
 
 
  Dummy Variable Regression of Four-factor Alpha on Star Rating 
Month 
Intercept  1  (1-star)  2  (2-star)  3  (3-star)  4  (4-star) 
 
R
2  F-Stat 
1  0.2015*** -0.0978**  -0.1062***  -0.0341  -0.0014  0.020061 6.474215 
  <10.0758>  < -2.2606>  < -3.884>  < -1.4426>  < -.0589>     
  (0.0000) (0.024)  (0.0001)  (0.1494) (0.953)     
2  0.1844*** -0.0631  -0.0961***  -0.0382  -0.0098 0.014041  4.543011 
  <8.971> <  -1.4495> <  -3.5108>  < -1.5888>  < -.3963>     
  (0.0000) (0.1474)  (0.0005)  (0.1124)  (0.692)     
3  0.1670*** -0.0736**  -0.1020***  -0.0344  -0.0178  0.018483 6.204726 
  <9.1378> <  -2.0435> <  -4.2196>  < -1.6213>  < -.8057>     
  (0.0000) (0.0412)  (0.0000)  (0.1052) (0.4205)     
4  0.2628*** -0.0621  -0.1332***  -0.0508  -0.0307 0.028727  9.863706 
  <14.0298>  < -1.5443>  < -5.5342> <  -2.3446>  <  -1.3717>    
  (0.0000) (0.1227)  (0.0000)  (0.0192) (0.1704)     
5  0.2741*** -0.0106  -0.0970***  -0.0146  0.0024  0.01508 5.11011 
  <11.9355>  < -.2155>  < -3.2915>  < -.5545>  <.0859>     
  (0.0000) (0.8294)  (0.001)  (0.5793) (0.9316)     
6  0.2066*** -0.0655  -0.0825***  -0.0309  -0.0236 0.01084 3.706846 
  <11.0006>  < -1.4757>  < -3.4183> <  -1.4082>  <  -1.0459>    
  (0.0000) (0.1403)  (0.0006)  (0.1593) (0.2958)     
7  0.1560*** 0.0051  -0.0598**  -0.0174  -0.0016  0.007704  2.694054 
  <8.2903> <.1176>  <  -2.4772>  < -.7949>  < -.0718>     
  (0.0000) (0.9064)  (0.0134)  (0.4268) (0.9427)     
8  0.0952*** -0.0228  -0.0452*** -0.0321**  0.0034 0.013456 4.7739 
  <7.3589> <  -.7529>  < -2.724>  < -2.1424> <.2255>     
  (0.0000) (0.4517)  (0.0065)  (0.0323) (0.8216)     
9  0.0412*** 0.0957***  -0.0388**  -0.0051  0.0246  0.020847 7.638205   86
  <2.9551> <3.089>  < -2.126>  < -.3156> <1.4834>     
  (0.0032) (0.002)  (0.0337)  (0.7523) (0.1382)     
10  0.0536*** -0.0169  -0.0377**  -0.0156  0.0108 0.011911  4.405814 
  <4.8616> <  -.7081>  < -2.5689>  < -1.2035> <.8123>     
  (0.0000) (0.479)  (0.0103)  (0.229) (0.4168)     
11  0.1357*** -0.0365  -0.0621*** -0.0276**  -0.0030 0.019213  6.792732 
  <11.6902>  < -1.6326>  < -4.0684>  < -2.0092>  < -.2178>     
  (0.0000) (0.1028)  (0.0000)  (0.0447) (0.8276)     
12  0.1215*** -0.0185  -0.0500*** -0.0226*  -0.0014 0.013767  4.913468 
  <10.6412>  < -.8407>  < -3.397>  < -1.6756>  < -.1009>     
  (0.0000) (0.4007)  (0.0007)  (0.094)  (0.9197)     
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Panel C   Dummy Variable Regression of Four-Factor Alpha on Stewardship Grades 
This panel displays the results of dummy variable cross-sectional regression of out-of-sample four-factor alpha on dummy variables representing 
the stewardship grade (Grade B to F) of funds. The numbers  within <  > are the t –statistics and those in (   ) are the p-values. The symbols   * , ** 
and  *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percentage levels respectively. 
 
 
  Dummy Variable Regression of Four-factor Alpha on Star Rating 
Month 
Intercept  1  (1-star)  2  (2-star)  3  (3-star)  4  (4-star) 
 
R
2  F-Stat 
1  0.1711*** -0.2948***  -0.1190*  -0.1525***  -0.0558  0.0471 15.6315 
  <4.5386> <  -5.6547> <  -2.6205> < -3.7802>  < -1.4064>    
  (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0089) (0.0002) (0.1598)     
2  0.1666*** -0.2904***  -0.0934*  -0.1281***  -0.0179  0.0376 12.4535 
  <3.592> <  -4.529>  < -1.679>  < -2.5852> <  -.3676>     
  (0.0003)  (0.0000) (0.0934) (0.0098) (0.7132)     
3  0.1441*** -0.2681***  -0.1157**  -0.1386***  -0.0185  0.0480 16.5991 
  <3.5293> <  -4.8257> <  -2.3744> < -3.1765>  < -.4308>     
  (0.0004)  (0.0000) (0.0177) (0.0015) (0.6667)     
4  0.1734*** -0.2717***  -0.1448***  -0.1287***  -0.0103  0.0415 14.4556 
  <3.768> <  -4.339> <  -2.5912>  < -2.6222>  < -.214>     
  (0.0002)  (0.0000) (0.0097) (0.0088) (0.8306)     
5  0.1813*** -0.2890***  -0.1867***  -0.1382***  -0.0180  0.0455 15.9169 
  <3.837> <  -4.4968> <  -3.2929> < -2.7435>  < -.3625>     
  (0.0001) (0.0000)  (0.001)  (0.0062)  (0.717)     
6  0.1761*** -0.2683***  -0.1598***  -0.1191**  -0.0071  0.0426 15.0483 
  <3.8386> <  -4.3369> <  -2.9049> < -2.4373>  < -.1466>     
  (0.0001)  (0.0000) (0.0037) (0.0149) (0.8835)     
7  0.1675*** -0.2751***  -0.1728***  -0.1210**  -0.0203  0.0402 14.5167 
  <3.7464> <  -4.4895> <  -3.2189> < -2.5374>  < -.432>     
  (0.0002)  (0.0000) (0.0013) (0.0113) (0.6658)     
8  0.1380** -0.1901**  -0.1043  -0.0554  0.0577  0.0254 9.1224 
  <2.5081> <  -2.4241>  < -1.5382>  < -.947> <1.001>     
  (0.0123) (0.0155)  (0.1242)  (0.3438)  (0.317)       88
9  0.1105** -0.2010**  -0.0942  -0.0489  0.0559  0.0226 8.2836 
  <2.0065> <  -2.5315>  < -1.3832>  < -.8336>  <.9659>     
  (0.045)  (0.0115) (0.1668) (0.4047) (0.3342)     
10  0.0884** -0.1281  -0.1033*  -0.0389  0.0564  0.0246  9.2310 
  <2.0163> <  -1.5961>  < -1.9586>  < -.8313> <1.2223>     
  (0.044)  (0.1107) (0.0504) (0.4059) (0.2218)     
11  0.0842* -0.0321  -0.0806  -0.0203  0.1007**  0.0308  11.0200 
  <1.8992>  < -.304>  < -1.4838> <  -.4268>  <2.1519>     
  (0.0577)  (0.7612) (0.1381) (0.6696) (0.0316)     
12  0.0943** -0.0228  -0.0797  -0.0194  0.0779* 0.0244  8.80651 
  <2.2773> <  -.2294> < -1.5744>  < -.4358> <1.7821>     
  (0.0229)  (0.8186) (0.1156) (0.6631) (0.0749)     
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Panel D  Dummy Variable Regression of Sharpe Ratio on Stewardship Grades 
This panel displays the results of cross-sectional dummy variable regression of out-of-sample Sharpe Ratio on dummy variables representing the stewardship 
grade (Grade B to F) of funds. The numbers  within <  > are the t-statistics and those in (   ) are the p-values. The symbols   * , ** and  *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percentage levels respectively 
 
  Dummy Variable Regression Of Sharpe Ratio On Stewardship Grade 
Month 
Intercept  1   (Grade F)  2  (Grade D)  3  (Grade C)  4  (Grade B) 
 
R
2  F-Stat 
1  0.2746*** -0.2651*** -0.1284***  -0.1079*** -0.0949***  0.026907  8.744605 
  <7.9972> <  -5.584> <  -3.1068>  < -2.9371>  < -2.6253>    
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0019)  (0.0034) (0.0088)     
2  0.2478*** -0.2672*** -0.1335***  -0.1043***  -0.0777**  0.031778  10.46991 
  <7.326> <  -5.7134> <  -3.2876>  < -2.8857>  < -2.1823>    
  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.001)  (0.004)  (0.0293)     
3  0.2225*** -0.2623*** -0.1187***  -0.1061***  -0.0679**  0.042113  14.48641 
  <7.4993> <  -6.4993> <  -3.3514>  < -3.3458>  < -2.1779>    
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0008)  (0.0008) (0.0296)     
4  0.2891*** -0.2486*** -0.1328***  -0.0943***  -0.0480  0.044936  15.6911 
  <9.5913> <  -6.0614> <  -3.6281>  < -2.9354>  < -1.5146>    
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0003)  (0.0034) (0.1301)     
5  0.3490*** -0.3000*** -0.1573***  -0.1079***  -0.0620  0.043026  15.00561 
  <9.646> <  -6.0941> <  -3.6221>  < -2.796>  < -1.6292>    
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0003)  (0.0052) (0.1035)     
6  0.2489*** -0.2554*** -0.1309***  -0.0956***  -0.0380  0.051548  18.38383 
  <8.1408> <  -6.1962> <  -3.5719>  < -2.9339>  < -1.1825>    
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0004)  (0.0034) (0.2372)     
7  0.2083*** -0.2399*** -0.1244***  -0.0916***  -0.0292  0.048906  17.84291 
  <6.9501> <  -5.8407> <  -3.4562>  < -2.866>  < -.9282>     
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0006)  (0.0042) (0.3535)     
8  0.1164*** -0.1624*** -0.0960***  -0.0623**  -0.0057  0.060432  22.51173 
  <5.6817> <  -5.5633> <  -3.8028>  < -2.8603>  < -.2632>     
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)  (0.0043) (0.7924)     
9  0.0845*** -0.1781*** -0.0923***  -0.0629***  -0.0062  0.051446  19.45727 
  <3.7583> <  -5.4962> <  -3.3195>  < -2.6256>  < -.264>       90
  (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0009)  (0.0087) (0.7918)     
10  0.0688*** -0.0940*** -0.0900***  -0.0415**  0.0048  0.045198  17.30173 
  <3.8366> <  -2.8625>  < -4.172>  < -2.1687> <.2559>     
  (0.0001) (0.0043) (0.0000)  (0.0303)  (0.798)     
11  0.1231*** -0.0321 -0.0931***  -0.0281  0.0205  0.052047  19.038 
  <6.8903> <  -.7522> < -4.2514>  < -1.4645> <1.0876>     
  (0.0000) (0.4521) (0.0000)  (0.1433)  (0.277)     
12  0.1127*** -0.0887** -0.0925***  -0.0197  0.0181 0.050591  18.75689 
  <6.4837> <  -2.1282>  < -4.3544>  < -1.0553> <.9845>     
  (0.0000) (0.0335) (0.0000)  (0.2915) (0.3251)     
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Panel E.  Statistics Summarising Predictive Ability of Fund Ratings Based on 
Regression Coefficient of Dummy Variable Regression of Out-of-sample 
Performance on Fund Ratings 
This panel displays the number of statistically significant and negative coefficients  3 2 1 , ,     and  4  as 
well as the number of significant occurrences (out of 12) of   ,   0  j  i j     for certain j > i 1     
 
 
Out-of-
sample 
Performance 
 
 
In-sample 
Rating 
No. of times 
1   <0 and is 
significant 
 
No. of times 
2   <0 and is 
significant 
 
No. of times 
3   <0 and is 
significant 
 
No. of times 
4   <0 and is 
significant 
 
No. of times 
3 2 1       
<0 and is 
significant 
 
Four-factor 
alpha 
 
Stewardship 
Grade 
 
9 
 
 
8 
 
 
7 
 
 
0 
 
5 
Four-factor 
alpha  Star  Rating  5 
 
11 
 
6 
 
2 
 
0 
 
Sharpe Ratio  Stewardship 
Grade 
11 
 
12 
 
10 
 
3 
  10 
Sharpe Ratio  Star  Rating  2  12  4 
 
0 0 
 
The results for lower-rating coefficients,  1   and  2  , turn out to be more 
affirmative, with  2   significantly negative in all 12 regressions for two of the cases and 
in 8 and 11 regressions for the other cases (iii) and (i) respectively. Finally, we find 
predictive ability more pronounced for stewardship grade. This conclusion applies to both 
out-of-sample measures. 
 
From the regression of out-of-sample performance on dummy variables 
representing the three performance groups, we again find strong evidence supporting the 
conclusion drawn so far that joint forecasting power of the two ratings is significantly 
strong. When the out-of-sample performance used is the Sharpe ratio, the inequality 
1 2 0       occur with high statistical significance for all 12 samples. For the case when 
the performance is measured by the four-factor alpha, we have  0 1    significantly for 
all 12 samples and  0 2    for 5 out of 12 samples. The constant term which captures the 
performance of the reference (best performing) group is significantly positive, regardless 
of the performance measure used. These results are robust to fund age and fund type. We 
repeat  (but do not display the results of) the above analysis by controlling for fund type 
and fund age. The conclusions remain the same.   
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Panel F   Dummy Variable Regression of Four-Factor Alpha on Performance Levels Determined by Rating Pairs of Funds 
This panel displays the results of a cross-sectional dummy variable regression of out-of-sample performance measures (Four-factor alpha/Sharpe Ratio) on 
dummy variables representing the performance groups ‘Good’, ‘Fair’ or ‘Poor’ where, a fund is in the ‘Good’ category if both SR and SG are 4 or 5,  in the  
‘Poor’ category if both SR and SG are 2 or 1 and in the ‘Fair’ category otherwise. The regression model is 
i i2 2 i1 1 0 i ε D β D β β S      
where D1 takes the value 1 when the fund is under ‘Poor’ category and D2 = 1 when the fund is classified as ‘Fair’. The ‘Good’ category is the reference group. 
The numbers  within <  > are the t–statistics and those in (   ) are the p-values. The symbols   * , ** and  *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 
percentage levels respectively 
 
 
Dummy Variable Regression of Out-of-sample Performance Measures on Performance Groups Determined Jointly by Star Ratings & Stewardship 
Grades 
 
Four-factor Alpha 
  
Sharpe Ratio 
 
 
Month  Intercept  1    2    R
2 Intercept  1    2    R
2 
1  0.1274*** -0.0769*** -0.0960***  0.020556  0.2054*** -0.0803*** -0.0500***  0.010887 
 <8.6303>  <  -2.9118>  < -5.1023>    <15.3607>  < -3.3617>  < -2.9373>   
  (0.00000) (0.00366) (0.00000)    (0.00000) (0.00080) (0.00337)   
2  0.1333*** -0.0916*** -0.0570**  0.007491  0.1832*** -0.0994*** -0.0370**  0.013677 
 <7.2219>  <  -2.8047>  < -2.4511>    <13.6873>  < -4.1951>  < -2.1956>   
  (0.00000) (0.00511) (0.01438)    (0.00000) (0.00003) (0.02830)   
3  0.1229*** -0.1205*** -0.0806***  0.016793  0.1689*** -0.0900*** -0.0503***  0.015561 
 <7.5161>  <  -4.1256> <  -3.954>    <14.2475> <  -4.2516> < -3.4027>   
  (0.00000) (0.00004) (0.00008)    (0.00000) (0.00002) (0.00069)   
4  0.1661*** -0.1543*** -0.0874***  0.019736  0.2552*** -0.1136*** -0.0549***  0.023163 
 <9.0656>  <  -4.8787> <  -3.8227>    <21.2632> <  -5.4842>  < -3.667>   
  (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00014)    (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00026)   
5  0.1432*** -0.1430*** -0.0565**  0.014585  0.2863*** -0.0943*** -0.0377**  0.010849 
 <7.5312>  <  -4.4369>  < -2.3833>    <19.6523>  < -3.8168>  < -2.0787>   
  (0.00000) (0.00001) (0.01730)    (0.00000) (0.00014) (0.03783)   
6 0.1367***  -0.12648***  -0.0303  0.012752  0.2024***  -0.0883***  -0.0327**  0.013549 
 <7.581>  <  -4.1287>  < -1.3329>    <16.7786>  < -4.3114>  < -2.1483>   
  (0.00000) (0.00004) (0.18279)    (0.00000) (0.00002) (0.03187)     93
7  0.1268*** -0.1548***  -0.0328  0.019911  0.1696*** -0.0909*** -0.0320**  0.01459 
 <7.3214>  <  -5.2154> <  -1.492>    <14.504> < -4.5358>  < -2.1564>  
  (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.13593)    (0.00000) (0.00001) (0.03122)   
8  0.1713*** -0.1719***  -0.0338  0.016012  0.1087*** -0.0807*** -0.0394***  0.025219 
 <8.226>  <  -4.6888>  < -1.2744>    <13.8228>  < -5.8373>  < -3.9286>   
  (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.20274)    (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00009)   
9  0.1356*** -0.1607*** -0.0167***  0.014376  0.0689*** -0.0750*** -0.0272**  0.016449 
 <6.4474>  <  -4.3413> <  -.6197>    <7.9108> < -4.8932>  < -2.4353>  
  (0.00000) (0.00002) (0.53553)    (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.01500)   
10  0.1120*** -0.1435***  -0.0039  0.019377  0.0659*** -0.0754*** -0.0183**  0.026246 
 <6.5617>  <  -4.8776> <  -.1774>    <9.3716>  < -6.22>  < -2.022>   
  (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.85924)    (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.04336)   
11  0.1537*** -0.1728***  -0.0172  0.025467  0.1370*** -0.0808*** -0.0219**  0.030325 
 <8.8366>  <  -5.7074> <  -.75>    <19.3604>  < -6.5664>  < -2.3507>  
  (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.45338)    (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.01888)   
12  0.1477*** -0.1443***  -0.0142  0.02084  0.1229*** -0.0674***  -0.0160*  0.022765 
 <8.9727>  <  -5.1543>  < -.6588>    <17.5542>  < -5.6615>  < -1.7482>   
  (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.51011)    (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.08065)   
 
 
Panel G   Statistics Summarising Predictive Ability of Fund Ratings Based on Regression Coefficients of Dummy Variable Regression of 
Out-of-sample Performance on Fund Ratings 
This panel displays the number of statistically significant and negative coefficients  1   and  2   as well as the number of significant occurrences of 
1 2 0      , out of  12 regressions. 
 
Out-of-sample 
Performance 
No. of times 
1   < 0 and is 
significant  
No. of times 
2   < 0 and is 
significant 
No. of times 
2 1     and is significant 
Four-factor alpha  12 
 
5 
 
4 
 
Sharpe Ratio  12 
 
12 
 
12 
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We proceed to run separately the regression of the out-of-sample performance 
measures on each of the following: the raw scores of stewardship grade, the raw scores of 
ratings and the product of the two raw scores. We believe results based on the raw scores 
are more informative than those based on the overall rating as the raw scores contain 
more information about the performance of funds. However, we remark that unlike the 
actual ratings which are more salient and easily accessible to the public, the raw scores 
are only available to mutual fund investors who subscribe to products such as the 
Morningstar Principia CD Roms. Hence, we still see the need to base our empirical work 
on both the raw scores and the actual ratings. 
 
The regression coefficients in the regression on the raw scores of either rating are 
found to be highly significant for all twelve samples. However, when we consider the 
model which includes both rating raw scores and their interaction term, significance of 
the interaction term disappears, as displayed in Panel H. This indicates that each rating 
and hence the combined rating as measured by the product of raw scores, exhibits some 
degree of predictive power, but the combined rating does not significantly enhance 
predictive power. This result, though in contrast to our earlier findings based on other 
tests, is not surprising because the two independent variables representing the two raw 
scores are highly correlated. Multicollinearity makes it difficult to separate the effects of 
the two correlated variables and thus discounts the significance of the interaction term.  
 
  As the stewardship grade is a function of five component scores, it would be 
instructive to find out which of the five components possess the highest explanatory 
power for future performance. For this purpose, we run for all twelve monthly samples, 
cross-sectional  regressions of out-of-sample performance measures on the five 
stewardship component scores. We report the results in Panels J and K. We find that 
Board Quality is the single most influential component for ex-post fund performance. It is 
surprising that Fees does not turn out to have a significant impact on future performance. 
One possible explanation is that Morningstar assigns scores in increment of 0.5. Funds 
are given scores ranging from 0 to 2.0 according to the percentile within which their   95
expense ratio falls. The categorical nature of the Stewardship component might attenuate 
its correlation with future fund returns. 
 
 
Panel H.   Regression of Out-of-sample Four-factor Alpha on Raw Rating Scores 
and Interaction Term 
This panel displays the results of cross-sectional regression of out-of-sample Four-factor alphas and Sharpe 
ratio on raw scores of stewardship grade and star ratings, including the interaction term. The numbers  
within <  > are the t–statistics and those in (   ) are the p-values. The symbols   * , ** and  *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percentage levels respectively 
 
Month Intercept  SG  MR  SG*MR 
1 -0.2847*** 0.2180***  0.0469  -0.0195 
 <-2.7258>  <2.6096> <1.422>  <-.7865> 
 (0.0065) (0.0092) (0.1553)  (0.4318) 
2 -0.4421*** 0.3779*** 0.0943**  -0.0609** 
 <-3.4885>  <3.7242>  <2.3518>  <-2.008> 
 (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0188)  (0.0448) 
3 -0.3937*** 0.3132*** 0.0700**  -0.0407 
 <-3.6307>  <3.6066>  <2.0148>  <-1.5551> 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0441)  (0.1202) 
4 -0.3325*** 0.2687***  0.0609  -0.0273 
 <-2.6189>  <2.6828>  <1.4902>  <-.8958> 
 (0.0089) (0.0074) (0.1364)  (0.3705) 
5 -0.3840*** 0.3270***  0.0661  -0.0378 
 <-2.9147>  <3.1401> <1.567>  <-1.1995> 
 (0.0036) (0.0017) (0.1173)  (0.2306) 
6 -0.3864*** 0.3607***  0.0739*  -0.0466 
 <-2.8309>  <3.3597>  <1.7048>  <-1.4447> 
 (0.0047) (0.0008) (0.0885)  (0.1488) 
7 -0.3262*** 0.2916***  0.0449  -0.0262 
 <-2.5847>  <2.9405>  <1.1245>  <-.8835> 
 (0.0098) (0.0033) (0.261)  (0.3771) 
8 -0.2130  0.2257*  0.0195  -0.0049 
 <-1.2472>  <1.7193>  <0.3679>  <-.1267> 
 (0.2125) (0.0858) (0.713)  (0.8992) 
9 -0.3749** 0.3637***  0.0640  -0.0483 
 <-2.1804>  <2.7658>  <1.2015>  <-1.2399> 
 (0.0294) (0.0058) (0.2297)  (0.2152) 
10 -0.4271*** 0.3555***  0.0900**  -0.0570* 
 <-3.0765>  <3.3281>  <2.1251>  <-1.827> 
 (0.0021) (0.0009) (0.0337)  (0.0679) 
11 -0.3366**  0.2871**  0.0776*  -0.0415 
 <-2.3237> <2.581> <1.6924>  <-1.238> 
 (0.0203)  (0.01)  (0.0908)  (0.2159) 
12 -0.2937**  0.2552  0.0753*  -0.0400 
 <-2.166> <2.454>  <1.7506>  <-1.2721> 
 (0.0305) (0.0142) (0.0802)  (0.2036) 
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Panel I. Regression of Out-of-sample Sharpe Ratio on Raw Rating Scores and Interaction 
Term 
This panel displays the results of cross-sectional regression of out-of-sample Sharpe Ratio and 
Sharpe ratio alpha on raw scores of stewardship grade and star ratings, including the interaction 
term. The numbers  within <  > are the t–statistics and those in (   ) are the p-values. The symbols   
* , ** and  *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percentage levels respectively 
 
 
 
 
Month  Intercept SG  MR  SG*MR 
1 0.0029  0.0574 0.0212  0.0045 
 <0.031>  <0.753>  <0.706> <0.201> 
 (0.9756)  (0.4514)  (0.4802)  (0.841) 
2 -0.0516  0.0839  0.0254  0.0020 
 <-.558>  <1.131>  <0.866> <0.092> 
 (0.5772)  (0.2581)  (0.3865)  (0.9267) 
3 -0.0258  0.0538  0.0086  0.0132 
 <-.326>  <0.851>  <0.339> <0.691> 
 (0.7441) (0.395)  (0.7343)  (0.4899) 
4 0.0811  0.0252 -0.0045  0.0251 
 <0.976>  <0.384>  <-.167> <1.261> 
 (0.3292)  (0.7008)  (0.8672)  (0.2076) 
5 0.0870  0.0671 -0.0027  0.0198 
 <0.86> <0.84>  <-.082> <0.821> 
 (0.3898)  (0.4012)  (0.9345)  (0.412) 
6 -0.0069  0.0825 -0.0031  0.0179 
 <-.073>  <1.121>  <-.104> <0.808> 
 (0.9414)  (0.2624)  (0.9168)  (0.4191) 
7 0.0077  0.0631 -0.0148  0.0222 
 <0.091>  <0.947>  <-.553> <1.113> 
 (0.9279) (0.344)  (0.5805)  (0.266) 
8 -0.0087  0.0247 -0.0244  0.0298 
 <-.138>  <0.508>  <-1.25> <2.07> 
 (0.8899)  (0.6115)  (0.2113)  (0.0386) 
9 -0.1279*  0.1115** 0.0000  0.0052 
 <-1.824>  <2.079>  <0.001> <0.329> 
 (0.0684)  (0.0378)  (0.9989)  (0.7425) 
10 -0.1117**  0.0838*  0.0074  0.0046 
 <-1.977>  <1.927>  <0.427> <0.359> 
 (0.0482)  (0.0542)  (0.6691)  (0.7195) 
11 -0.0659 0.0978** 0.0137  0.0005 
 <-1.136>  <2.195>  <0.746> <0.04> 
 (0.2562)  (0.0283)  (0.4556)  (0.9684) 
12 -0.1026*  0.1230*** 0.0239  -0.0084 
 <-1.809>  <2.829> <1.33> <-.636> 
 (0.0706)  (0.0047)  (0.1837)  (0.525) 
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Panel J. Regression of Out-of-sample Four-factor Alpha on Five Stewardship 
Components 
This panel displays the results of cross-sectional regression of out-of-sample four-factor alpha on 
the scores of the five stewardship components: Board Quality (BQ), Corporate Culture (CC), 
Fees (Fees), Manager Incentives (MI) and Regulatory Issue (RI). The numbers  within <  > are 
the t–statistics and those in (   ) are the p-values. The symbols   * , ** and  *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percentage levels respectively 
 
 
Month  Intercept BQ  CC  Fees  MI  RI 
1  -0.29802*** 0.19799***  0.08334***  -0.03648***  0.039224**  -0.00684 
  <-7.9415> <6.9708>  <3.2109>  <-2.6348> <2.4998> <-.4259> 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001)  (0.0014)  (0.0085) (0.0126)  (0.6702) 
2  -0.33825*** 0.257496***  0.055068*  -0.05395***  0.044873**  0.016589 
  <-7.4617> <7.5136>  <1.7265>  <-3.1742> <2.3594> <.8409> 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001)  (0.0845)  (0.0015) (0.0185)  (0.4006) 
3  -0.34533*** 0.229691***  0.03493  -0.02549*  0.030796*  0.02811 
  <-8.6381> <7.6086>  <1.2544>  <-1.7016> <1.8464> <1.6202> 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001)  (0.2099)  (0.0891) (0.0651)  (0.1054) 
4  -0.33838*** 0.261772***  0.035843  -0.04306**  0.032797*  0.030503 
  <-7.5461> <7.9816>  <1.162>  <-2.5652> <1.7443> <1.6059> 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001)  (0.2454)  (0.0104) (0.0813)  (0.1085) 
5  -0.3873*** 0.295674***  0.02226  -0.04385**  0.033402*  0.039772** 
  <-8.5151> <8.8886>  <.7068>  <-2.5656> <1.7621> <2.0572> 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001)  (0.4798)  (0.0104) (0.0783)  (0.0399) 
6  -0.35755*** 0.283363***  0.036531  -0.04108**  0.030007  0.025756 
  <-8.1852> <8.9139>  <1.1891>  <-2.4903> <1.6419> <1.3792> 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001)  (0.2346)  (0.0129) (0.1008)  (0.1681) 
7  -0.37981*** 0.268269***  0.033147  -0.02694*  0.027006  0.034285* 
  <-8.5044> <8.7858>  <1.1025>  <-1.6613> <1.5229> <1.8828> 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001)  (0.2704)  (0.0969) (0.128)  (0.0599) 
8  -0.34013*** 0.293721***  -0.05322  -0.00297  0.001041  0.077154*** 
  <-6.0894> <7.8232>  <-1.4204>  <-.1444> <.0472>  <3.2101> 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001)  (0.1557)  (0.8852) (0.9624)  (0.0014) 
9  -0.36356*** 0.301403***  -0.04642 -0.0195  -0.0021  0.07949*** 
  <-6.3321> <7.8013>  <-1.2136>  <-.9317> <-.094>  <3.2338> 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001)  (0.2251)  (0.3517) (0.9251)  (0.0012) 
10  -0.30231*** 0.252863***  -0.02142  -0.00872 -0.00711  0.048272** 
  <-6.4376> <8.1026>  <-.6962>  <-.5232> <-.3886> <2.287> 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001)  (0.4864)  (0.6009) (0.6977)  (0.0223) 
11  -0.25131*** 0.239379***  -0.04727  0.014127 -0.0268  0.057508** 
  <-4.9534> <7.4747>  <-1.455>  <.7816> <-1.3959>  <2.5312> 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001)  (0.1459)  (0.4346) (0.163)  (0.0115) 
12  -0.21201*** 0.231083***  -0.06999**  0.025456  -0.03723**  0.055566*** 
  <-4.5056> <7.6432>  <-2.3092>  <1.5206> <-2.0946>  <2.6475> 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001)  (0.0211)  (0.1286) (0.0364)  (0.0082) 
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Panel K. Regression of Out-of-sample Sharpe Ratio on Five Stewardship 
Components 
This panel displays the results of cross-sectional regression of out-of-sample Sharpe ratio on the 
scores of the five stewardship components: Board Quality (BQ), Corporate Culture (CC), Fees 
(Fees), Manager Incentives (MI) and Regulatory Issue (RI). The numbers  within <  > are the t–
statistics and those in (   ) are the p-values. The symbols   * , ** and  *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percentage levels respectively 
 
 
Month  Intercept BQ  CC  Fees  MI  RI 
1  -0.1082*** 0.2073***  -0.0091  -0.0350***  0.0031 0.0223 
  <-3.159> <7.9941>  <-.3834>  <-2.7669>  <.2162>  <1.5203> 
  (0.0016) (<0.0001)  (0.7015)  (0.0057) (0.8289)  (0.1287) 
2  -0.1535*** 0.2217***  -0.0040  -0.0464***  0.0062  0.0312*** 
  <-4.6583> <8.897>  <-.1715>  <-3.7518>  <.4495>  <2.1759> 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001)  (0.8638)  (0.0002) (0.6532)  (0.0297) 
3  -0.1519*** 0.1885***  -0.0014  -0.0337***  0.0030  0.0364*** 
  <-5.248> <8.6242>  <-.071> <-3.1069>  <.251> <2.8999> 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001)  (0.9434)  (0.0019) (0.8019)  (0.0038) 
4  -0.0941*** 0.2027***  -0.0129  -0.0332***  0.0163  0.0405*** 
  <-3.2206> <9.4895>  <-.6424>  <-3.0343>  <1.3272>  <3.2719> 
  (0.0013) (<0.0001)  (0.5207)  (0.0025) (0.1847)  (0.0011) 
5  -0.1014*** 0.2383***  -0.0172  -0.0436***  0.0255**  0.0489*** 
  <-2.9149> <9.3689>  <-.7147>  <-3.335> <1.7561> <3.3049> 
  (0.0036) (<0.0001)  (0.4749)  (0.0009) (0.0793)  (0.001) 
6  -0.1518*** 0.2079***  0.0074  -0.0330***  0.0187  0.0309** 
  <-5.2248> <9.8323>  <.3642>  <-3.0026>  <1.5386>  <2.4838> 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001)  (0.7158)  (0.0027) (0.1241)  (0.0131) 
7  -0.1899*** 0.1999***  0.0159  -0.0233**  0.0147  0.0271** 
  <-6.3522> <9.7791>  <.7918>  <-2.1502>  <1.2378>  <2.2234> 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001)  (0.4286)  (0.0317) (0.216)  (0.0263) 
8  -0.1723*** 0.1332***  0.0066  0.0053  0.0182**  0.0171** 
  <-8.3602> <9.6126>  <.4779>  <.6979> <2.2374> <1.9296> 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001)  (0.6328)  (0.4854) (0.0254)  (0.0539) 
9  -0.2190*** 0.1457***  0.0102 -0.0048  0.0185**  0.0202** 
  <-9.4034> <9.2961>  <.6591>  <-.5703> <2.0431> <2.0268> 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001)  (0.5099)  (0.5686) (0.0412)  (0.0429) 
10  -0.1575*** 0.1148***  0.0214* 0.0049  0.0091  -0.0020 
  <-8.2805> <9.0777>  <1.7205>  <.7198> <1.2225> <-.2321> 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001)  (0.0855)  (0.4718) (0.2217)  (0.8165) 
11  -0.1004*** 0.1271***  0.0006  0.0096  0.0098 0.0053 
  <-4.9786> <9.9918>  <.0482>  <1.3392> <1.2908> <.5877> 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001)  (0.9616)  (0.1807) (0.197)  (0.5568) 
12  -0.1044*** 0.1238***  -0.0136  0.0162**  0.0086 0.0116 
  <-5.3298> <9.8329>  <-1.0766>  <2.3207>  <1.1597>  <1.3325> 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001)  (0.2819)  (0.0204) (0.2464)  (0.1829) 
   99
4.9  Short-term Persistence of Morningstar Ratings 
 
In this section, we examine the short-term persistence of the Morningstar ratings 
based on our twelve-month data. Our first measure of rating persistence is the percentage 
of funds that are continuously awarded the same rating over the 12 month period 
December 2004 – November 2005. We report in Panel A and Panel B of Table 8 the 
corresponding statistics for star ratings and stewardship grades respectively. 
 
TABLE 8 
Persistence of Morningstar Ratings and Stewardship Grades 
   
Panel A. Percentage of Funds that Are Continuously Awarded the Same Star Ratings from 
December 2004 - November 2005. 
This panel displays the frequency and percentage frequency of funds that receive the same star rating 
continuously throughout the 12-month period: December 2004 to November 2005. The sample contains 
1107 funds which comprise 361 domestic stock funds, 342 international stock funds and 404 bond funds. 
We include only funds that received both the Morningstar rating and stewardship grade (the corresponding 
frequency distributions of which are displayed in Panel B) and which are continuously recorded in the 
January 2005 to December 2005 Morningstar principia disc series. Numbers in parentheses (  ) are 
percentages. 
 
Frequency and Percentage Frequency 
 
All                    
Funds  
1-Star 
N=49 
2-Star 
N=176 
3-Star 
N=397 
4-Star 
N=329 
5-Star 
N=156 
Total 
N=1107 
12  78 154  113 68 425   
(24.49) (44.32) (38.79) (34.35) (43.59) (38.39) 
 
Bond 
 
1-Star 
N=10 
2-Star 
N=62 
3-Star 
N=147 
4-Star 
N=125 
5-Star 
N=60 
Total 
N=404 
3  26 64 49 29  171   
(30.0) (41.93)  (43.53) (39.2)  (48.3) (42.33) 
 
Domestic 
Stock   
 
1-Star 
N=31 
2-Star 
N=69 
3-Star 
N=135 
4-Star 
N=83 
5-Star 
N=43 
Total 
N=361 
6  30 45 33 34  138   
(19.35) (43.47) (33.33 (39.76) (79.07) (38.22) 
 
International 
Stock   
1-Star 
N=8 
2-Star 
N=45 
3-Star 
N=115 
4-Star 
N=121 
5-Star 
N=53 
Total 
N=342 
3  22 45 31 15  116   
  (37.5) (48.88) (39.13 (25.62) (28.30 (38.39) 
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Panel B. Percentage of Funds That Are Continuously Awarded the Same Stewardship 
Grade from December 2004 - November 2005. 
This panel displays the frequency and percentage frequency of funds that receive the same stewardship 
grade continuously throughout the 12-month period: December 2004 to November 2005. The sample 
contains 1107 funds which comprise 361 domestic stock funds, 342 international stock funds and 404 bond 
funds. We include only funds that received both the Morningstar rating and stewardship grade and which 
are continuously recorded in the January 2005 to December 2005 Morningstar principia disc series. 
Numbers in parenthesis (  ) are percentages. 
 
Frequency and Percentage Frequency 
 
All                    
Funds  
Grade F 
N=49 
Grade D 
N=176 
Grade C 
N=397 
Grade B 
N=329 
Grade A 
N=156 
Total 
N=1107 
10  116 334 321 151 932   
(20.51) (65.99) (89.78) (97.55) (96.61) (84.19) 
 
Bond 
 
Grade F 
N=35 
Grade D 
N=52 
Grade C 
N=130 
Grade B 
N=173 
Grade A 
N=14 
Total 
N=404 
8  31 117  165 14 171   
(22.9)  (59.61) (90.00) (95.37)  (100.00)  (42.33) 
 
Domestic 
Stock   
Grade F 
N=4 
Grade D 
N=45 
Grade C 
N=145 
Grade B 
N=141 
Grade A 
N=26 
Total 
N=361 
0  42 123  141 25 331   
(0.00)  (93.33) (84.83)  (100.00)  (96.15) (91.69) 
 
 
International 
Stock   
Grade F 
N=0 
Grade D 
N=50 
Grade C 
N=97 
Grade B 
N=176 
Grade A 
N=19 
Total 
N=342 
0  24  94 172 18 308   
  (37.5)  (48.00) (96.91) (97.73) (94.73) (90.05) 
 
 
We find that for the star rating, less than 50% of the sample funds in any rating 
group are able to keep their ratings consistently over a 12-month period.  In contrast, 
approximately 96% of funds with top two stewardship grades continuously receive the 
same grade for twelve months and about 90% of funds with Grade C do not experience 
any stewardship grade changes. Across fund categories, domestic stock funds have the 
highest percentage (79%) of 5-star funds keeping their top star rating, reflecting the less 
volatile nature of bonds. There is no discernible difference in persistence of stewardship 
grades across categories. 
 
A second way to measure the 12-month volatility of fund ratings is to compute the 
sample standard deviation of the raw scores associated with the rating, as given by (3.7)   101
in Chapter Three. When the actual ratings are used, we compute the mean absolute 
difference between consecutive-month ratings given by (3.6) in Chapter Three. The mean 
absolute difference as compared to the usual standard deviation can more accurately 
capture changes in ratings. As an illustration, if the evolution of the ratings of fund A 
over three consecutive months is  3, 4, 3 while that of fund B is 3, 3, 4, both funds record 
the same standard deviation for rating change but the mean absolute difference of 
consecutive rating change for fund A is 2/3 as compared to 1/3 for B, thus correctly 
reflecting the higher fluctuation of rating changes experienced by fund A.  
 
Panel C contains the statistics for both methods of measuring volatility. We 
observe that both the mean and median volatility of star ratings are higher than those for 
stewardship grades. Results of a Wilcoxon signed-rank test indicate that the differences 
in volatility are indeed statistically significant. 
 
Finally, we display in each of Panels D and E a contingency table that summaries 
the relationship between the Morningstar ratings of funds as of December 2004 and the 
corresponding ratings as of November 2005. The diagonal terms dominate both tables, 
suggesting a high degree of persistence. The most drastic rating changes from the best to 
the worst or vice versa does not occur. When comparing the persistence of the two ratings, 
we examine the percentage of funds that experience rating changes of more than two 
grades. It is obvious from the contingency tables that the stewardship grades show greater 
degree of persistence. While no funds have stewardship upgrade or downgrade by more 
than two grades, four funds have star ratings changed by three to four stars. The number 
of funds having their ratings altered by two stars is 44, which is eight more than the 
corresponding figure for stewardship grade. Furthermore, winners in stewardship grade 
are more likely to remain winners than those in star ratings. While only 54% of five-star 
funds retain top rating, 97% of Grade-A funds do not suffer any rating downgrade. 
Results of chi-square tests for both Morningstar ratings reject the hypothesis that the two 
ratings are independent and thus provide another statistical evidence for persistence of 
ratings.  
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Panel C. Volatility of Star Ratings and Stewardship Grades over 12-month Period 
December 04 to November 05 
This panel displays the descriptive statistics of the volatility measures of both the star ratings and the 
stewardship grades of a sample of the 1107 funds which comprise 361 domestic stock funds, 342 
international stock funds and 404 bond funds. We include only funds that received both ratings 
continuously over the 12-month period December 2004 to November 2005, as recorded in January 2005 to 
December 2005 Morningstar Principia CDs. We use both the final grades (star rating: 1-star to 5-star and 
stewardship grade: A to F) as well as the estimated raw scores for each rating to calculate the volatility. 
When actual grades are used, we define volatility of a fund to be the quantity  

 
11
1
1 12
1
i
i i grade grade ; 
when raw scores are used, the volatility is given by  


12
1
2
________
12
1 ) (
i
i rawscore rawscore  where gradei = grade 
of the fund in month i (for example, grade i = 3 if the fund receives a 3-star rating or a C grade. We 
perform paired-sample t-test and Wilcoxon signed rank test to test equality of mean and median volatility 
of both rating methods and report the test statistics and p-values in brackets [ ]  and ( ) respectively. 
 
 
 
  Volatility of Ratings Using Raw Scores (N-1107) 
 
Rating 
 
Summary Statistics 
 
 
mean Median  Min  Max 
Standard 
deviation 
Star rating raw score  (0 – 5) 
 
0.18695   0.17321  0  0.92421  0.12592 
Stewardship 
Grade raw score (0 – 10) 
0.06329 
  0.00 0.00  0.45146  0.0099456 
Difference 
0.12366*** 
[24.36371] 
(<0.0001) 
0.17321*** 
[173773.5] 
(<0.0001) 
- -  - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Volatility of Ratings Using Actual Rating (N=1107) 
Rating 
 
Summary Statistics 
 
mean Median  Min  Max 
Standard 
deviation 
Star rating ( 1– 5)  0.13353  0.09091  0  0.72727  0.14459 
Stewardship Grade (1 – 5) 
A=5, B=4, .. , F=1 
0.011333 
  0 0  0.18182  0.03126 
Difference  
0.122198*** 
[27.38453] 
(<0.0001) 
0.09091*** 
[115165.5] 
(<0.0001) 
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Panel D. Contingency Tables of December 2004 Star Ratings and November Star Ratings. 
This panel displays the contingency table that summarises the star ratings of funds in December 2004 and 
November 2005. The sample contains 1107 funds which comprise 361 domestic stock funds, 342 
international stock funds and 404 bond funds. We include only funds that received both ratings 
continuously over the 12-month period December 2004 to November 2005, as recorded in January 2005 to 
December 2005 Morningstar Principia CDs. Numbers in parenthesis (  ) are percentages. 
 
 
Star Rating as of  
December 2004 
Frequency 
Percent    1-Star 2-Star 3-Star 4-Star 5-Star Total 
26 21  1  1  0  49 
1-star  (2.35) (1.90) (0.09) (0.09)  0  (4.43) 
20 125 26  4  1  176 
2-star  (1.81) (11.29) (2.35)  (0.36)  (0.09) (15.90) 
10 70 240 67 10 397 
3-star  (0.90) (6.32) (21.68) (6.05) (0.90) (35.86) 
2 11  102  186  18  329 
4-star  (0.18) (0.99)  (9.21) (16.80) (2.53) (29.72) 
0 0 8 64  84  156  5star 
(0.00) (0.000) (0.72)  (5.78)  (7.59) (14.09) 
58 227 377 322 123  1107 
Star Rating  
as of  
November 
2005 
Total 
(5.24) (20.57) (34.06) (29.09) (11.11)  100 
 
Chi-square Statistics 1196.8470 (p < 0.001) 
 
Panel E. Contingency Tables of December 2004 Stewardship Grades and November Star 
Ratings. 
This panel displays the contingency table that summarises the stewardship grades of funds in December 
2004 and November 2005. The sample contains 1107 funds, which comprise 361 domestic stock funds, 342 
international stock funds and 404 bond funds. We include only funds that received both ratings 
continuously over the 12-month period December 2004 to November 2005, as recorded in January 2005 to 
December 2005 Morningstar Principia CDs. Numbers in parenthesis (  ) are percentages. 
 
 
Stewardship Grades of  
December 2004 
Frequency 
Percent   
1-Star 2-Star 3-Star 4-Star 5-Star Total 
8 31 0  0  0 39 
1-star  (0.72) (2.80) (0.000 (0.00) (0.00) (3.52) 
0 97 46 4  0 147 
2-star  (0.00) (8.76) (4.16) (0.36) (0.00) (13.28) 
0 3  335  34 0  372 
3-star  (0.00) (0.27) (30.260 (3.07) (0.00) (33.60) 
0 0 2  478  10  490 
4-star  (0.00) (0.00) (0.18) (43.18) (0.90) (4.26) 
0 0 0 2 57  59  5star 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.18) (5.15) (5.33) 
8 131 38 518 67  1108 
Stewardship 
Grade 
as of  
November 
2005 
Total 
(0.72) (11.83) (34.60) (46.79) (6.05)  (100) 
 
Chi-square Statistics = 2699.718 (p < 0.000)   104
 
 
Chapter Five 
 
Conclusions And Further Research 
 
5.1 Conclusions 
 
Using both ordinary least-squared regressions and multinomial ordered logit 
regressions, we seek influential determinants of the Morningstar stewardship grades. 
Parallel to results reported by Khorana and Nelling (1998)  in their study on determinants 
of the Morningstar star ratings, we report that funds that receive good stewardship grades 
are generally those managed by experienced managers, incur low expenses and possess a 
large asset base.  
 
In examining the predictive power of the Morningstar ratings, we find that neither 
the star rating nor the stewardship grade possesses a strong ability to forecast future fund 
performance. Although funds with poor ratings generally continue to exhibit poor future 
performance and underperform their peers with better ratings, we do not find strong 
enough evidence to support the contention that funds with the best rating (5-star in star 
rating or A in stewardship grade) will outperform funds with second best rating (4-star in 
star rating or B in stewardship grade). Our results on the star ratings are by and large in 
line with those reported by Blake and Morey (2000). However, when we consider joint 
ratings as measured either by the sum of the raw scores of the two ratings or by some 
ranking criteria based on the pair of ratings, we find that predictive performance 
improves dramatically.  This seems to suggest that some degree of synergy is created 
when the two ratings are simultaneously examined. However, the lack of statistical 
significance in the difference in mean future returns of funds in the top and second best 
groups undermines the efficacy of the investment strategy of buying only funds with best 
ratings.  Any conclusive results about predictive power can at best be drawn from a   105
comparison between the top (for example, top two ratings or top two deciles) and the 
bottom (for example, lowest rating or worst two deciles) groups.   
 
 The hypothesis that there exists short-term persistence in mutual fund ratings has 
been strongly supported by our statistical results. We observe that both star ratings and 
stewardship grades exhibit strong short-term persistence, with an overwhelmingly high 
percentage of funds continuously receiving the same rating over a twelve-month time 
horizon. We also find that the degree of persistence is much more pronounced in 
stewardship grades than in star ratings. Furthermore, the volatility in stewardship grades 
is much lower than that in the star ratings. For mutual fund investors who seek funds with 
good corporate governance but have a short investment horizon, our results suggest that 
they should consider selling funds with poor stewardship grades as the likelihood of a 
poor rated fund “turning around” is small. 
 
In summary, our results support the view that a blend of quantitative and 
qualitative information of mutual funds contained in the two Morningstar fund ratings 
can jointly provide reasonably good insights into the future performance of funds. 
However, neither of the two ratings is capable of forecasting future returns with a high 
accuracy. In addition, our results, as well as those reported by many authors, indicate that 
funds with poor ratings are likely to continue to perform badly in the future, thus 
implying that investors holding poor-rated funds should consider selling them. As for 
good-rated funds, we do not have sufficiently strong statistical evidence to justify the 
investment strategy of buying and holding only the best rated funds. Specifically, our 
analysis suggests that there is no significant difference in the future performance of funds 
in the top two rating groups. The prospect of a portfolio of best-rated funds delivering 
superior returns to investors is thus questionable. 
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5.2  Suggestions For Further Research 
 
The current work can be expanded in several dimensions. To begin with, we can 
obtain results that are robust over different periods of assessment by using a Morningstar 
data set that spans over a longer period of time. Since the stewardship grades were first 
released in 2004, we can assemble a thirty-six month (August 2004 – August 2007) in-
sample data on Morningstar ratings. We can then compare in-sample ratings with out-of-
sample performance on time intervals of various durations. For instance, if we consider 
intervals of one-year, we will have 25 overlapping periods of 24 months, with 12-month 
in-sample ratings and 12-month out-of-sample performance, the first being August 2004 
to July 2005 and the last August 2006 to July 2007. We can assess predictive power of 
ratings by using standard methodology.  Similarly, a longer period of assessment will 
allow us to conduct a more robust analysis of persistence and other characteristics of 
ratings. Furthermore, we can perform a comprehensive examination of the effect that the 
initiation of top and bottom stewardship grades might have on future performance. We 
can also examine how important fund characteristics such as fund expenses, portfolio 
turnover and fund size change with ratings downgrades or upgrades. 
 
Next, we can embark on a study of the relation between mutual fund governance 
(as measured by the stewardship grades) and the corporate governance of the firms in the 
fund’s portfolio holdings. Such a study can be designed to test the hypothesis that fund 
managements that value corporate governance are more likely to focus on, and hence 
include in their portfolio, shares of companies with good corporate governance. In 
addition, a cross examination of stewardship grades and corporate governance of fund 
holdings can shed some light on how stewardship grades can predict future performance, 
since a positive relation between the quality of corporate governance and fund 
performance has long been affirmed by many researchers.  
 
Finally, we can investigate whether geography makes any difference in the 
corporate governance of mutual funds as measured by the fund stewardship grades. To 
widen the scope of this study, we can interpret ‘geography’ in the two different ways: the   107
location of the fund management and the location of the fund assets. The results of such 
an academic exercise will not only complement existing works on the relation between 
geography and mutual fund performance, but also provide mutual fund investors a 
criterion, which is based on geographical considerations, for selecting mutual funds. 
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Appendix A  Morningstar Categories 
 
The 64 comparison groups into which funds are classified by Morningstar in determining 
the star rating of funds. 
 
Large Growth  World Stock  Emerging Markets Bond 
Mid-cap Growth  Europe Stock  Stable Value 
Small Growth  Diversified Pacific/Asia  Municipal Bond 
Large Blend  Pacific/Asia ex-Japan Stk  High-Yield Muni 
Mid-cap Blend  Japan Stock  Muni National Long 
Small Blend  Diversified Emerging Mkts  Muni National Interm 
Large Value  Latin America Stock  Muni National Short 
Mid-cap Value  World Allocation  Muni Single State Long 
Small Value  Foreign Large Value  Muni Single State Int/Sh 
Specialty Natural Resources  Foreign Large Blend  Muni New York Long 
Specialty Technology  Foreign Large Growth  Muni New York Int/Sh 
Specialty Utilities  Foreign Small/Mid Value  Muni California Long 
Specialty Health  Foreign Small/Mid Growth  Muni California Int/Sh 
Specialty Financial  Long Government Muni  Florida 
Specialty Real Estate  Intermediate Government  Muni Pennsylvania 
Specialty Communications  Short Government Muni  Massachusetts 
Specialty Precious Metals  Long-term Bond  Muni New Jersey 
Bear-Market  Short-term Bond  Muni Ohio 
Conservative Allocation  Ultrashort Bond  Muni Minnesota 
Moderate Allocation  Bank Loan  Muni Single State Short 
Convertibles High  Yield  Bond   
 Multisector  Bond   
 World  Bond   
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Appendix B: Mutual Fund Share Classes 
 
Many mutual funds are made available in several share classes, typically Class A, 
Class B, and Class C. The differences among these share classes typically lie in the fee 
structure. Such a multi-class structure offers investors an opportunity to select the share 
class that best fits their investment goals.  
Here is a brief description of Class A, B and C. Class A shares are ideal for 
investors who are considering holding large number of units over a long period of time. 
Investors of Class A shares are expected to pay a sales charge or a front-end load, 
typically 200 to 500 basis points, which is deducted upfront. For example, a 3 percentage 
sales charge reduces a $10000 investment to $97000.  
Class B shares appeal to investors who wish to invest a smaller amount of money 
over the long term. Unlike Class A chares, there is no up-front load, which means all the 
money invested will be converted into fund shares or units. However, investing in Class 
B shares incurs a back-end load, also known as a contingent deferred sales charge (CDSC) 
or simply, redemption fees, payable upon selling the fund units. Back-end load usually 
decreases over time, although this varies from fund to fund and no charges apply if the 
fund is held till the end of the time period.  
As for Class C shares, there is normally no front-end load. CDSC is typically 
higher for Class C than for Class B shares. This charge is reduced to zero if investors 
hold the shares beyond the CDSC period. For Class C shares, this period is typically 12 
months. The catch, however, is that fund expenses such as management fees, is higher for 
Class C shares than for the other two share classes. As such, Class C shares are suitable 
for investors who intend to invest and hold the fund for a shorter period of time, say less 
than 5 years. 
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Appendix C  List of Abbreviations   
 
 
Variable Definition 
AR04  Annual return 2004 
BFAlpha Best-fit  alpha 
BFBeta Best-fit  beta 
BFRsq Best-fit  R-squared 
BQ
*  Board quality 
CC
*  Corporate culture 
ER Expense  ratio 
Fees
*  Fees 
LAR12m  12-month Load-adjusted returns 
LAR3yr  3-year Load-adjusted returns 
MI
*  Manager incentives 
MT Manager  tenure  (Average) 
MR
*  Morningstar star rating 
Log asset  Log of total net asset 
RI
*  Regulatory issue 
RTS1m  1-mth returns after tax and sales 
RTS1yr  1-year Returns after tax and sales 
RTS3yr  3-year returns after tax and sales 
SR
  Sharpe ratio 
SD3  Standard deviation of fund’s return 
SG
*  Stewardship grades 
TNH  Total number of holdings 
TR Turnover  ratio 
 
 
*These are categorical variables that have been assigned the appropriate numeric values. 
For example, ‘Excellent’ = 2.0 and ‘Fair’ = 1.0 for the five Stewardship components, 
while ‘A’ = 5 and ‘C’ = 3 for overall Stewardship grade. 